Separate visual representations in the planning and control of action - Response by Glover, Scott
1. Introduction
This article explores the evidence for a distinction in human
performance between the planning and on-line control of
actions. The planning–control model is put forth as an ex-
planation for human action production. A review of studies
from healthy subjects reveals differences between the vi-
sual and cognitive processes involved in planning and con-
trol. Brain imaging studies support the dichotomy, in that
planning in humans is linked with activity in a distributed
network including a visual representation in the inferior
parietal lobe (IPL), whereas control is linked with activity
in a separate network including a visual representation in
the superior parietal lobe (SPL). Studies of brain-damaged
populations also support the thesis that separate brain re-
gions support planning and control, respectively. A review
of evidence from brain and behavior studies suggests that
the planning–control model provides an account of the data
better than a model based on a distinction between per-
ception and action (Milner & Goodale 1995).
1.1. The planning–control framework
Woodworth (1899) was the first to propose a distinction be-
tween the planning and control stages of action, based on
his seminal study examining the use of visual feedback in
on-line control. Since Woodworth’s time, the distinction be-
tween planning and control has been the subject of much
investigation (e.g., Beggs & Howarth 1970; 1972; Carlton
1981; Fitts 1957; Keele 1968; Meyer et al. 1988; Vince
1948; see Elliott et al. 2001, for a review), and the existence
of these two stages has generally become accepted as an un-
derlying principle of human motor behavior (Jeannerod
1988; Rosenbaum 1991).
We have expanded on the planning and control distinc-
tion (Glover 2002; Glover & Dixon 2001a; 2001b; 2001c;
2002a; 2002b; Glover et al. 2004) to include separate visual
representations in each stage of action. In our “planning–
control” model, body movements are selected and executed
by means of two temporally overlapping systems. Prior to a
movement’s initiation, a motor program is selected based
on a broad range of cognitive factors coupled with a visual
“planning” representation in the IPL. During execution of
a movement, the action comes increasingly under the influ-
ence of a “control” system, using a limited but quickly up-
dated visual representation in the SPL, coupled with visual
and proprioceptive feedback, and an efference copy of the
movement plan.
1.1.1. The need for separate planning and control sys-
tems. In the planning–control model, the planning system
generally operates prior to a movement, whereas the con-
trol system operates during execution. The quasi-separa-
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tion of these two stages is hypothesized to reflect the need
of each system to fulfill distinct purposes. For planning, the
requirement is to select an adaptive motor program given
the environment and the goals of the actor. This will depend
on a number of factors related to the object of the action,
the surrounding environment, and the internal state of the
actor. Conversely, for control, the requirement is the mini-
mization of the spatial error of the movement. This requires
a relatively simple but quickly updated analysis of the spa-
tial characteristics of the target and actor. The next two sec-
tions expand on the characteristics of the planning and con-
trol systems.
1.1.2. The planning system. The planning system has the
goal of selecting and initiating an adaptive motor program,
given the environment and the goals of the actor. At a high
level, planning is responsible for such things as selecting an
appropriate target, or choosing to grasp an object in a cer-
tain manner. Beyond these selection processes, however,
planning also determines the initial kinematic parametriza-
tion of the movements, including their timing and velocity.
To fulfill its aims, planning must take into account a wide
variety of visual and cognitive information. This informa-
tion can be classified into four basic aspects of the environ-
ment and actor: (1) the spatial characteristics of the actor
and the target, including such things as the size, shape, and
orientation of the target, as well as the spatial relations be-
tween the actor and the target; (2) the nonspatial charac-
teristics of the target, including such things as its function,
weight, fragility, and the coefficient of friction of its sur-
faces; (3) the overarching goal(s) of the action; and (4) the
visual context surrounding the target. This information is
integrated with memories of past experiences (cf. Rosen-
baum et al. 1995). Table 1 lists object characteristics im-
portant for action as belonging to either the spatial or non-
spatial class, as well as the movement parameters most
dependent on each characteristic. The position of the ef-
fector is always considered to be a spatial characteristic.
It is important to point out that nonspatial object char-
acteristics are not entirely visual. That is, whereas the spa-
tial characteristics of objects tend to be geometric proper-
ties that can be gleaned from low-level visual processes
alone, the nonspatial characteristics invariably necessitate
reference to stored memories. For example, knowing that
a tomato is more fragile than an apple requires that each be
identified and that these properties be called up from mem-
ory. The identification process may require the incorpora-
tion of spatial information, such as the target’s shape and
size, with other information such as color. Similarly, know-
ing that an iron bar is heavier than a wooden bar of the same
size requires not just being able to identify the material, but
also to judge the similarity in size of the two objects. Thus,
an integration of spatial characteristics with information
about an object’s identity is usually required to compute a
nonspatial characteristic. However, the reverse is not also
true: Nonspatial characteristics are not required to com-
pute spatial characteristics.
As mentioned, the planning system specifies the major-
ity of the macroscopic and microscopic aspects of the action
before initiation. Specifically, planning is responsible for:
selecting the target; for all movement parameters relating
to nonspatial target characteristics; for the initial determi-
nation of the movement parameters relating to spatial tar-
get characteristics (although these can be modified on-line
by the control system); for determining the timing of move-
ments (including reaction times, movement times, and ac-
celeration/velocity parameters); and for the selection of
macroscopic (i.e., postural) aspects of the movement.
The integration of such a broad range of information and
the computation of a broad range of movement parameters
by the planning system requires a relatively long processing
time. Further, these varied sources of information can in-
teract, sometimes interfering with the selection of adaptive
motor programs. For example, contextual figures can in-
duce visual illusions (Coren & Girgus 1978; Gregory 1968)
that will impact the computation of both spatial and non-
spatial target characteristics in the planning system. This
means that visual illusions will have large effects on spatial
parameters early in a movement, and large effects on non-
spatial parameters over the entire course of the movement.
Further, as planning relates closely to cognitive processes,
the planning representation will rely on and be subject to
interference from processes such as language and memory.
Again, interference effects of these variables will be evident
when they interact with the computation of characteristics
of the target. Further, because planning relies on a store of
memories of past experiences in selecting an appropriate
plan, it will be less able to plan precise movements when
the situation is unfamiliar, such as when a novel object is the
target, as compared to when the target is familiar or the
movement is well practiced. Finally, the interaction of plan-
ning with cognitive processes will result in planning being
at least somewhat susceptible to conscious influence.
The general operation of the planning system can be il-
lustrated with an everyday example. Imagine an actor with
the aim of satisfying his thirst. To achieve this goal, the plan-
ning system may select a reach-to-grasp movement di-
rected towards a glass on a shelf. It will first select a glass of
an appropriate size depending on how thirsty the actor is
(overarching goals). The action of grasping the glass will
serve the ultimate purpose of filling it with water and drink-
ing out of it (overarching goals). The planning system will
choose to grasp a thin glass with less force than a thick glass
because the former is more fragile (nonspatial characteris-
tics of the target). It will determine a path that will avoid
contacting obstacles along the way to the glass (visual con-
text). It will plan a fairly accurate movement towards the
glass, taking into account its position relative to the effec-
tor, its size, its shape, and so forth (spatial characteristics of
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Table 1. Spatial and nonspatial object characteristics
Spatial Most salient effect Basic reference
Orientation Hand orientation Jeannerod (1981)
Position Hand trajectory Jeannerod (1981)
Shape Hand shape Klatzky et al. (1995)
Size Grasping aperture Jeannerod (1984)
Velocity Hand trajectory Brenner et al. (1998)
Nonspatial Most salient effect Basic reference
Fragility Grasping force Klatzky et al. (1989)
Function Hand shape Klatzky et al. (1987)
Temperature Grasping force? —
Texture Movement time Fikes et al. (1994)
Weight Grasping/lifting force Gordon et al. (1991)
the actor and target). Finally, planning will time the move-
ment such that a sufficient period of time is available for the
control system to operate. When a motor program is se-
lected that satisfies these constraints, the planning system
will determine when to initiate the movement. Once the
movement has been selected and initiated, it will come in-
creasingly under the influence of the control system.
1.1.3. The control system. Whereas the planning system is
generally adept at selecting an appropriate motor program,
given the environment, the control system allows the added
benefit of monitoring and occasionally adjusting motor pro-
grams in flight. These adjustments are limited to the spatial
characteristics of the target, as these are the most likely to
change or to be erroneously planned. Specifically, spatial
errors may arise either from how the movement was
planned (e.g., from interference as a result of cognitive in-
fluences), or during execution of the plan (e.g., because of
noise in the neuromuscular system). Also, the spatial char-
acteristics of the target may change in unanticipated ways
(e.g., a fruit on a branch blowing in the wind). In contrast,
the nonspatial characteristics of the target (such as its
weight or function) are almost completely unlikely to
change after the movement is planned.
The vicissitudes of the spatial characteristics of the actor
and target, along with interference from cognitive or per-
ceptual variables, will make it difficult to always plan a spa-
tially accurate movement. Yet this is of little consequence
to the overall adaptiveness of the action. This is because the
ultimate success of the movement depends much more on
how accurate it is at its end, not on how accurate it was when
it was planned. In other words, errors in planning can still
be corrected given sufficient time; errors in control are
much more likely to cause the act to fail.
To ensure that the movement is spatially accurate, the
control system requires a quickly computed visual repre-
sentation. The speed of processing in this representation is
gained by limiting it to the spatial characteristics of the tar-
get. This control representation is coupled with visual feed-
back, proprioception, and efference copy (i.e., a “blueprint”
of the movement plan obtained from the planning system
prior to initiation). The limit of the control representation
to spatial characteristics naturally limits its influence to the
spatial parameters of the movement. These include such
things as grip aperture, hand trajectory, and hand orienta-
tion (see Table 1). As planning and control overlap in time,
the influence of control on the spatial parameters becomes
increasingly larger as the movement unfolds.
Being limited to the spatial characteristics of the actor
and target has the benefit of allowing for fast processing and
similarly fast on-line adjustments by the control system.
Further, the spatial analysis that takes place in the control
representation is immune to the interference of such vari-
ables as the visual context or cognitive processes. The in-
dependence of the control system from such cognitive
processes as goal formation and conscious perception also
means that control operates outside of conscious awareness
and influence.
The visual representation guiding control is transient in
nature. This allows for it to be quickly updated as a move-
ment unfolds, but it also means that its memory is of short
duration. When visual information regarding the effector or
target is removed either prior to or during a movement, the
control representation will begin to gradually decay over a
period of roughly two seconds (cf. Elliott & Madalena
1987). The decay of the control representation is gradual
rather than instantaneous, and during delay periods of less
than two seconds, a less dramatic reduction in the influence
of control will result (Westwood et al. 2001a). However,
when the delay is more than two seconds, the decay will be
nearly complete, and movements made after delays much
longer than two seconds will be executed entirely “as
planned” (i.e., without the benefit of on-line control).
Completing the above example of grasping a glass illus-
trates the operation of the control system. After the plan-
ning system has selected and initiated an appropriate move-
ment directed towards the glass, the control system will be
responsible for minimizing any spatial error in the move-
ment itself (spatial characteristics of the target and actor).
These might include the scaling of the hand to the size of
the glass or the orienting of the wrist to the appropriate an-
gle. Control will generally ignore any objects surrounding
the glass (visual context), the intention to use the glass to
drink from (overarching goals), and the fragility of the glass
(nonspatial characteristics of the target). Put simply, the
control system is focused on the on-line correction of the
spatial parameters of the action.
1.1.4. The time course of planning and control. As men-
tioned above, the two stages of action are temporally over-
lapping (cf. Desmurget & Grafton 2000; Wolpert &
Ghahramani 2000; Wolpert et al. 1995; but see Crossman
& Goodeve 1983; Meyer et al. 1988). Prior to movement
initiation, planning is entirely responsible for the initial de-
termination of all movement parameters, and continues to
be highly influential early in the movement. As movements
progress, however, the influence of control on the spatial
parameters of the action increases. Such a gradual cross-
over between planning and control systems has the benefit
of allowing for smooth rather than jerky corrections (cf.
Wolpert & Ghahramani 2000).
As planning is generally operative early in a movement
and control late in a movement, the influence of each will
rise and fall as the movement unfolds. For example, peak
grip acceleration, a size-dependent parameter that occurs
at roughly 35% of movement duration (Jakobson &
Goodale 1991; Jeannerod 1984), will reflect planning more
than control. In contrast, maximum grip aperture, a size-
dependent parameter that occurs at roughly 70% of move-
ment duration (Jakobson & Goodale 1991; Jeannerod
1984) will reflect control more than planning. Similar ap-
plications can be made to other parameters dependent on
spatial characteristics: The orientation of the hand early in
a reach should reflect mainly planning, late in a reach it
should reflect mainly control, and so forth.
Because control relies to a significant degree on visual
and proprioceptive feedback loops, the more time in which
these loops can operate, the greater the influence control
will exert. That is, whenever actions take longer or shorter
than a stereotypical reach-to-grasp movement, the influ-
ence of control will be extended or shortened, respectively.
In long-duration movements such as manual tracking or
catching a long fly ball, for example, almost the entire move-
ment will be under the influence of control. In contrast, for
short-duration movements such as keyboarding, practically
the entire movement will be executed as planned.
The planning–control model can also be applied to more
complex and continuous movements, such as playing tennis
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or running over rough terrain. In these movement se-
quences, planning and control processes would alternate
with each other in succession. For example, the intention
to swing at a ball in tennis and the initial parametrization of
the muscle contractions underlying the swing will be pre-
planned, whereas the execution of the swing will be con-
trolled on-line. The ensuing movement of rushing towards
the net to anticipate the opponent’s return will require a dif-
ferent set of muscle movements, and a new plan. The plan-
ning of this action may begin even while the control process
is monitoring and adjusting the initial swing at the ball. In
this way, the planning system can use the times in which
control is operating to select and parametrize the next
movement in the sequence.
Running over rough terrain would similarly engage both
planning and control mechanisms. Whereas each step or se-
ries of steps could be preplanned, the execution of the steps
would be controlled on-line. Given the difficult nature of
the task, and the need to make adjustments based on unan-
ticipated events (such as stepping on a rock that throws the
actor off balance), such a task would most likely tax the con-
trol system quite heavily. Generally speaking, the more the
outcome of a given movement or series of movements is
predictable, the more it will rely on planning and the less
on control. Conversely, when the consequences of move-
ments are unpredictable, or when unanticipated forces act
on the body or target, planning will give way more and more
to control processes.
1.1.5. Limitations of the planning–control model. The
planning–control model is designed to predict and explain
body movements. It is not meant to generalize to eye move-
ments. This limitation is necessary because of the very dif-
ferent constraints that apply to each type of movement. For
example, body movements involve complex physical transi-
tions through three-dimensional space. These transitions re-
quire consideration of objects in the visual context as poten-
tial obstacles. Conversely, eye movements involve relatively
simple (in terms of muscle activations) rotations of the eyes
in the orbits in which collisions with the visual context are ex-
tremely unlikely, if not impossible. Because of these differ-
ent constraints, the planning–control model is limited to
movements of the body, although how eye and body move-
ments are coordinated is undoubtedly an important issue.
1.2. Neural components of planning and control
In the planning–control model, the two stages of action uti-
lize distinct neural networks in the human brain. Planning
involves the use of a visual representation located in the
IPL, coupled with motor and related cognitive processes in
the frontal lobes and basal ganglia. Control, on the other
hand, involves a visual representation located in the SPL,
coupled with motor processes in the cerebellum.
1.2.1. Evolution of the parietal lobes and a greater sepa-
ration of planning and control in humans. The evolution-
ary divergence of humans and monkeys has coincided with
a significant relative enlargement of the parietal lobes in
humans (Fig. 1). According to the planning–control model,
this expansion has allowed humans to integrate a vast array
of visual and cognitive information into an action plan.
While both planning and control appear to exist (though not
necessarily together) in the IPL of monkeys, I contend that
in humans planning is largely the province of the phyloge-
netically newer cortex in the IPL, whereas control is largely
the province of the phylogenetically older SPL.
The role of the human IPL in action planning may have
arisen quite recently in evolution and may be manifest in
the uniquely human population lateralization in hand pref-
erence (Hacean & Ajuriaguerra 1964; Harris 1993; Hop-
kins 1996). This human hand preference may have evolved
from the need to have at least one highly coordinated limb
that could accomplish fine unimanual manipulatory acts.
1.2.2. Distinct neural systems subserving planning and
control. Figure 2 represents a schematic of the neural bases
of planning and control. Prior to a plan being formed, visual
input travels to the IPL via the temporal lobe and a “third”
visual stream (Boussaoud et al. 1990). The temporal lobe
input includes both the spatial (e.g., size, shape, orienta-
tion) and nonspatial (e.g., weight, function, fragility) char-
acteristics of a target, as well as the visual context sur-
rounding the target (it is less clear what the third stream
contributes). Information relating to the overarching goals
of the action is provided by the frontal lobes, and the frontal
lobes also exert executive control (i.e., they are heavily in-
volved in selecting the target, and in deciding “what” to do
as well as “how” to do it). The visual and cognitive infor-
mation used in planning is integrated with proprioceptive
input from somatosensory association areas in the selection
of an appropriate motor plan. Simple movements such as
reaching and grasping tend to rely more on the IPL for
movement selection and parametrization. Complex move-
ment sequences rely more heavily on frontal lobe sequenc-
ing and timing mechanisms.
After a movement has been planned, an efference copy
of the plan is forwarded to the SPL and cerebellum. This
efference copy represents a “blueprint” of an upcoming ac-
tion. Once the action is initiated, the control regions begin
to integrate visual and proprioceptive feedback with the ef-
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Figure 1. Comparison of the human (top) and macaque (bot-
tom) brains. Cortical surfaces of the left hemispheres of both
species are shown. Note the large area of expansion within the
parietal lobes of the human brain compared to the monkey. La-
beled in the figure of the human brain are the two regions of the
parietal lobe unique to humans, the supramarginal and angular
gyri. Not to scale.
ference copy to monitor and, if need be, adjust the move-
ment in flight. Monitoring of the body likely involves the
SPL more heavily than the cerebellum. Comparing the
movement with the motor plan likely involves the cerebel-
lum more heavily than the SPL.
1.3. Comparing the planning–control model to other
models of action
Although the distinction between planning and control
stages of action has a long history (cf. Fitts 1957; Keele &
Posner 1968; Meyer et al. 1988; Woodworth 1899), the
planning–control model has several features that make it
unique among these and other models of motor control
(e.g., Arbib 1981; Desmurget & Grafton 2000; Jeannerod
1988; Milner & Goodale 1995; Wolpert & Gharamani
2000). First and foremost, only the planning–control model
postulates separate visual representations underlying the
two stages of action. Even other models that include plan-
ning and control stages make no such distinction (e.g.,
Desmurget & Grafton 2000; Jeannerod 1988; Wolpert &
Gharamani 2000; Woodworth 1899). In pursuance of this,
only the planning–control model assigns the inferior and
superior aspects of the parietal lobes to their specific roles
in computing these visual representations. Second, the
planning–control model makes no specific distinction be-
tween the information used during reaching versus grasp-
ing (as was central to Jeannerod 1988). Third, in assuming
a gradual rather than discrete crossover between the two
stages of action, the planning–control model differs from at
least some (e.g., Crossman & Goodeve 1983; Keele & Pos-
ner 1968; Woodworth 1899) models of motor control that
assume that control can only begin when feedback loops
have had time to close. Similarly to Wolpert et al. (1995; see
also Desmurget & Grafton, 2000; Wolpert & Gharamani
2000), the planning–control model suggests that efference
copy may be used to adjust movements from any time after
initiation.
Throughout the remainder of this article, the planning–
control model is contrasted mainly with the perception–ac-
tion model (Goodale & Milner 1992; Milner & Goodale
1995). This is done partly for the sake of brevity, and partly
because the two models are the most readily comparable.
The three main differences between these models can be
summarized as follows. First, in the planning–control
model, the two stages of action utilize distinct visual repre-
sentations in the IPL and SPL, respectively. Conversely, in
the perception–action model, both planning and control
mainly utilize representations in the SPL, although certain
classes of stored perceptual information may be imported
from the “ventral” stream (see e.g., Haffenden & Goodale
2000; Milner & Goodale 1995), and the IPL “third” stream
is said to play an important role in spatio-cognitive opera-
tions (Milner & Goodale 1995).
Second, the distinct representations in the planning–
control model result in interactions between cognitive and
visual information in planning but not control, whereas the
perception–action model suggests that vision for action
should generally be immune to cognitive influences. In par-
ticular, the perception–action model suggests that parame-
ters of movement dependent on the spatial characteristics
of the target will be both planned and controlled indepen-
dently of cognitive and perceptual influences.
Third, whereas both models assume a role of nondorsal
stream visual areas in target selection, and whereas the per-
ception–action model also holds that some action planning
processes require an “interaction” between streams, only
the planning–control model assumes that the IPL is in-
volved in the kinematic parametrization of all movements,
not just those that require information regarding nonspatial
target characteristics.
It will be seen in the ensuing review that the explanations
of the planning–control and perception–action models of-
ten conflict for findings from both experimental psychology
and neuroscience. For one thing, each predicts different ef-
fects of visual illusions and semantics on behavior. For an-
other, each predicts different patterns of brain activations
in imaging experiments. Finally, each predicts different
patterns of behavior following brain damage to specific re-
gions. It will be seen that where these conflicts exist, the
planning–control model provides an account of the evi-
dence superior to that of the perception–action model.
2. Evidence for planning and control in healthy
subjects
There is much to support the planning–control distinction
in healthy subjects. Specifically, available evidence agrees
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Figure 2. Schematic of the planning–control model showing the
hypothesized connectivity and functions of the human visuomo-
tor, cognitive, and somatosensory regions involved in action plan-
ning and control. Connections between early visual regions, and
between visual and cerebellar regions are putative human homo-
logues of connections in the macaque brain (Boussaoud et al.
1990; Glickstein 2000; Mishkin et al. 1983). Connections beyond
the termination of the two streams are based on common activa-
tion (see sect. 3).
with the notion that planning is a relatively slow process that
is sensitive to both spatial (e.g., size, shape, orientation) and
nonspatial (e.g., function, weight, fragility) visual informa-
tion, as well as cognitive (e.g., goals, semantics) and per-
ceptual (e.g., visual illusions) factors. The data also support
the idea that control is a relatively fast process focused on
the spatial characteristics of the target and actor, relying on
visual and proprioceptive feedback, along with efference
copy. Critically, the data from visual illusion and semantic
interference effects on planning, but not control, are much
more consistent with the planning–control model than with
the perception–action model.
2.1. Planning considers overarching action goals
Marteniuk et al. (1987) provided the classic example of how
planning incorporates overarching action goals into an ac-
tion plan. In this study, participants had to reach for and
grasp a chip in one of two conditions. In one condition, par-
ticipants were instructed to place the chip into a small hole,
whereas in another condition, participants were instructed
to toss the chip into a large cup. Marteniuk et al. found that,
when the goal was to “place” the chip, the requirement for
a much more precise movement was reflected in longer
movement times with extended decelerations, compared to
when the goal was to “toss” the chip. This result supports
the idea that planning incorporates overarching goals into
immediate movements. Similar results have been obtained
in other studies involving different types of goal specifica-
tions (e.g., Gentilucci et al. 1997b; Haggard 1998), and have
also occurred when the overarching goal was two or more
steps away (Rosenbaum et al. 1992).
2.2. Movement times are largely determined by the
planning system
Fitts (1957) observed that speeded pointing movements di-
rected towards targets that were difficult to hit took longer
than movements directed towards targets that were easy to
hit. In the planning–control framework, this speed–accu-
racy trade-off (“Fitts’ Law” as it is commonly known) ex-
emplifies how the planning system strategically accommo-
dates the limitations of the motor system by adjusting the
timing parameters of a movement. When the target is small
and/or distant, planning processes are more apt to result in
a large error, and control processes will benefit from having
more time to correct the error. In the planning–control
framework, planning is hypothesized to slow down move-
ments made towards “hard” targets to allow the control sys-
tem more time to operate.
Fitts’ aiming task has since been extensively investigated
and evaluated (e.g., Beggs & Howarth 1972; Carlton 1981;
Crossman & Goodeve 1983; Hay & Beaubaton 1986; Wal-
lace & Newell 1983). Many of these studies have found that
the availability of visual feedback has a positive influence on
movement accuracy, leading to a corresponding reduction
in movement times, compared to when visual feedback is
unavailable. The slowing of movements under conditions of
reduced or absent visual feedback seems to reflect ad-
vanced planning related to the need to account for the dif-
ficulty of an upcoming movement (cf. Jeannerod 1988).
The idea that planning is responsible for movement
times is controversial. A competing explanation of Fitts’
Law is that increased movement times reflect control more
than planning (e.g., Crossman & Goodeve 1983; Meyer et
al. 1988; see also Plamondon & Alimi 1997). This explana-
tion is based on the fact that longer movements tend to re-
sult almost entirely from an increase in the amount of time
spent in deceleration. Indeed, it is clear that the lengthen-
ing of movement deceleration can either be preplanned or
reflect the need for on-line adjustments that add to the time
required to execute the movement (e.g., Paulignan et al.
1991a). It is important to reiterate here that in the planning-
control framework, effects observed at or near the end of
the movement do not necessarily reflect control processes
alone, or at all. Just as grip force and other weight-related
parameters reflect planning but not control, I suggest that
whereas movement time can be extended during control
under conditions such as target perturbations, in those
cases such extensions may occur as a by-product of the ad-
justments themselves. Conversely, under most “natural”
circumstances (e.g., when the target remains stationary),
movement times mainly reflect processes that go on before
movement initiation (i.e., during planning).
2.3. Planning considers both spatial and nonspatial
target characteristics
It has often been shown that parametrization related to the
spatial characteristics of the target is evident well before the
movement is complete. For example, the opening and clos-
ing of the thumb-finger grip aperture in grasping an object
correlates with the size of the target well before the target
is contacted (Jakobson & Goodale 1991; Jeannerod 1984).
This early scaling has been observed for many other spatial
parameters as well, including velocity/acceleration (Gen-
tilucci et al. 1997b; Klatzky et al. 1995), hand shaping
(Klatzky et al. 1995), and hand orientation (Desmurget et
al. 1995; 1996; Jeannerod 1981).
It has also been shown that planning considers the non-
spatial characteristics of the target. For example, the weight
of an object affects the amount of force used to grasp and
lift it (Gordon et al. 1991). The coefficient of friction of an
object’s surface affects the velocity of the reach (Fikes et al.
1994; Fleming et al. 2002). Other examples of planning uti-
lizing nonspatial target characteristics are available from
everyday observation. For example, people normally ac-
knowledge the function of tools by grasping them by the
handle, as they generally avoid contacting hot or sharp sur-
faces, and so forth.
2.4. Control considers only the spatial characteristics of
the target
In contrast to the large number of variables that are hy-
pothesized to affect planning, the planning–control model
predicts that the visual information used during control will
be focused on only the spatial characteristics of the target.
Specifically, control will rely on both feedback (visual and
proprioceptive) and feedforward (i.e., efference copy)
mechanisms to monitor and adjust movements on-line.
There is abundant evidence that these mechanisms con-
tribute to on-line control.
2.4.1. Fast visual feedback loops in control. Woodworth
(1899) was the first to study the use of visual feedback in
on-line control. Woodworth reported that when partici-
pants drew lines at a rate of 400 msec per line or faster, the
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accuracy of the drawings was worse than if the lines were
drawn at slower rates. Further, if the same task was done
with eyes closed, participants’ performance at all speeds
was just as poor as when the task was done quickly with eyes
open.
More recent studies have shown that visual feedback can
operate much faster than the 400 msec estimate offered by
Woodworth. For example, Elliott & Allard (1985) observed
a time frame of 170 msec in which visual feedback mecha-
nisms could operate in a study of visuomotor adaptation to
distortion caused by wearing prism goggles. Zelaznik et al.
(1983) showed that when subjects were aware of whether
or not visual feedback would be available, visual feedback
aided in the accuracy of pointing movements in as little as
120 msec (see also Carlton 1981).
2.4.2. Fast proprioceptive feedback loops in control. The
importance of proprioception in action is well documented.
When proprioception is lacking as a result of pathology of
the brain or peripheral nerves, accuracy is reduced (Gen-
tilucci et al. 1994; Jackson et al. 2000; Jeannerod et al. 1984;
Lee & Tatton 1975; Sainburg et al. 1993). On-line correc-
tions of actions based on proprioceptive feedback have
been observed to take place in as little as 50–100 msec
(Craggo et al. 1976; Evarts & Vaughn 1978; Lee & Tatton
1975; Smeets et al. 1990).
Time frames of less than 150 msec in which feedback
mechanisms can operate are markedly less than reaction
times to initiate a movement, which Stark (1968) estimated
to be at least 250 msec (cf. Jeannerod 1988). These findings
suggest that the planning and control of movements are
separate processes. Planning appears to be a slower, more
deliberate process in which a motor program is selected and
initiated, whereas on-line control is much faster and more
adaptable.
2.4.3. Use of efference copy in control. Von Helmholtz
(1866) was the first to postulate the existence of efference
copies (“blueprints” of the motor plan forwarded to control
mechanisms). Although von Helmholtz was concerned with
the dissemination of information regarding upcoming eye
movements, it appears that the brain also uses efference
copies to control body movements.
The use of efference copy in control is evident in studies
in which participants’ ability to localize unseen body parts
was tested. When the participant actively moved the arm
prior to localization, the ability to localize the arm with the
other hand was relatively intact. In contrast, when the ex-
perimenter moved the arm, localization was relatively poor
(Eklund 1972; Jones 1974; Paillard & Brouchon 1968).
Neurological support for the existence of an efference copy
in reaching was found by Bard et al. (1999; see also
Duhamel et al. 1992). Bard et al. observed that a deaffer-
ented patient was able to partly accommodate changes in a
target’s position without the benefit of visual or proprio-
ceptive feedback. As visual and proprioceptive feedback
were denied this patient, any on-line adjustments must of
necessity have relied on efference copy.
2.4.4. The perturbation paradigm. The perturbation para-
digm involves suddenly changing a characteristic of the tar-
get, typically coincident with the onset of the movement
(e.g., Georgopoulos et al. 1981; Soechting & Lacquaniti
1983; for a complete review see Desmurget et al. 1998). Ac-
cording to the planning–control model, on-line adjust-
ments to perturbations of the spatial characteristics of the
target should occur relatively quickly, whereas on-line ad-
justments to nonspatial perturbations should take much
longer, if they occur at all. For example, the motor system
should adjust the grip aperture quickly to any change in the
size of the target that occurs after movement initiation, as
grip aperture relies on size (a spatial characteristic). How-
ever, the motor system should not be able to make a fast
change to the force used in lifting the object, as this relies
on a new computation of weight (a nonspatial characteris-
tic).
Many studies have demonstrated the ability of the con-
trol system to adjust to changes in the spatial characteristics
of the target. For example, Paulignan et al. (1991b) studied
the ability of the motor system to accommodate a change in
object location that coincided with movement initiation.
Paulignan et al. (1991b) placed three dowels on a table. By
manipulating the lighting of the dowels, they were able to
create the impression that the target had changed location
on some trials. Paulignan et al. (1991b) found that the ac-
celeration profiles of the participants changed only 100
msec after the appearance of the new target. Similar short
time-frames have been found for reactions to perturbations
of the target’s orientation (Desmurget & Prablanc 1997;
Desmurget et al. 1995; 1996), another spatial characteris-
tic.
Paulignan et al. (1991a) studied the effects of a size per-
turbation on hand shaping in a thumb and finger grasp of a
dowel. They observed that it took upwards of 300 msec for
the finger movements used in grasping to be affected by a
change in target size. However, a similar study by Castiello
et al. (1993) showed that hand shaping could respond to a
size perturbation in as little as 170 msec. The Castiello et
al. study differed from Paulignan et al. (1991a) in that the
participants were free to use as many fingers as desired to
grasp the object; in the latter study participants were re-
quired to use the thumb and index finger only, an unnatural
grasping pattern for a large object.
Castiello et al. (1998) modified the perturbation para-
digm to introduce a simultaneous perturbation of size and
location. Such a double-perturbation paradigm would also
allow one to change the identity of the target (e.g., substi-
tuting a fragile target for a hard one). According to the plan-
ning–control model, it ought to take longer to accommo-
date the change in fragility by adjusting the force applied in
grasping the object than to accommodate a change in loca-
tion or size by adjusting the trajectory of the reach or the
opening of the hand. It is notable, however, that Castiello
et al. (1998) found relatively long adjustment times of grip
aperture to the perturbation, suggesting that control
processes can be slowed if more than one spatial charac-
teristic is changed simultaneously.
2.5. Consciousness in planning and control
According to the planning–control model, only planning
should be susceptible to conscious influence. Indeed, it is
intuitively obvious that at least some degree of conscious
control can be exerted on many aspects of planning. For ex-
ample, one will typically choose one’s targets consciously;
on a lower level, one may speed up one’s movements if in a
hurry, or change posture consciously, and so forth. Behav-
ioral evidence that conscious systems can influence plan-
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ning comes from studies showing that participants are 
consciously aware of the kinds of interactions that can sen-
sibly be had with objects (Klatzky et al. 1987; 1989). In con-
trast to this, several studies have suggested that mecha-
nisms responsible for on-line control operate outside of
conscious awareness and influence (e.g., Castiello & Jean-
nerod 1991; Gentilucci et al. 1995; Goodale et al. 1986;
Pisella et al. 2000; Prablanc & Martin 1992; Savelsbergh et
al. 1991).
2.5.1. Control is immune to saccadic suppression. The
ability of our perceptual system to disregard motion of im-
ages on the retina during eye movements has the side ef-
fect of making it very difficult for us to notice small dis-
placements that occur in the visual world during a saccade.
Often objects can be moved several degrees of visual angle
without the displacement being noticed consciously. This
phenomenon is known as saccadic suppression (see
Chekaluk & Llewelynn 1992, for a review). Despite the in-
accessibility of these changes to conscious awareness, the
motor system is able to accommodate them without diffi-
culty (Goodale et al. 1986; Hallett & Lightstone 1976;
Goodale et al. (1986) had participants point to a target
that, in some conditions, moved during an initial saccade
to its location. Although participants were unable to say
whether or not the target had moved during the saccade,
they nonetheless accurately adjusted their saccades and
pointing movements towards the target without vision of
the moving hand. It appeared that the control mecha-
nisms had adjusted to a change in the target’s location that
had remained consciously inaccessible. The fact that the
adjustment occurred during the movement suggests that
on-line control mechanisms were almost, if not entirely,
responsible for the adjustment. In contrast, there is no ev-
idence that planning processes play any role in the ac-
commodation of the motor system to saccadic suppres-
sion.
2.5.2. Control is involuntary and unconscious. A study by
Pisella et al. (2000) examined whether on-line adjustments
could be subject to voluntary, conscious intervention. In
their study, participants were required to make fast move-
ments to targets that either remained stationary or jumped
to a new location. In one condition, participants were in-
structed to correct their movements on-line when the tar-
get jumped. In another condition, participants were in-
structed to stop their movement when they noticed the
target jump.
Pisella et al. found that when movements were fast (i.e.,
movement times of less than 250 msec), participants were
often unable to avoid correcting their movements when the
target jumped, even when they were explicitly instructed to
stop the movement rather than correct it. This result sug-
gested that fast control mechanisms operate outside of con-
scious control. Notably, Pisella et al. also found that an op-
tic ataxic was impaired at making fast corrections even
when instructed to do so, an important piece of evidence
that I will return to in section 4.
2.6. Context-induced optical illusions and action
Studies of context-induced visual illusions and action offer
an excellent opportunity to test the predictions of the plan-
ning–control model, because they involve the impact of a
factor predicted to influence planning (the visual context)
on the classes of visual information used by planning (spa-
tial and nonspatial characteristics) as well as control (spatial
characteristics). As illusions can affect both of these classes
of visual information, the planning–control model can be
used to make clear predictions as to how and when visual
illusions should affect actions. Further, these predictions
often conflict with those of the perception–action model,
allowing for direct empirical tests of the two models.
2.6.1. Predictions of the planning–control and percep-
tion–action models. According to the planning–control
model, planning (which incorporates the context) should be
affected by illusions induced by the surrounding visual con-
text, whereas control (which ignores the context) should be
unaffected (for other reviews and viewpoints, see Bruno
2001; Carey 2001; Franz 2001). This means that illusion ef-
fects on all aspects of actions should be large early in the
movements, but effects on parameters of actions based on
the spatial characteristics of the target (e.g., size, distance,
orientation) should progressively decrease as the move-
ments unfold. Because the control representation is limited
to the spatial characteristics of the target over a time-frame
of two seconds, the on-line correction of illusion effects on
action should only occur when visual information is cur-
rently or recently available. In contrast, illusion effects on
nonspatial target characteristics should not be corrected
on-line, nor should illusion effects on spatial characteristics
when a delay of two seconds or more is imposed. Finally,
because control relies on both visual and proprioceptive
feedback as well as efference copy, removal of any one of
these sources of information ought to result in larger illu-
sion effects in the control stage of movements than when all
of these sources of information are available to the control
system.
The predictions of the planning–control model can be
contrasted with those of the perception–action model
(Goodale & Milner 1992; Milner & Goodale 1995). In the
latter model, a single visual representation is said to sub-
serve actions, whereas a separate representation subserves
perceptions. According to the perception–action model,
actions should generally be less susceptible to illusions than
are perceptions (with some notable exceptions, such as
movements made under delayed conditions – see Milner &
Goodale 1995).
Critical to the ensuing review is the contrast between the
planning–control model, which predicts dissociations in
the effects of illusions on planning versus control, and the
perception–action model, which predicts no such dissocia-
tions. In contrast, in the perception–action model, the ef-
fects of visual illusions should be consistent (either small or
large) throughout the movement. Further, the perception–
action model predicts that the effects of illusions should not
depend on the availability of visual feedback during control.
Table 2 summarizes the literature on visual illusions and
body movements. (For studies examining the effects of il-
lusions on eye movements, see, e.g., Binsted & Elliott 1999;
Binsted et al. 2001; Mack et al. 1985; Wong & Mack 1981.)
It is clear from Table 2 that parameters determined by plan-
ning (e.g., lifting force, posture choice, movement time,
grip acceleration) tend to exhibit large illusion effects,
whereas those heavily influenced by control (e.g., maxi-
mum grip aperture, pointing accuracy, final hand orienta-
tion) tend to exhibit small or nonsignificant illusion effects.
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For example, when a delay of two seconds or more is im-
posed between the offset of the visual stimulus and the ini-
tiation of the movement, illusion effects are larger than
when no delay is imposed, which is consistent with the idea
that the control representation has decayed during the de-
lay, and the index of action is measuring planning processes
only (this result is also consistent with the perception–ac-
tion model). More critically, when illusion effects on a spa-
tial parameter are compared at different times in the move-
ments, the effects tend to be larger early in the movements
than later.
2.6.2. Illusions affect planning. Many findings have been
consistent with the idea that illusions affect planning. For
example, van Donkelaar (1999) reported that the Titchener
(or Ebbinghaus) size-contrast illusion affected movement
times, but not the accuracy of pointing movements. Van
Donkelaar (1999) had participants point to the center of a
target circle subject to the Titchener illusion as quickly and
accurately as possible. Whereas the accuracy and variable
error of the pointing movements were not affected by the
illusion, the movement times were affected. Consistent
with Fitts (1957), pointing to targets that appeared smaller
took longer than pointing to targets that appeared larger.
This occurred even though the targets were in fact identi-
cal in size. Assuming that movement times reflect the tim-
ing of actions and thus planning processes (as I suggested
in sect. 2.2), this study supported the idea that illusions af-
fect action planning. Further, others have also found effects
of illusions on movement times (Franz et al. 2001; Gen-
tilucci et al. 1996; Smeets & Brenner 1995a; but see Fischer
2001). These results are generally consistent with the no-
tion that illusions affect planning.
Brenner and Smeets (1996) and Jackson and Shaw
(2000) studied the effects of the Ponzo size illusion on vi-
suomotor estimates of weight. The Ponzo illusion results
when an object is placed on a background of radiating lines.
If the object is placed near the end of the background
where the lines originate, it appears larger than if it is placed
near the end where the lines are maximally spread. Bren-
ner and Smeets (1996) found a significant effect of the
Ponzo size illusion on lifting force (measured as the veloc-
ity with which the object was raised). Similarly, Jackson and
Shaw (2000) found that the Ponzo illusion affected grasp-
ing force (the force applied to the sides of the object in lift-
ing), another index of perceived weight. From these two
studies, it appears that illusions affect motor parameters re-
lated to object weight (a nonspatial target characteristic),
and that illusion effects on these parameters were not cor-
rected on-line.
2.6.3. Illusions do not affect on-line control. Aglioti et al.
(1995) measured the maximum grip aperture (distance be-
tween thumb and forefinger) as participants reached out to
pick up a thin disk surrounded by a Titchener illusion dis-
play. They found that the maximum grip aperture was less
affected by the Titchener illusion than were perceptual es-
timates of target size, the latter being measured using the
method of comparison. (For difficulties associated with
Aglioti et al.’s means of comparing perception and action,
see Franz et al. 2000; 2001; Pavani et al. 1999.) However,
maximum grip aperture was still affected by the illusion to
some extent, suggesting that the context had played some
role in the shaping of the hand. Haffenden and Goodale
(1998; Haffenden et al. 2001) also showed that maximum
grip aperture was less affected by the Titchener illusion
than perceptions when participants were denied visual
feedback of the moving hand. Although these authors ar-
gued that maximum grip aperture represented an index of
action planning, this parameter occurs well into the control
phase of the movement and allows ample time in which on-
line corrections could take place. As such, this result is con-
sistent with both the planning–control and perception–ac-
tion models.
2.6.4. Availability of visual feedback reduces illusion ef-
fects. One important test of the planning–control and per-
ception–action models is that only the planning–control
model predicts a reduction of illusion effects when visual
feedback is available. In contrast, the perception–action
model argues that illusion effects should be just as small
during planning as they are during control, and thus the size
of the effect should not depend on whether visual feedback
is available during on-line control.
Gentilucci et al. (1996) demonstrated the influence of vi-
sual feedback on pointing movements subject to the
Muller-Lyer illusion. Participants were asked to start with
their finger at one end of a Muller-Lyer shaft and move it
to the other end. Gentilucci et al. (1996) manipulated the
amount of visual feedback available to participants, ranging
from full feedback of the moving hand and target, to a no-
feedback condition with a five-second delay between lights
out and movement initiation. Whereas only small effects of
the illusion on accuracy were found in the full visual feed-
back condition, the effects of the illusion increased contin-
uously over each condition in which less (or less recent) vi-
sual feedback was available. Similar interactions between
illusion effects and the availability of visual feedback have
been observed in other studies as well (Glover & Dixon
2001c; 2002a; Westwood et al. 2000a; 2000b).
These results suggested that visual feedback could play a
significant role in reducing illusion effects on action. This is
consistent with the planning–control model, in which visual
feedback contributes to the on-line correction of illusion ef-
fects. It is not consistent, however, with the perception–ac-
tion model, in which illusion effects should be small on both
planning and control, whether or not visual feedback is
available during the movement itself.
2.6.5. Delays increase illusion effects. It is clear from sev-
eral studies (Bridgeman et al. 1997; Gentilucci et al. 1996;
Westwood et al. 2001b) that illusion effects on action in-
crease when a delay of two seconds or more is imposed be-
tween offset of the visual stimulus and initiation of the
movement. This is consistent with the notion that the con-
trol representation has decayed in the interval, and that on-
line corrections are absent under these conditions. Accord-
ing to the planning–control model, illusion effects after
delays of two seconds or more reflect the influence of plan-
ning only, as control is unable to operate after delays. Note
however that these results are also consistent with the per-
ception–action model, as delays are said to result in a decay
of the action representation and the use of a perceptual rep-
resentation.
Another explanation may also be considered here. Franz
et al. (2000; 2001; Franz 2001) have argued that both per-
ception and action utilize a single visual representation, and
that both are equally affected by illusions. On this account,
Glover: Separate visual representations in the planning and control of action
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2004) 27:1 11
Glover: Separate visual representations in the planning and control of action
12 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2004) 27:1
Table 2. Summary of the effects of context-induced optical illusions on actions
Visual Planning Effect Effect 
Illusion Measure feedback or control? n perception on action Reference
Roelef ’s  Pointing Acc. delay  P 10 2 deg. * Bridgeman et al. (1997)
(motion) (4 sec) * (7/9 subjects) Exp. 1
˝ Pointing Acc. no vision MC 10 2 deg. * Bridgeman et al. (1997)
* (5/10 subjects) Exp. 1
Titchener (size) MT full vision MP 6 — 20 msec (5.7) van Donkelaar (1999)
*
˝ MT full vision MP 11 0.3 mm minus 5 msec Fischer (2001)
* (18)
ns
˝ Grip Ap. @ no vision MP 15 2.1 mm (0.5) 1.9 mm (0.4) Glover & Dixon (2002a)
40% MT * * Exp. 2
˝ Grip Ap. @ full vision MP 11 — 1.5 mm (0.5) Glover & Dixon (2002a)
40% MT * Exp. 1
˝ Max. Grip Ap. no vision MC 18 2.4 mm (0.1) 1.4 mm (2.3) Haffenden & Goodale (1998)
* ns
˝ Max. Grip Ap. no vision MC 18 2.6 mm (0.3) 0.2 mm (0.4) Haffenden et al. (2001)
* ns
˝ Max. Grip Ap. no vision MC 26 1.5 mm (0.1) 1.5 mm (0.4) Franz et al. (2000)
* *
˝ Max. Grip Ap. full vision MC 14 2.5 mm (0.2) 2.1 mm (0.5) Aglioti et al. (1995)
* *
˝ Grip Ap. @ no vision MC 15 2.1 mm (0.5) 0.0 mm (0.4) Glover & Dixon (2002a)
100% MT * ns Exp. 2
˝ Grip Ap. @ full vision C 11 — 0.6 mm Glover & Dixon (2002a)
100% MT (0.3) Exp. 1
ns
Single contrast Max. Grip Ap. delay P 2.5 mm (0.5) 2.3 mm (0.7) Hu & Goodale (2000)
(size) (5 sec) * Exp. 1
˝ Max. Grip Ap. no vision MC 2.1 mm (0.4) 1 mm (0.7) Hu & Goodale (2000)
* ns Exp. 1
Ponzo (size) Lifting force full vision P 8 — * Brenner & Smeets (1996)
˝ Grip force full vision P 10 — 0.3 N Westwood et al. (2000b)
ns
˝ Grasping force full vision P 8 — 0.19 N Jackson & Shaw (2000)
*
˝ Max. Grip Ap. full vision MC 8 — 0.4 mm Brenner & Smeets (1996)
ns
˝ Max. Grip Ap. full vision MC 10 — 0.7 mm Westwood et al. (2000b)
ns
˝ Max. Grip Ap. full vision MC 8 — 0.1 mm Jackson & Shaw (2000)
ns
Parallel lines Max. Grip Ap. no vision MC 26 2.3 mm (0.3) 1.2 mm (0.3) Franz et al. (2001)
(size) * * Exp. 4
Muller-Lyer  Pointing Acc. delay (5 sec) P 8 — 11.2 mm Gentilucci et al. (1996)
(extent) *
˝ Max. Grip Ap. delay (3 sec) P 9 — 5.3 mm Westwood et al. (2000c)
*
˝ Max. Grip Ap. delay (2 sec) P 10 6.5 mm (0.7) 5.0 mm Westwood et al. (2001b)
* *
˝ MT delay (5 sec) P 8 — 47.3 msec Gentilucci et al. (1996)
˝ MT no vision P 8 — 10.2 msec Gentilucci et al. (1996)
˝ MT full vision P 8 — 16.4 msec Gentilucci et al. (1996)
˝ Max. Grip Ap. no vision P 6 6.7 mm 8.4 mm Westwood et al. (2000a)
Pantomime * *
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˝ Peak Grip Vel. delay (3 sec) P 9 — 28 mm/s Westwood et al. (2001b)
*
˝ Peak Grip Vel. no vision P 9 — 25 mm/s Westwood et al. (2001b)
*
˝ Peak Grip Vel. full vision P 9 — 12 mm/s Westwood et al. (2001b)
*
˝ Max. Grip Ap. monocular MP 14 12.8 mm 2.6 mm Otto-de Haart et al. (1999)
vision * *
˝ Max. Grip Ap. no vision MC 9 3.1 mm 4.8 mm Westwood et al. (2000c)
* *
˝ Pointing Acc. no vision MC 8 — 4.8 mm Gentilucci et al. (1996)
˝ Max. Grip Ap. full vision MC 9 — 2.1 mm Westwood et al. (2000c)
ns
˝ Max. Grip Ap. full vision MC 8 — 1.2 mm Daprati & Gentilucci (1997)
*
˝ Max. Grip Ap. full vision MC 16 2.0 mm (0.2) 3.4 mm (0.4) Franz et al. (2001)
* * Exp. 1
˝ Max. Grip Ap. full vision MC 10 6.6 mm 2.6 mm (1.0) Westwood et al. (2001b)
* *
˝ Max. Grip Ap. full vision MC 6 — 0.6 mm Westwood et al. (2000a)
ns
˝ Pointing Acc. full vision C 8 — 2.4 mm Gentilucci et al. (1996)
Velocity contrast RT full vision P 12 65 mm/s ~ 20 msec Smeets & Brenner (1995a)
(velocity) * * Exp. 3
˝ MT full vision P 12 65 mm/s ~ 20 msec Smeets & Brenner (1995a)
* * Exp. 3
˝ Striking Acc. full vision C 12 65 mm/s 9 mm Smeets & Brenner (1995a)
* ns Exp. 3
Tilt (orn.) Posture choice full vision P 10 2.0 deg (0.3) 1.9 deg. (0.7) Glover & Dixon (2001a)
* * Exp. 1
˝ Hand Orn. @ full vision MP 8 2.1 deg. (0.2) 7.8 deg. (3.1) Glover & Dixon (2001a)
MT 25% * * Exp. 2
˝ Hand Orn. @ no vision MP 10 — 2.7 deg. (0.3) Glover & Dixon (2001c)
50% MT *
˝ Hand Orn. @ no vision MC 10 — 1.4 deg. (0.2) Glover & Dixon (2001c)
100% MT *
˝ Hand Orn. full vision C 8 2.1 deg. (0.2) 0.8 deg. (1.2) Glover & Dixon (2001a)
@ 100% MT * ns Exp. 2
Simul. tilt (orn.) Posting Orn. no vision MC 12 8 deg. 6.8 deg. (0.8) Dyde & Milner (2002)
@ 100% MT (1.7) * Exp. 1
*
Rod in frame Hand Orn. @ no vision MC 12 5 deg. 0.2 mm Dyde & Milner (2002)
(orn.) 100% MT (1.8) (0.4) Exp. 2
* ns
Horizontal- Grip Ap. @ no vision P 23 8% 12% Vishton et al. (1999)
vertical 100% MT (1%) (6%) Exp. 4
pantomime * *
˝ Max. Grip Ap. no vision MC * ns Servos (2000)
Columns from left to right: the type of illusion; the measurement of action taken; the availability of visual feedback; whether the mea-
sure of action should reflect planning or on-line control; sample size; effect on perception (standard error), effect on action (standard
error), and reference. Acc.  accuracy; Max. Grip Ap.  maximum grip aperture; Peak Grip Vel.  peak grip velocity; Orn.  orien-
tation; P  planning only; MP  mainly planning; MC  mainly control; C  control only; -  perceptual effect not tested; N  New-
ton’s force; *  statistically significant at the p  0.05 level; ns  statistically nonsignificant. Notes: (1) In some cases standard errors and/
or significant tests were not reported or deducible. (2) Effects on Max. Grip Aperture are scaled to reflect the typical grip aperture-
target size correlation of 0.8 (Jeannerod 1988) at the time of MGA (cf. Franz et al. 2001; Glover & Dixon 2001a). All other data are as
reported in the studies or estimated from reported statistics or figures. (3) Max. Grip Aperture typically occurs at 60–75% of move-
ment duration (Jeannerod 1988).
Table 2. (continued)
Visual Planning Effect Effect 
Illusion Measure feedback or control? n perception on action Reference
apparently small illusion effects on action have arisen be-
cause of a failure to adequately match the attentional re-
quirements of the task. For example, Franz et al. (2000) ar-
gued that small effects of the Titchener illusion on
maximum grip aperture relative to perceptual judgments in
the Aglioti et al. (1995) study were a consequence of the
need to attend to only one of the Titchener displays in the
action task, but to both in the perception task. This hy-
pothesis is intriguing, but would not seem able to account
for differential effects on action and perception tasks 
when the two are adequately matched, as they are in most
studies of illusions and action reported in Table 2. Further,
this model would have to predict that illusion effects on 
perception would increase when delays are imposed, just 
as they do for actions. Evidence to contradict this hypoth-
esis has been found in a study comparing delay effects 
on pointing and perceptual judgments (Bradshaw & Watt 
2002).
2.6.6. Dynamic illusion effects in reaching. Although the
planning–control model provides a ready account of the
findings described above, we aimed to investigate illusion
effects on planning and control more directly (Glover &
Dixon 2001a). This was done using a task in which partici-
pants grasped a small bar placed at various orientations. We
manipulated the perceived orientation of the bar by plac-
ing the bar on a background grating that was misoriented
with respect to the participants’ sagittal plane. When the
grating was rotated ten degrees clockwise or counterclock-
wise from sagittal, participants’ perceptions of the bar’s ori-
entation were overestimated in the opposite direction. This
orientation illusion effect was found to be roughly two de-
grees in a perceptual task in which participants were re-
quired to align the bar with their sagittal planes.
In one experiment, we gave participants a choice be-
tween abducting or adducting their hand in picking up the
bar. Abducting the hand results in the thumb being placed
on the rightward edge of the bar (from the participant’s per-
spective), whereas adducting the hand results in the thumb
being placed on the leftward edge of the bar. It has been
shown that when an object is moved through a range of po-
sitions or orientations, participants’ choice of postures will
typically switch from one posture to another within a fairly
narrow portion of that range (Kelso et al. 1994; Rosenbaum
et al. 1990; 1992; Short & Cauraugh 1997; Stelmach et al.
1994). The question in this experiment was whether the ori-
entation illusion would affect the threshold at which par-
ticipants switched from one posture to another. Our as-
sumption was that the choice of postures would be made
during pre-movement planning, and although it would still
be possible to change the choice made once the reach was
underway, the costs would usually outweigh the benefits.
Thus, we reasoned that posture choice would provide a rel-
atively uncontaminated measure of the illusion’s effect on
planning.
We found that the choice of postures was affected by the
orientation illusion. The threshold for switching from a
hand-abducted to a hand-adducted posture was adjusted
approximately two degrees by the orientation illusion, an
effect roughly equivalent to the effect on perceptual judg-
ments. This finding supported the idea that macroscopic as-
pects of planning are affected by illusions.
In another experiment, we set out to test the planning–
control model more directly. Here, we had participants
again pick up the bar, but had them use a hand-abducted
(thumb-right) posture on every trial. The orientation of the
hand was measured throughout the movement using opti-
cal recording equipment. We observed that the orientation
of the hand was linked to the orientation of the bar, and this
was evident early in the reach, as has been found elsewhere
(Desmurget et al. 1995; 1996; Desmurget & Prablanc 1997;
Glover & Dixon 2001b; 2001c). More interesting was the
fact that the orientation illusion affected the orientation of
the hand. The effect of the illusion on the orientation of the
hand was large early in the reach, but decreased to near
zero as the hand approached the bar. This “dynamic illusion
effect” supported our prediction that participants would
correct for illusion effects in flight. Large effects early in the
movement presumably reflected the illusion’s influence on
planning, whereas continuously decreasing effects there-
after reflected the relative immunity of control.
It is difficult to accommodate the results of this study
within the perception–action framework, however. For one
reason, posture choice would seem to have to rely on an il-
lusory “perceptual” representation, even though the bar
and display were visible throughout each trial, and pre-
sumably enough information was present to select an ap-
propriate posture. For another, it would appear that in
reaching, the perceptual representation would have had to
subserve the initial planning of the reaches towards the bar,
whereas the action representation would have been re-
sponsible for the balance of the movements.
One study by Dyde and Milner (2002) looked at the ef-
fects of a simultaneous tilt illusion on “posting” behavior. In
this study, participants aimed a card towards a rectangular
figure drawn vertically on a background grating. Although
Dyde and Milner (2002) did not specifically analyze illusion
effects over time in this study, they did find a large effect of
the illusion on posting behavior at the end of the move-
ment. This result seems to contradict our own results using
a very similar illusion (Glover & Dixon 2001a; 2001b;
2001c), and Dyde and Milner interpreted their results as
suggesting that the orientation illusion arises at V1, thus af-
fecting both perception and action. Although this hypothe-
sis does not explain why we did not find similar effects at
the end of the movement in any of our experiments, an ex-
planation of the discrepancy between studies may be given.
It is possible that the discrepancies resulted from the use of
vertically-oriented targets by Dyde and Milner, whereas
ours ranged in orientation from 5 to 35 degrees. In their
study, the posting task may have included a strong demand
to “match” the tilted appearance of the target with the card;
in our study the orientation illusion was much less notice-
able and so this demand was not present.
2.6.7. Dynamic illusion effects in grasping. We have also
applied a similar kinematic analysis to the grip aperture in
a reach to a disk subject to the Titchener size illusion
(Glover & Dixon 2002a). The data in this study also sup-
ported the planning–control model. Illusion effects on grip
aperture were largest early in the reach and decreased as
the hand approached the target. Dynamic illusion effects
have also occurred when vision of the hand and target were
blocked during the reach (Glover & Dixon 2001c; 2002a),
suggesting that proprioceptive and efference mechanisms
can play a significant role in the on-line correction of illu-
sion effects.
The results of this study involving the Ebbinghaus illu-
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sion have been contentious, however. Danckert et al.
(2002) reanalyzed two of the experiments previously car-
ried out in the Goodale lab. Based on the reanalysis, they
suggested that there was no evidence for an illusion effect
at any time up to the point where maximum grip aperture
was reached (i.e., at roughly two-thirds of movement du-
ration), except for an effect in one experiment at the time
of maximum grip aperture. I have questioned this conclu-
sion, however, because there was no scaling of grip aper-
ture effects to the changing dependence of the grip aper-
ture on object size at different times during the reach
(Glover 2002). Such scaling is vital in any analysis of the ef-
fects of cognitive or perceptual variables effects on action
(for explanations, see, e.g., Franz et al. 2000; 2001; Glover
& Dixon 2001a; 2002b).
2.7. Semantics interfere with planning but not control
Gentilucci and his colleagues (Gentilucci & Gangitano
1998; Gentilucci et al. 2000a) recently demonstrated inter-
esting effects of semantics on actions. In these studies,
words were printed on objects and participants reached to
and grasped them. It was observed that the meanings of the
words printed on the objects affected the kinematics of the
participants’ movements directed towards those same ob-
jects. For example, Gentilucci et al. (2000a) observed that
the maximum grip aperture was larger for objects on which
the word “GRANDE” (“large”) had been printed than for
words on which had been printed “PICCOLO” (“small”).
This suggested that the motor system had been influenced
by the meanings of the words when a motor program was
selected. Effects were also observed for several other word
pairs, including (the Italian equivalents of) “long” and
“short,” “near” and “far,” and “high” and “low.” Gentilucci
and his colleagues interpreted these results within the
framework of models that argue for a close relationship be-
tween language and motor processes (e.g., Kimura 1979;
Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998).
We have recently extended the work of Gentilucci and
his colleagues to measure the effects of words on action
throughout the course of the movement (Glover & Dixon
2002b; Glover et al. 2004). In particular, we aimed to test
the predictions of the planning–control model with respect
to semantic effects. In the planning–control model, a cog-
nitive process such as semantics should affect the planning
of the movements, but not how they are controlled on-line.
Thus, a similar result should occur as occurred with visual
illusions: That is, there ought to be large effects of the words
early in the movements but continuously decreasing effects
as the hand approached the targets. And, in fact, these were
the exact results we obtained. In one study, we found that
participants had larger grip aperture early in the reach for
objects on which was printed the word “LARGE” than for
objects labeled “SMALL.” However, as with illusion effects
on action, these word effects faded as the hand approached
the targets (Glover & Dixon 2002b).
A similar result was obtained when we had subjects first
read a word, then grasp an object (Glover et al. 2004). In
this study, the words could represent either relatively large
objects (e.g., “APPLE,” “BASEBALL”) or relatively small
objects (e.g., “PEA,” “GRAPE”). Here, we observed that
the size of the object represented by the word had a large
effect on the grip apertures early in the reach. For exam-
ple, reading words such as “APPLE” led to larger grip aper-
tures than reading words such as “GRAPE.” Again, how-
ever, this effect faded as the hand approached the targets,
and participants were able to execute the grasps without
difficulty.
These “dynamic word effects” provide further support
for the planning–control model, but would be difficult to
incorporate within a perception–action model. In the latter
model, the motor system could presumably plan and exe-
cute the movement based simply on the relevant spatial
characteristics of the target alone, independent of seman-
tic processes. Conversely, if the perception–action model
were extended to include the supposition that semantics
could influence action by an interaction between percep-
tion and action systems, it would still have difficulty ex-
plaining why the words affected planning only and not con-
trol. In short, the effects of semantics on action seem to be
much more consistent with the planning–control model
than with the perception–action model.
2.8. Summary of studies on healthy participants
Studies of healthy participants have demonstrated the dis-
tinction between planning and control. Whereas planning
represents a process that is relatively slow and complex,
control mechanisms appear to be much more flexible and
faster, yet limited in scope. Planning selects an action based
on an integration of a broad range of visual and cognitive in-
formation. In contrast, control operates using a fast visual
representation limited to the spatial characteristics of the
target, coupled with visual and proprioceptive feedback, as
well as efference copy, in monitoring and adjusting move-
ments in flight.
Because planning incorporates the context surrounding
the target, it is affected by context-induced visual illusions.
Conversely, because the control representation excludes
the context, it is relatively immune to these same illusions.
This distinction is reflected in the pattern of illusion effects
on action. Whereas indices of planning are affected by illu-
sions, indices of control are much less affected, if at all. Crit-
ically, when measures of illusion effects on spatial parame-
ters are taken throughout the movement, the effects of the
illusion are large early in the reach, but decrease as the hand
approaches the target (Glover & Dixon 2001a; 2001b;
2001c; 2002a). Similar results have occurred for the effects
of semantics on action (Glover & Dixon 2002b; Glover et
al. 2004), also consistent with the notion that cognitive in-
fluences on planning are corrected on-line during control.
The results of these studies were much less consistent with
the perception–action model, however.
Future studies may be aimed at expanding and clarifying
the nature of the dissociations between planning and con-
trol. According to the planning–control model, these disso-
ciations should generally take the form of influences of
many visual and/or cognitive variables on planning, but a
lack of an influence of these same variables on control. For
example, the planning–control model predicts that the pat-
tern of effects of semantics on action ought to be identical
to the pattern of illusion effects (i.e., large effects on indices
of planning, small or nonexistent effects on indices of con-
trol). More generally, nonspatial characteristics of the tar-
get, conscious awareness, visual context, memory processes,
and overarching goals should all interact to affect planning,
but only the spatial characteristics of the target should af-
fect control.
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3. Brain imaging of planning and control
Here, I briefly describe the anatomy and connectivity of the
brain before discussing the neural bases of action. Figure 3
shows the main visual cortical pathways in the human and
monkey brains. In the monkey, the visual pathways fall into
two main “streams,” a dorsal stream terminating in the in-
ferior parietal lobule and a ventral stream terminating in
the inferior temporal lobe (Mishkin et al. 1983). Boussaoud
et al. (1990) also proposed the existence of a “third” visual
stream, terminating in the superior temporal sulcus.
3.1. Functions of the two streams in monkeys
Originally, the two main visual streams were hypothesized to
serve functions related to object identity and spatial localiza-
tion (the “what versus where” distinction; Mishkin et al.
1983). However, numerous researchers have suggested a
role of the primate parietal lobe in sensorimotor transforma-
tions (e.g., Mountcastle et al. 1975; Stein 1991; 1992). Some
researchers have contended that the roles of the two streams
may best be described not as “what versus where,” but rather
as “what versus how” (Goodale & Milner 1992; Milner &
Goodale 1995), or similarly, as “semantic versus pragmatic”
(Jeannerod 1994; 1997; Jeannerod et al. 1994; 1995).
Such a reformulation of the functions of the two streams
has drawn evidence largely from neurophysiological stud-
ies of monkeys. Numerous authors have argued that the
dorsal stream pathway encodes the sensorimotor transfor-
mations necessary for goal-directed actions (Goodale &
Milner 1992; Kalaska & Crammond 1992; Milner &
Goodale 1995; Sakata et al. 1997; Wise & Desimone 1988).
Support for this notion comes from studies showing activ-
ity of cells in the dorsal stream of monkeys related to the vi-
sual guidance of reaching (Taira et al. 1990) and grasping
(Murata et al. 1996). Cells in the posterior parietal lobe of
monkeys have also been shown to be sensitive to changes in
motor plans independent of changes in visual attention
(Gnadt & Andersen 1988; Snyder et al. 1997; 1998).
3.1.1. Functions of the two streams in monkeys may not
map onto the human brain. A reasonable assumption to
make is that human brain organization and function will
closely parallel that found in monkeys. However, it will be
seen that the data from both brain imaging and neuropsy-
chology raise serious doubts about drawing such parallels in
high-level vision (see also, e.g., Eidelberg & Galubardi
1984; Vandufell et al. 2002). In particular, I will show that
the “what/how” distinction found in monkeys cannot be
easily translated into an explanation of human brain orga-
nization. Rather, I suggest that the evolution of the human
brain has resulted in the localization of planning processes
in the phylogenetically newer cortex of the inferior parietal
lobule. Tool and object use in particular has required that
human motor planning processes integrate ventral stream
functions related to object identification and context. I hy-
pothesize that this integration occurs in the IPL. The role
of the IPL suggested here is thus dramatically different
from that proposed by Milner and Goodale (1995), who
emphasized the role of the IPL in spatio-cognitive opera-
tions and praxis. These authors suggested that the dorsal
stream generally possessed sufficient visual information for
both the planning and control of actions, although on occa-
sion it may be necessary for the streams to “interact,” such
as in movements to remembered targets, or movements
made after a delay (Milner & Goodale 1995). In contrast to
the perception–action model’s predicted interactions be-
tween dorsal and ventral and/or IPL visual systems in some
actions, only the planning–control model maps planning
and control specifically onto the IPL and SPL, respectively.
The planning–control distinction can also be plausibly
extended to other brain structures. Specifically, I hypothe-
size that the planning system includes regions in the frontal
lobes, basal ganglia, and cerebellum. Similarly, although the
visual representation in the SPL is said to be the crucial fac-
tor underlying on-line monitoring and control, I hypothe-
size that it operates in concert with other control centers in
the cerebellum.
3.2. Brain images of action: Predictions of the
planning–control and perception–action models
The planning–control and perception–action models can
be used to make specific predictions regarding the brain re-
gions active during motor behaviors. In the planning–con-
trol model, activation of the two systems should depend on
the task at hand. Specifically, tasks that require heavy in-
volvement of planning systems, such as selecting an appro-
priate posture, should preferentially activate planning re-
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Figure 3. Illustration of putative visual pathways in the posterior
regions of the human brain (top), and macaque brain (bottom –
based on Boussaoud et al. 1990; Mishkin et al. 1983). Note that
whereas the dorsal stream in the macaque brain terminates in the
inferior parietal lobule, in the human brain it is hypothesized to
terminate in the superior parietal lobule. The medial or “third”
stream is hypothesized to terminate in the superior temporal sul-
cus in monkeys, but in the inferior parietal lobule in humans. Not
to scale.
gions. Conversely, tasks that require major involvement of
on-line control systems, such as manual tracking or adjust-
ments to target perturbations, should preferentially activate
control regions.
These predictions are in contrast to the predictions of the
perception–action model (Goodale & Milner 1992; Milner
& Goodale 1995). In this model, visual “action” represen-
tations are said to reside in the SPL. As such, the percep-
tion–action model predicts that motor behavior should
generally lead to activation of the SPL but not the IPL, and
that this should be true during both planning and control.
Three types of brain imaging paradigms have been used
to study the neural underpinnings of planning and control.
One paradigm involves motor tasks that encompass both
planning and control, and thus reveals structures active
during one or the other, or both stages. A second paradigm
focuses on the neural structures involved in either planning
or control, respectively. A third paradigm employs the use
of “motor imagery,” imagining the production of a move-
ment without actually carrying it out. As predicted by the
planning–control model, increased activity in regions of the
planning system is strongly associated with the planning
phase of action, whereas increased activity in regions of the
control system is strongly associated with the on-line con-
trol phase of action.
3.2.1. PET and the motor brain. Several PET studies have
shown increased activation of both planning and control re-
gions during motor tasks. Kertzmann et al. (1997) studied
the changes in brain activation during visually guided point-
ing. They found that activity increased in both the inferior
and superior regions of the parietal lobe, the premotor cor-
tex, and the basal ganglia (the cerebellum was not scanned)
when pointing movements were made. Inoue et al. (1998)
studied how pointing with or without visual feedback af-
fected brain activation. Whether or not feedback was al-
lowed, significant increases in activity occurred in both the
inferior and superior regions of the parietal lobe during
movement compared to rest trials, suggesting that the in-
volvement of neither region was contingent on the availabil-
ity of visual feedback. Activity was also observed in the
frontal lobes, temporal lobes, basal ganglia, and cerebellum.
Rizzolatti et al. (1996) studied the neural underpinnings of
grasping movements using PET. Grasping an object resulted
in increased activity in both the IPL and posterior regions of
the SPL, as well as the basal ganglia and cerebellum.
The studies reviewed above show that motor behavior re-
sults in increases in activity in both the inferior and superior
regions of the parietal lobe, as well as the frontal lobes, basal
ganglia, cerebellum, and in one case, the temporal lobes.
Whereas these studies are consistent with activation of both
of the networks I have proposed in this article, they do not
allow one to dissociate activity related to planning from that
related to control. For that purpose, it is necessary to turn
to more direct investigations of planning versus control.
3.2.2. PET and planning versus control. Figure 4 summa-
rizes the results of studies comparing brain activity during
the planning and control of actions, respectively. Grafton et
al. (1998) measured changes in brain activity when partici-
pants made a choice between a power and precision grasp,
the former involving the entire hand and the latter involv-
ing the thumb and forefinger only. In two conditions, grasp
choice was mandatory. In another condition, a cue occurred
prior to each trial that informed the participants of which
grasp to use.
Significant increases in activation occurred in the IPL
and basal ganglia in all movement conditions, whereas in-
creased activation in the SPL only occurred in the cued ver-
sus mandatory comparison. That is, only when participants
had to focus attention on an upcoming cue was activity in
the SPL elevated. This finding concurs with other PET
studies that suggest that the SPL is involved in visuospatial
attention (Corbetta et al. 1993; 1996; Haxby et al. 1994;
Jovicich et al. 2001; Nobre et al. 1997). Increased activity
also occurred in the premotor cortex in the cued versus
mandatory comparison.
Deiber et al. (1996) also studied brain activation during
movement selection. This study had the added control of
having delays imposed between cue and response. This al-
lowed for a greater proportion of scanning time being de-
voted to measuring regions involved in planning. Flexion or
extension of either the forefinger or little finger was required,
and cues could inform participants of the finger to be used,
the movement required, both the finger and movement re-
quired, or neither. Another condition allowed participants to
freely decide which movement to make with which finger.
Deiber et al. (1996) showed that increased activation of
the IPL, premotor cortex, and cerebellum occurred in all of
the selection conditions relative to a rest condition, whereas
increased activation of the SPL was present only when the
cue was uninformative or only partly informative. Similar to
Grafton et al. (1998), the results of Deiber et al. (1996) sug-
gest that the IPL was activated during planning whether the
cue was informative or not, whereas the SPL was only acti-
vated during the planning phase when attentional demands
were high.
Krams et al. (1998) utilized a task in which participants
were required to copy a hand posture shown to them on a
screen. Three conditions manipulated the relative import
of planning and control. In one (“execute only”) condition,
participants simply copied the movement immediately af-
ter its presentation. In another (“plan and execute”) condi-
tion, a pause was given between the presentation of the
movement and a subsequent cue to imitate. Participants
were instructed to use this delay to prepare the movement.
A third (“plan only”) condition had participants prepare the
movement, but withhold its execution.
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Figure 4. Summary illustration of increases in brain activity in
the posterior parietal lobe related to motor planning, on-line con-
trol, and motor imagery. Filled squares: increased activity related
to planning; empty squares: increased activity related to on-line
control; filled circles: increased activity related to motor imagery.
See text for details.
The design of Krams et al. (1998) allowed them to disso-
ciate the changes in activity during planning from the
changes during on-line control. When the “plan only” con-
dition was compared to the rest condition, increased activ-
ity was found in the supramarginal gyrus of the IPL, pre-
motor cortex, basal ganglia, and cerebellum. No increase in
activity was observed in the SPL. Increased activation of the
IPL and premotor cortex was also observed in the “plan and
execute” condition compared to the “execute only” condi-
tion, another measure of planning. However, there was no
increase in activity in the SPL, cerebellum, or basal ganglia
in this comparison.
The reverse comparisons (i.e., “execute only” versus rest,
“plan and execute,” versus “plan only”) showed what hap-
pened during the execution phase of a movement. In the for-
mer of these comparisons (“execute only” versus rest) in-
creased activity occurred in the intraparietal sulcus bordering
the IPL and SPL, the frontal lobes (including premotor and
primary motor cortex), and the cerebellum, suggesting that
these regions were involved in executing the actions. The lat-
ter comparison (“plan and execute” versus “plan only”)
showed increased activity in the basal ganglia and cerebel-
lum. Some increase was also observed in the IPL in the “ex-
ecute only” condition; this may have reflected the necessity
of at least some planning preceding the movement’s initia-
tion. These results suggest that, for copied movements at
least, the planning system, including the IPL, premotor cor-
tex, and basal ganglia, is more heavily involved in the planning
of actions, whereas the control system, including the SPL and
cerebellum, is more heavily involved in their execution.
Desmurget et al. (2001) examined brain activation asso-
ciated with target perturbations during pointing move-
ments while visual feedback of the hand was unavailable. In
this study, participants had to look at and point to targets.
The target itself either remained stationary or was per-
turbed during the saccade. This allowed Desmurget et al.
to dissociate activity related to large corrections required
for perturbed targets from activity related to much smaller
or nonexistent corrections required for stationary targets.
Desmurget et al. found that perturbing the target (thus re-
quiring a large on-line correction) led to increased activity
centered in the left intraparietal region bordering the IPL
and SPL, as well as right cerebellum. This suggested that
nonvisual feedback loops at least were reliant on the con-
trol regions as indicated by the planning–control model.
Grafton et al. (1992) investigated the brain regions active
during manual tracking. Because manual tracking of a mov-
ing target is a long-lasting movement requiring a continual
updating of the relationship between the hand and target,
I have suggested that it can be considered to be largely un-
der the influence of control. If on-line control relies pri-
marily on the regions I have hypothesized, one might ex-
pect these “control regions” to be active during the task, but
not necessarily the “planning regions,” as planning require-
ments would be negligible. This is generally what occurred.
Increased activity in the SPL, supplementary motor area,
and cerebellum was found by Grafton et al. during manual
tracking, whereas activity in the IPL and basal ganglia was
unaffected by performance of the task.
3.2.3. PET and motor imagery. A third set of evidence in fa-
vor of ascribing planning and control to different brain re-
gions comes from studies of motor imagery. In these stud-
ies, participants are asked to imagine they are making the
requested movements, but to not actually make the move-
ments themselves. There is considerable evidence that brain
regions that are more active during motor imagery are very
similar to those that are more active during motor prepara-
tion (Jeannerod 1994; 1997), but less similar to those in-
volved during execution. According to the planning–control
model, studies of motor imagery ought to reveal increased
activity in the planning but not the control regions.
Decety et al. (1994) studied brain activation while par-
ticipants performed one of two tasks. In one condition, par-
ticipants viewed pictures of a hand grasping an object,
whereas in the other condition, participants imagined
grasping objects with their own hand. In neither condition
did participants themselves move. Imagined grasping in-
creased activity in the IPL, prefrontal, premotor, basal gan-
glia, and cerebellar regions, but not the SPL, as compared
to a rest condition. Increased activation was also found in
the IPL, prefrontal, premotor, and basal ganglia regions in
the imagined grasping condition compared to the observed
grasping condition, but not in the SPL or cerebellar re-
gions. This showed that the increase in the planning regions
was a result of motor imagery and not visual imagery. The
fact that participants did not move at all during the experi-
ment supports the idea that activity in the planning network
was related to the planning of such movements and not
their execution.
Similar studies by Grafton et al. (1996) and Deiber et al.
(1998) found results consistent with Decety et al., although
the Grafton et al. study also showed some increased activity
along the border between superior parietal and occipital re-
gions. From these four studies combined, it would appear
that motor imagery activates the IPL and related planning
regions more than it does the SPL and control regions.
3.3. Summary of brain imaging studies
Brain imaging studies of action can be divided into three
main categories. One type of study is concerned with mo-
tor-related activity only and does not attempt to distinguish
between planning and control. These studies typically find
increased activation in both the planning (IPL, frontal
lobes, basal ganglia) and control (SPL, cerebellum) regions
of the brain (Inoue et al. 1998; Kertzmann et al. 1997; Riz-
zolatti et al. 1996).
Another type of study aims to dissociate the effects of
planning from those of control by focusing the scanning
time on one or the other process. These studies typically
find increased activation of the planning regions during mo-
tor planning, with increased activation of the control re-
gions restricted to the execution phase (Deiber et al. 1996;
Desmurget et al. 2001; Grafton et al. 1992; 1998; Krams et
al. 1998). When increased activation of the SPL does occur
during the planning stages (Deiber et al. 1996; Grafton et
al. 1998), it can readily be explained by the attentional de-
mands of the task. In some cases, the cerebellum is also ac-
tive during planning. Such activation was not predicted by
the planning–control model, and leaves open a controversy
over the exact role of the cerebellum in motor learning,
planning, and/or control (see e.g., Kitazawa et al. 1998;
Stein 1986).
A third type of study investigates the neural underpin-
nings of motor imagery; these provide interesting parallels
with studies of planning. In accord with the hypothesis that
motor imagery is a form of planning in which the move-
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ments are never carried out (Jeannerod 1994; 1997), plan-
ning regions are more active during motor imaging than
control regions (Decety et al. 1994; Deiber et al. 1998;
Grafton et al. 1996;).
These results were generally not consistent with the per-
ception–action model, however, which predicts motor-re-
lated activity in the SPL but not in the IPL. The fact that ac-
tivity occurred in both regions, coupled with the distinction
between planning and control shown for the IPL and SPL,
strongly favors the planning–control model over the per-
ception–action model with regard to the brain imaging data.
The planning–control model predicts that future brain
imaging studies should be able to correlate activity in the
IPL, frontal lobes, and basal ganglia with the behaviors I
have associated with planning. These include target selec-
tion, macroscopic selection of postures, and movements re-
quiring the integration of nonspatial target characteristics.
One example of a task involving the heavy involvement of
the planning system would be grasping a tool appropriately
when such a grasp is not the most convenient. Conversely,
activity in the SPL ought to continue to be correlated with
control behaviors, emphasized in such behaviors as manual
tracking and reactions to perturbations. Paradigms that
specifically isolate the planning and control stages of actions
(e.g., Desmurget et al. 1999; Grafton et al. 1992; Krams et
al. 1998) should be among the most useful in this respect.
Finally, the role of the cerebellum in either planning and /
or control has been ambiguous in PET studies, and needs
to be clarified.
4. Disruptions in planning and control following
brain damage
Whereas PET imaging studies provide a clear indication
that planning and control rely on relatively independent
networks within the brain, human neuropsychology pre-
sents a somewhat more complex story. The inherent diffi-
culties in using human neuropsychology to understand
brain function can be traced to several factors (see Kolb &
Whishaw 1995), the three most important of which I will
describe here. First, lesions rarely restrict themselves to
neat anatomical divisions that researchers can isolate. Sec-
ond, damage can often result in the disturbances of func-
tion in cells far removed from the lesion. Third, the plas-
ticity of the brain often allows for significant recovery of
function, or at the very least, the acquisition of compen-
satory strategies. Therefore, it may not be too surprising
that human neuropsychology does not offer quite as clear a
distinction between planning and control as that offered by
PET. Nevertheless, it will be seen that parallels do exist be-
tween the results of brain imaging and neuropsychology.
The planning–control model predicts that damage to
brain regions responsible for either planning or control will
result in distinctly different deficits. Damage to planning
centers in the IPL, frontal lobes, or basal ganglia, for ex-
ample, should disrupt the integration of visual and cogni-
tive processing into a coherent action plan. Because of the
complexity of planning processes, deficits can be manifest
in several ways, not all of which will follow from damage to
a specific region. These deficits might be manifest in the
impaired performance of overlearned movements based on
visual input, or in the ability to incorporate future goals into
current actions. Damage to a planning region ought to also
result in impairments in the parametrization of movements.
For example, the early portions of the grip aperture or hand
orientation profiles might be disrupted when damage to
planning regions occurs. Given the role of the IPL in inte-
grating visual sources of information, damage to this region
would be expected to lead to deficits in the “visual” com-
ponent of planning, for such things as the coding of object
characteristics and/or contextual elements. For example,
the scaling of grip force to an object when grasping it might
be disrupted following damage to the IPL. Difficulties in
accommodating the visual context surrounding the target
might also occur, either in target selection or obstacle avoid-
ance. Finally, because planning is responsible for move-
ment timing and initiation, damage to at least some regions
ought to result in deficits to these aspects of action.
Damage to the SPL or cerebellum, on the other hand,
ought to lead to impairments in on-line control. These
deficits should be most evident in actions requiring a large
degree of on-line control, such as adjusting to a perturbed
target, or tracking a moving target. Deficits ought to be lim-
ited to those movement parameters dependent on the spa-
tial characteristics of the target, such as grip formation or
hand trajectory. Deficits ought to be larger when the plan-
ning system is handicapped in some way. For example,
when the situation is unfamiliar, or when the target is not
foveated. Further, when delays of two seconds or longer are
imposed between offset of vision of the stimulus and move-
ment initiation, the movement should come entirely under
the influence of planning – performance should actually
improve. Finally, deficits resulting from damage to the con-
trol system should be most evident in the latter stages of the
actions when control processes are most influential.
The predictions of the planning–control model again
contrast with those of the perception–action model
(Goodale & Milner 1992; Milner & Goodale 1995), in
which a single visual representation underlying action is
said to exist in the SPL. Accordingly, damage to this repre-
sentation or its frontal projection regions should disrupt ac-
tion. Although proponents of the perception–action model
acknowledge the role of the IPL in praxis (Milner &
Goodale 1995), they do not specifically characterize the
IPL/SPL distinction as being between planning and con-
trol. As such, the perception–action model would predict
that damage to the SPL should lead to the greatest deficits
in actions, and that these deficits should be equally preva-
lent during both planning and control.
It will be seen that the evidence from human neuropsy-
chology is generally more consistent with the planning–
control model than with the perception–action model. In
particular, the critical evidence suggests that damage to the
IPL disrupts planning, that damage to the SPL leads to
deficits in on-line control, and that damage to the allied
brain regions of planning and control result in deficits re-
lated to their role in one or the other stage.
4.1. The left IPL and the “visuokinesthetic engram”
Damage to the left IPL (or its visual inputs) often results in
ideomotor apraxia, a deficit in executing learned move-
ments (although, note that ideomotor apraxia can occur
with damage outside of these regions as well). Heilman,
Poizner, and their colleagues (e.g., Clark et al. 1994; Heil-
man et al. 1985; Poizner et al. 1990; 1995), following an idea
originally suggested by Liepmann (1920), have argued that
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the left IPL in right-handers contains “visuokinesthetic mo-
tor engrams,” stored representations of learned acts. When
the left IPL is damaged, or when it is disconnected from
frontal premotor areas, apraxia is said to result from the in-
ability to access these stored representations of actions.
4.1.1. Studies of performance in ideomotor apraxics. One
of the interesting sequelae of ideomotor apraxia occurs
when a patient is presented with an overlearned, common-
place task they are quite familiar with, yet they are unable
to perform the task appropriately. In one study, Clark et al.
(1994) studied the kinematics of three apraxic patients as
they carried out the act of slicing bread. The patients had
varying degrees of brain damage, with the common locus
being the IPL, its connections, or its underlying white mat-
ter. In four conditions, patients were asked to carry out the
act with varying numbers of cues: (1) no cue available (pure
pantomime); (2) bread but no knife; (3) knife but no bread;
and (4) actual execution of the act of slicing bread, with
both bread and knife.
Clark et al. (1994) reported that although the patients
clearly understood what they were to do and made every ef-
fort to complete the task, their performance was severely im-
paired. Several kinematic indices of the action were dis-
turbed in the apraxic patients relative to controls.
Movements as a whole were of lower amplitude, with a lower
peak velocity, and had longer movement times in each slic-
ing cycle relative to controls. Moreover, the planes of the slic-
ing motions were incorrectly oriented, being nearer to the
patients’ sagittal than frontal planes. The planes of motion
were less consistent in the ideomotor apraxics than controls,
and tended to be more curved than linear. In short, the pa-
tients were unable to execute movements with anywhere
near the same fluidity and competence as the controls. These
deficits were greatest when no visual cues were available (i.e.,
in the pure pantomime condition), but were only slightly
ameliorated by the presence of the bread and/or knife.
A follow-up study done by Poizner et al. (1995) on the
same three patients tested by Clark et al. (1994) showed
that the patients also had other kinematic deficits in the act
of slicing bread. There were distorted relationships be-
tween the relative angles and velocities of joints in the arm,
as well as a lack of synchrony between the elbow and shoul-
der joints in the apraxics relative to controls.
These studies demonstrate that damage to the left IPL or
its connections can result in the disruption of the stored
memories of how to execute a learned task. These memories,
or “visuokinesthetic engrams,” clearly relate to the planning
of action. This type of finding is consistent with what I have
proposed as an important role for the left IPL in planning.
In contrast to the deficits ideomotor apraxics show for
learned movements, they may often appear to be relatively
normal in the execution of simple pointing and grasping
movements (i.e., they are not spatially inaccurate the way
optic ataxics are). I contend that this difference depends on
the requirements of the task itself. For one thing, learned
movements based on stored memories emphasize the plan-
ning phase of the action. In contrast, it will be seen that
pointing and grasping movements to unfamiliar targets em-
phasizes the on-line control phase. For another, errors in
the accuracy of movements early in a trajectory can be cor-
rected on-line as long as the control system remains intact
( just as happens with visual illusions and semantic interfer-
ence). Because damage to the IPL does not lead to errors
in accuracy at the end of a simple reaching and grasping
movement, does not mean these errors were not present
earlier in the movement. The planning–control model pre-
dicts that such errors would be found should careful kine-
matic analyses of reaching and grasping movements in pa-
tients with damage to the IPL be undertaken.
Only a few studies have examined the relationship be-
tween ideomotor apraxia and kinematic abnormalities. Al-
though one study has found correlations between incidence
of ideomotor apraxia and deficits in premovement planning
(Haaland et al. 1999), others have found less of a relation-
ship (e.g., Hermsdorfer et al. 1996; 1999; Ietswaart et al.
2001). Notably, the areas of damage in these patients were
quite diverse, and so these studies cannot be used to draw
strong conclusions regarding the function of specific brain
regions. One of the reasons for the dearth of studies may be
that subtle deficits in kinematic parametrization in apraxics
in reaching and grasping tasks are unnoticeable or over-
shadowed by larger deficits in action selection. Clearly,
more numerous and stringent tests of the planning–control
hypothesis are needed for patients with damage centered
on the left IPL or its visual inputs.
4.2. The right IPL and action planning
The right IPL has also been shown to play a role in motor
planning processes. Damage to the right IPL is most closely
associated with the syndrome of unilateral neglect, com-
monly characterized as a disorder in orienting attention to
contralateral space (Kinsbourne 1987) or in the represen-
tation of the contralateral half of space (Bisiach & Vallar
1988; Bisiach et al. 1985). It is often difficult to show a re-
lationship between the right IPL and motor deficits in these
patients, because the damage often includes many other
brain regions. However, studies have also demonstrated
that neglect can include a motor component (Goodale et al.
1990; Heilman et al. 1985; Mattingley et al. 1994; 1998;
Reuter-Lorenz & Posner 1990). In some cases, large errors
early in the trajectory are corrected on-line using visual
feedback (Edwards & Humphreys 1999). When visual
feedback was made unavailable to the neglect patient, large
errors remained, suggesting that feedback-based control
was being used to correct errors in planning.
4.3. The frontal lobes and basal ganglia in planning
Just as damage to the left IPL often results in ideomotor
apraxia, with its attendant errors in the spatio-temporal
characteristics of movement, damage to the frontal lobes
can lead to ideational apraxia. In this variant of apraxia, it is
the representation of the incorporation of the goal of the
movement that appears to be disrupted rather than the ex-
ecution of the movement itself (Heilman & Gonzalez Rothi
1993). This can often be manifested in deficits in sequenc-
ing movements. The presence of ideational apraxia follow-
ing damage to the frontal lobes is consistent with a role of
the frontal lobes in motor planning.
The basal ganglia is also important for action planning.
This region has been implicated in Parkinson’s disease, a
complex syndrome that includes such things as tremor,
rigidity, speech disturbances, and so forth. Perhaps the
most relevant symptom to the role of the basal ganglia in
planning is akinesia, a difficulty in initiating movements.
Damage to other regions of the basal ganglia can also cause
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various symptoms, such as involuntary movements and hy-
pokinesia (Zigmond et al. 1999).
4.4. The SPL: Optic ataxia as a deficit in on-line control
A common consequence of damage to the SPL is optic
ataxia, characterized by inaccuracy in movement. Accord-
ing to the planning–control model, optic ataxia reflects a
deficit limited to the on-line control of movements (cf. Gréa
et al. 2002; Pisella et al. 2000). As such, errors in optic
ataxics should be most evident in circumstances in which
large corrections are required. These include movements
made to perturbed targets or manual tracking movements,
as well as movements made without the benefit of having
foveated the target, or those made to unfamiliar targets (re-
sulting in less accurate planning). Deficits in optic ataxics
should be concentrated in the later stages of movement,
and should be limited to the spatial parameters of move-
ment, such as accuracy, grip aperture, and so forth.
The perception–action model gives quite a different ac-
count of optic ataxia, however. According to this model, the
SPL is equally important during both planning and control.
As such, none of the predictions of the planning–control
model given above should hold true. Specifically, move-
ments should be equally inaccurate whether or not the tar-
get is foveated, whether or not the position of the target is
perturbed during reaching, or whether the task is manual
tracking versus simple aiming. It will be seen that the data
from SPL patients clearly favors the interpretation of optic
ataxia as being a deficit concentrated in the control stage of
action, consistent with the planning–control model but not
the perception–action model.
4.4.1. The Perenin and Vighetto studies of optic ataxia.
Although Balint (1909) and Holmes (1918) were among the
first to describe the condition of optic ataxia, two of the
most detailed studies carried out on optic ataxics were those
of Perenin and Vighetto (1983; 1988). Perenin and Vighetto
(1983) studied six patients with optic ataxia. In one task, pa-
tients reached to and grasped objects placed in various parts
of their visual fields while maintaining central fixation. In a
second task, patients were asked to “post” their hand into a
rectangular slot oriented at different degrees in the frontal
plane. A third task had patients point to targets in the pe-
riphery while manipulating the use of central versus pe-
ripheral vision and the availability of visual feedback.
In the reaching and grasping task, patients either missed
the target altogether, or had to deliberately correct their
movements to acquire the target. Reaching and grasping in
these patients was vastly improved when they were allowed
to fixate the targets. Patients were able to orient their hand
correctly in the posting task, although deliberate correc-
tions were often required.
In the pointing task, patients were accurate when they
were allowed to foveate the target and to see their hands
while they reached. Errors occurred when patients had to
maintain central fixation, or when patients were not allowed
visual feedback of the moving hand. Performance improved
if patients were allowed to see their hand just before initi-
ating the pointing movement.
Perenin and Vighetto (1988) used two of the tasks used by
Perenin and Vighetto (1983), the reaching and the posting
tasks. The patients in this study were similar to Perenin and
Vighetto’s (1983) patients, in that the common locus of dam-
age was in the SPL, and also in that elementary motor, per-
ceptual, and somasthetic capacities were largely intact. This
study had similar results to the original, in that errors were
prevalent in all tasks, and were greatest when patients were
not allowed to foveate the targets (see also Carey et al. 1997).
4.4.2. Disruption of control in optic ataxic prehension.
Deficits in the on-line control of grasping after damage to
the SPL have also been reported. Jakobson et al. (1991) ob-
served a patient who exhibited a gross deficit in grasping.
Although their patient, V.K., showed an apparently normal
early phase of hand opening during attempts to grasp an ob-
ject, her on-line control of grip aperture quickly degener-
ated, resulting in numerous secondary peaks in the grip
aperture profile (a normal profile consists of a single peak).
A similar result was found in a patient studied by Jeannerod
(1986; see also Binkofski et al. 1998).
Analysis of the trajectory of a reaching and grasping
movement made by optic ataxics revealed velocity and grip
aperture profiles that were relatively intact in the first stages
of the movement (Binkofski et al. 1998; Jakobson et al. 1991;
Jeannerod 1986), although the initial heading was not stud-
ied. Disturbances in the velocity or grip aperture profiles
were greatest after the first “peak” has been reached (i.e.,
maximum velocity or maximum grip aperture).
Jeannerod et al. (1994) observed a patient with extensive
damage to the SPL, secondary visual areas, and some dam-
age to the IPL. The patient, A.T., showed marked deficits
in hand shaping when grasping a plain white cylinder. These
deficits existed independent of any deficit in the transport
phase of reaching. However, A.T. showed a relatively nor-
mal ability to grasp familiar objects.
4.4.3. Optic ataxia disrupts adjustments to target pertur-
bations. By adapting the perturbation paradigm to the
study of an optic ataxic (I.G.), Pisella et al. (2000) provided
a critical test of the importance of the SPL in control. Pisella
et al. had healthy participants and I.G. point to targets that
sometimes changed location coincident with movement
initiation. Pisella et al. found that I.G. showed accuracy
comparable to the healthy subjects in her movements to
stationary targets. However, whereas normal controls were
usually able to adjust to perturbed targets, I.G. was unable
to make such corrections in flight. It was only when the pa-
tient was allowed to slow her movements down consider-
ably that she was able to correct her movements.
A follow-up study of on-line adjustments in optic ataxia
was carried out by Gréa et al. (2002). In this study, I.G. was
instructed to reach out to and grasp an object. On some tri-
als, the object could suddenly jump to a new position coin-
cident with the onset of the movement. In trials in which
the target remained stationary throughout the reach, I.G.’s
performance was indistinguishable from the healthy con-
trols. However, in trials in which the target changed loca-
tion, I.G.’s performance was quite impaired. Whereas
healthy control subjects quickly and easily adapted their
movements to the new location of the target, I.G. appeared
unable to adjust her movement in flight. Rather, I.G. exe-
cuted two reaching and grasping movements: a movement
to the original location of the target, followed by a second
movement to the new location of the target. This effect was
not a result of any deficit in noticing the change in target
position by I.G.; she was just as quick to respond to such a
change as were the healthy controls.
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4.4.4. Effects of previews on an optic ataxic. Milner et al.
(2001) studied the effects of previews on prehension in
I.G.. Whereas I.G. showed considerable deficits in the scal-
ing of her maximum grip aperture to the size of an object,
her grip scaling was much better when the target was taken
out of her sight for five seconds after its initial presentation
(vision of the target was restored coincident with the signal
to move). A second experiment by Milner et al. (2001) ex-
amined what happened when the target was replaced by a
differently sized object during the delay period. In these
cases, the optic ataxic I.G. showed a surprising amount of
grip scaling to the object that had previously been shown,
as opposed to the object that was currently present.
Milner et al. (2001) argued that the delay resulted in the
use of the ventral stream in action production, which pre-
sumably resulted in movements after delays that were accu-
rately based on the previously seen object (whether the same
as or different from the one acted upon). In the planning–
control framework, the ventral stream projections to the IPL
would always be used for planning, and delays serve to “can-
cel” the control phase of the movement. As such, both mod-
els appear to give plausible explanations for these results.
4.5. Cerebellar ataxia
Whereas damage to the SPL can result in a deficit in the ac-
curacy of movements under visual control, damage to the
cerebellum may result in a more general form of ataxia. Cere-
bellar ataxics differ from optic ataxics in that their disorder
does not seem to be related to vision, but rather seems to
manifest itself as an overall spatial inaccuracy in movement,
which, unlike optic ataxia, may include deficits in localizing
points on the body (Kolb & Whishaw 1995). This deficit im-
plicates a role for the cerebellum in the control system.
4.6. D.F.: Disrupted planning processes with intact
control
In this section I describe the patient D.F., a woman who
suffered severe damage to the ventral visual stream follow-
ing carbon monoxide poisoning. The brain damage severely
undermined D.F.’s ability to perceive form, yet left her abil-
ity to interact with objects manually relatively intact. In the
planning–control framework, damage to D.F.’s ventral
stream should impair many aspects of how she plans move-
ments, but should leave her control processes essentially in-
tact. In contrast to this, proponents of the perception–ac-
tion model have argued that D.F. represents a single
dissociation: damage to the ventral stream that affects per-
ception but not action. This they have contrasted with the
studies of optic ataxics described above.
4.6.1. Impaired motor abilities in D.F. Many deficits in ac-
tion have been reported in D.F., consistent with an im-
paired planning system. For example, D.F. exhibited hy-
pokinesia (Milner et al. 1991), similar to many patients with
damage in planning regions. She was unable to reach ap-
propriately to a target after a delay (Goodale et al. 1994a).
When trying to post a T-shaped target, she was correct on
half the trials, but misoriented her hand to the target by 90
degrees on the other half of the trials. Her ability to reflect
knowledge of the functions of objects by choosing an ap-
propriate reach and grasp was also impaired. Similar to
many apraxics, D.F. grasped everyday objects in a manner
inappropriate to their use when they were presented in
noncanonical orientations (Carey et al. 1996).
4.6.2. Spared motor abilities in D.F. Despite numerous
deficits in action planning, D.F. appears to possess rela-
tively intact on-line control. For example, she was able to
orient her hand correctly in a posting task similar to the one
used by Perenin and Vighetto (1983; 1988) (Goodale et al.
1991; Milner et al. 1991); she could choose relatively adap-
tive points of contact in grasping odd-shaped objects
(Goodale et al. 1994c); and showed near-normal on-line
scaling of both reach and grasp parameters (Carey et al.
1996; Goodale et al. 1991; Milner et al. 1991).
Taken in sum, the constellation of impaired and spared
behaviors in D.F. are just as consistent with the planning–
control model as with the perception–action model. In par-
ticular, her many deficits in motor behavior can be likened
to those suffered by many apraxics, whereas her spared abil-
ities can be likened to those impaired in many optic ataxics.
4.7. TMS studies of motor control
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) appears to allow
for the temporary disabling of localized brain regions
(Walsh & Rushworth 1999). TMS applied over the visual
motion area V5, for example, temporarily disrupts the per-
ception of motion (Beckers & Zeki 1995). It seems logical
then to assume that TMS “lesions” of motor areas underly-
ing planning and control should lead to corresponding
deficits in these behaviors, just as real lesions do. Assuming
this is true, the data from studies employing TMS have
been generally consistent with the predictions of the plan-
ning–control model.
Rushworth et al. (2001a) examined the importance of the
IPL in premovement planning (what Rushworth et al.
called “motor attention”; see also Rushworth et al. 1997b;
2001b). When TMS was applied over the angular gyrus in
the left IPL, reaction times to initiate button presses in a
choice response task were lengthened relative to when
TMS was applied over other regions of the parietal lobes.
This suggested that the left IPL was involved in the plan-
ning functions of response selection and/or initiation.
A complementary study used TMS to examine control
(Desmurget et al. 1999). These authors found that TMS ap-
plied over the intraparietal region bordering the IPL and
SPL disrupted the ability of participants to make on-line
corrections to perturbations of a target’s location. Notably,
however, the application did not affect the accuracy of
movements to stationary targets, in which case it might be
assumed that on-line adjustments were much less neces-
sary. This suggested that the intraparietal region was specif-
ically involved in on-line control. Desmurget et al. were un-
able to localize the region of disruption to either the IPL or
SPL, and the application site seems to imply the inclusion
of the intraparietal region in the control system.
4.8. Summary of studies of brain-damaged populations
The evidence from human neuropsychology generally sup-
ports the distinction between action planning and control.
Ideomotor apraxia, a common consequence of damage to
the left IPL, can seriously impair the ability of the motor
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system to plan familiar, overlearned actions (Clark et al.
1994; Poizner et al. 1995). This occurs despite the fact that
these patients do not show many of the deficits in on-line
control observed in optic ataxics (Heilman & Gonzalez
Rothi 1993). Damage to the right IPL has been linked with
hypokinesia (Mattingley et al. 1998), and hemineglect that
can include errors in the initial heading of the movement
(Edwards & Humphreys 1999). Damage to the frontal
lobes can result in deficits in the selection of movements
(Heilman & Gonzalez Rothi 1993), whereas damage to the
basal ganglia can lead to Parkinson’s disease, one symptom
of which is akinesia (Zigmond et al. 1999).
In contrast, damage to the control regions of the brain re-
sults in a much different constellation of deficits. Three par-
ticular pieces of evidence highlight the role of the SPL in
particular in control. First, optic ataxics have greater diffi-
culty with movements to nonfoveated than foveated targets
(Perenin & Vighetto 1983; 1988), the former presumably
allowing for less accurate planning. Second, the kinematic
profiles of optic ataxics can be relatively intact early in the
reach, but become disrupted in the later stages (Jakobson
et al. 1991; Jeannerod 1986). Third, an optic ataxic has been
shown to be severely impaired in making on-line correc-
tions to perturbed targets, although she can accurately di-
rect movements to stationary targets (Gréa et al. 2002;
Pisella et al. 2000). Taken in sum, these results suggest a
specific role of the SPL in control.
D.F. presents a unique opportunity to study the effects
of visual agnosia on planning and control. D.F.’s motor sys-
tem has difficulty in tasks that emphasize planning, such as
in pantomiming delayed actions to remembered targets
(Goodale et al. 1994a), or when the nonspatial properties of
objects, such as function, must be encoded (Carey et al.
1996). In cases of relatively straightforward manual inter-
action with objects, D.F.’s control processes seem to inter-
vene and ensure accurate execution of the action (Carey et
al. 1996; Goodale et al. 1991; 1994c; Milner et al. 1991).
A new area of study uses transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) to temporarily disable small regions of the brain. The
results of these studies have generally been consistent with
the planning–control model. Whereas planning is disrupted
by stimulation over the IPL (Rushworth et al. 2001a), con-
trol is disrupted by stimulation to the intraparietal sulcus
(IPS), bordering the SPL (Desmurget et al. 1999).
More studies will be needed to test each type of patient
group (or its TMS equivalent) with the paradigms used to
examine planning and control in healthy participants. For
example, one could investigate the ability of ideomotor
apraxics and optic ataxics to accommodate optical illusions,
or to extend the work of Gréa et al. (2002) and Pisella et al.
(2000) using perturbations of other spatial and nonspatial
target characteristics. Apraxics and patients with Parkin-
son’s disease might be examined using other kinds of tasks
that emphasize planning, such as when affordances must be
computed and postures selected (e.g., Rosenbaum et al.
1992; Short & Cauraugh 1997). D.F. might be tested on her
ability to accommodate various optical illusions or pertur-
bations. Investigations along these lines could be quite use-
ful in expanding our understanding.
The planning–control model makes specific predictions
regarding studies involving each of these classes of brain-
damaged patients. For example, damage in the SPL and/or
cerebellum should result in an inability to correct illusion
effects on-line, owing to the disruption of the control sys-
tem. These patients should also be impaired at adjusting to
target perturbations on-line, as has already been found in
the optic ataxic I.G. (Gréa et al. 2002; Pisella et al. 2000).
Similarly, semantic interference effects on these patients
ought to remain large throughout the movement. Con-
versely, damage to planning regions ought to result in the
lack of appropriate posture selection in tasks, such as was
used by Rosenbaum et al. (1992), as well as in deficits in
other movements dependent on planning, such as move-
ments to remembered targets after a delay of two seconds
or longer. Finally, the patient D.F. ought to be normal in her
ability to accommodate perturbations, and show similar
patterns of effects of visual illusions as healthy participants.
5. Conclusions
The studies reviewed here are consistent with the charac-
terization of the planning and control of actions hypothe-
sized in the planning–control model. This evidence sug-
gests that a rich and detailed visual representation exists in
the IPL, which operates in concert with frontal and basal
ganglia regions in movement planning. During execution,
movements come increasingly under the influence of a con-
trol representation in the SPL, operating in concert with
the cerebellum. The studies reviewed here are less consis-
tent, however, with a perception–action model in which ac-
tions are thought to be both planned and controlled using
a single visual representation in the SPL.
Studies of healthy participants indicate that planning and
control are distinct processes that rely on distinct types of
information. Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of this oc-
curs in cases where on-line control operates outside of con-
scious awareness, such as during saccadic suppression
(Goodale et al. 1986; Prablanc & Martin 1992), or in the on-
line correction of movements made to targets subject to vi-
sual illusions (Glover & Dixon 2001a; 2001b; 2001c; 2002a)
or semantic interference effects (Glover & Dixon 2002b;
Glover et al. 2004).
Brain imaging studies suggest the existence of an inferior
parietal/superior parietal distinction between planning and
on-line control. When planning occurs without execution
(Deiber et al. 1996; Grafton et al. 1998; Krams et al. 1998),
the IPL tends to be much more active. During execution, ac-
tivity in the SPL increases (Desmurget et al. 2001; Grafton
et al. 1992; Krams et al. 1998). The planning–control dis-
tinction generally extends to other regions of the brain as
well, in that planning is associated with activity in the frontal
lobes and basal ganglia, whereas control is often (though not
always) associated with activity in the cerebellum.
Human neuropsychology provides a useful complement
to other studies of brain organization. In humans, damage
to the left IPL is linked with ideomotor apraxia, which in-
cludes the loss of the ability to carry out learned actions ef-
fectively (Clark et al. 1994; Poizner et al. 1995). Damage to
the right IPL often results in unilateral neglect, although
this gross deficit has been shown to mask subtle defects in
action planning (Edwards & Humphreys 1999; Mattingley
et al. 1998). Damage to the SPL typically results in deficits
in on-line control, reflected in spatial inaccuracies in reach-
ing and grasping and kinematic profiles that appear to be
disrupted mainly in the second half of the movement (Jean-
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nerod 1986; Jeannerod et al. 1994; Perenin & Vighetto
1983; 1988). Damage to the SPL can also result in an ab-
sence of on-line corrections to perturbed targets (Pisella et
al. 2000). The patient D.F., with damage in the ventral
stream, exhibits some planning deficits, but relatively intact
on-line control (Carey et al. 1996; Goodale et al. 1994b;
Milner et al. 1991; Milner & Goodale 1995).
Although I have outlined a collection of regions associ-
ated with both the IPL and planning, on the one hand, and
the SPL and control, on the other, future studies will be
needed to clarify and elucidate the roles of these allied re-
gions in their respective stages. Methods such as fMRI and
TMS, coupled with innovative behavioral and neuropsy-
chological studies, should offer excellent chances for isolat-
ing and examining the respective neural and behavioral
bases of the planning and control of actions.
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fMRI evidence for and behavioral evidence
against the planning–control model
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Abstract: Consistent with the planning–control model, recent fMRI data
reveal that the inferior parietal lobe, the frontal lobes, and the basal gan-
glia are involved in motor planning. Inconsistent with the planning–con-
trol model, however, recent behavioral data reveal a spatial repulsion ef-
fect, indicating that the visual context surrounding the target can
sometimes influence the on-line control of goal-directed action.
Glover’s planning–control model postulates distinct brain areas
mediating planning and on-line control of action. In this view,
planning involves the inferior parietal lobe, the frontal lobes, and
basal ganglia, whereas control involves the superior parietal lobe
and the cerebellum. In support of this distinction, Glover cites
several neuroimaging studies that used PET. Recently, we com-
pleted an fMRI study that was specifically designed to study the
neural mechanisms of motor planning (Adam et al. 2003). Im-
portantly, this study used the finger-precuing task (Miller 1982)
to measure motor planning. The finger-precuing task requires
subjects to respond to spatial-location stimuli with discrete re-
sponses from index and middle fingers of both hands. Preceding
the target stimulus, a spatial precue indicates a subset of possi-
ble finger responses; this allows the selection and preparation of
two finger responses. The fMRI data revealed that the prepara-
tion of discrete finger responses was associated with increased
activation levels in the parietal cortex (inferior and superior re-
gions, intraparietal sulcus), the frontal cortex (middle frontal
gyrus, premotor and supplementary motor cortex), and the basal
ganglia (caudate nucleus and putamen). This outcome generally
corroborates the planning network as proposed by Glover, ex-
cept for the involvement of superior parietal lobe (and possibly
the intraparietal sulcus bordering the inferior and superior pari-
etal lobe). However, as Glover has pointed out, and consistent
with other neuroimaging studies, the increased activity in the su-
perior parietal lobe probably reflects the attentional effects of
the spatial cues.
Furthermore, the planning–control framework introduced by
Glover postulates a distinction between planning and on-line con-
trol of actions. Whereas planning is assumed to take into account
various sources of visual and cognitive information, control is lim-
ited to the spatial characteristics of the target and the actor. Im-
portantly, according to the planning–control model, the visual
context (e.g., objects surrounding the target) is ignored during on-
line control. However, recent data suggest that the visual context
also can influence control. In two studies (Keulen et al. 2002;
2003), we investigated distractor interference in selective reach-
ing. Participants pointed to a target appearing in isolation or con-
currently with a distractor. The distractor could appear either in
front of or beyond the target. With a small (i.e., 5 mm) separation
between target and distractor we observed a spatial repulsion ef-
fect; that is, the movement endpoints were biased away from the
location of the distractor. In other words, participants ended their
movements within the prescribed target area so as to maximize the
distance to the adjacent distractor (for a first demonstration of this
effect, see Fischer & Adam 2001). The fact that the repulsion ef-
fect was small but consistent (i.e., 0.6 mm on average), and oc-
curred only when target and distractor were close to each other,
suggests that the spatial repulsion effect reflects on-line control
rather than planning. Thus, the spatial repulsion effect indicates
that the immediate visual context surrounding the target can in-
fluence the on-line control of actions. Certainly, this observation
is not fatal for Glover’s model, but it represents a minor qualifica-
tion to one of its premises.
At least some electrophysiological and
behavioural data cannot be reconciled with
the planning–control model
P. Paolo Battaglinia, Paolo Bernardisb, and Nicola Brunob
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Abstract: The planning/control distinction is an important tool in the
study of sensorimotor transformations. However, published data from our
laboratories suggest that, contrary to what is predicted by the proposed
model, (1) structures in the superior parietal lobe of both monkeys and hu-
mans can be involved in movement planning; and (2) fast pointing actions
can be immune to visual illusions even if they are performed without vi-
sual feedback. The planning–control model as proposed by Glover is al-
most certainly too schematic.
Can we make a sharp distinction between planning and control in
human action production? There is little doubt that planning must
precede the onset of movement, whereas on-line control must be-
come increasingly important as the action progresses. It remains
to be seen, however, whether this obvious temporal ordering is
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also implemented in separate neural structures running on the ba-
sis of different internal representations. Although Glover’s model
is remarkably successful in accounting for a large body of data, it
seems to us that other results remain problematic in the light of a
sharp planning/control distinction.
One of us (Battaglini) has described arm-movement related
neurons in area V6A of the macaque superior parietal lobe (SPL).
Comparing neural activity with arm electromyographic recordings
clearly showed that several of these neurons discharged prior to
the onset of movement (Galletti et al. 1997b). Further analyses
suggested that as many as 30% of these V6A neurons may be ac-
tivated before the onset of a reaching movement (Fattori et al.
2001). In a lesion study, small bilateral lesions in the same area
(V6A) of the green monkey produced deficits in fast, ballistic
reaching and grasping. When presented with food (raisins) at spe-
cific egocentric distances, in initial trials, lesioned monkeys mis-
reached the targets several times and only in later trials reached
correctly from the start. Moreover, lesioned monkeys failed to
generalize their training to other egocentric distances, as one
would expect if they suffered from a planning deficit (Battaglini et
al 2002a; 2003). Contrary to Glover’s predictions for humans,
these data suggest that the monkey SPL may be involved in both
planning and control. Although these results may reflect func-
tional differences between the human and monkey brain struc-
tures (but see Galletti et al. 1997a), in EEG studies of reaching in
humans Battaglini also found a clear activation at the SPL before
the onset of movement (Battaglini et al. 2002b). These findings
suggest that Glover’s identification of the human SPL as the site
of on-line control may be too schematic.
Similarly, human studies from the second of our laboratories
(Bruno) may be interpreted as evidence that Glover’s conception
of the internal representations used by planning and control is also
too schematic. In a study of bimanual, fast reaching to the end-
points of a surface subjected to Kanizsa’s compression illusion
(Bruno & Bernardis 2002), Bruno measured performance in two
motor conditions. In the first of these conditions, blindfolded ac-
tors extended their arms until their hands were in the position
where they had seen the endpoint of the surface. Results showed
no hints of compression, although visual discrimination data
showed the usual 5% compression reported in previous studies
(Kanizsa 1975). Given that these actions were performed quickly
and without visual feedback, in the planning–control framework
they should have reflected a greater influence of the “cognitive”
representations used for planning. However, the results failed to
show the “cognitive” effect of the illusion. Even more convinc-
ingly, in a second condition actors simply placed their hand in
front of their chest, in spatial alignment with the surface endo-
point, without extending their arms completely. Given that this
second action corresponded to the early part of bimanual reach-
ing, in the planning–control framework it should have reflected
an even greater influence of the cognitive representation. How-
ever, the results again failed to show any cognitive effect. In fact,
there was no difference with the full reaching condition. Compa-
rable results were found in a pointing study, which also general-
ized them to a variant of Müller-Lyer’s illusion (Bruno & Bernardis
2003).
Can the motor system utilize a stored
representation to control movement?
Gordon Binsteda and Matthew Heathb
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5C2, Canada; bDepartment of Kinesiology and Program in Neural Science,
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Abstract: This commentary focuses on issues related to Glover’s supposi-
tions regarding the information available to the on-line control system and
the behavioral consequences of (visual) information disruption. According
to the author, a “highly accurate,” yet temporally unstable, visual repre-
sentation of peripersonal space is available for real-time trajectory correc-
tions. However, no direct evidence is currently available to support the po-
sition.
Glover’s planning–control model (PCM) suggests that an unfold-
ing visual representation (of the aiming environment) gradually
assumes control of goal-directed action. Certainly, this view is con-
sistent with a number of investigations suggesting that “control”
builds throughout the time-course of visually-guided movements,
culminating in a smooth transition between preplanned and on-
line control processes (Elliott et al. 1999; Heath et al. 1998). But
what happens to on-line control processes when vision of the aim-
ing environment is occluded at some point prior to the movement
(i.e., so-called memory-guided reaching movements)? Glover’s
PCM assumes that a visual representation persists and is available
to the motor system to rapidly modify the memory-guided reach-
ing trajectory. Because this visual representation is assumed to be
transient in nature, delays of greater than two seconds purportedly
lead to near-complete decay of the visual representation, result-
ing in an action executed without the benefit of on-line control.
The inference here is that a stored visual representation may serve
as a valid, albeit temporally unstable, spatial referent for execut-
ing (error-nullifying) corrections to the movement (2-seconds
delay). Undoubtedly, this account of the PCM is rooted in Elliott
and Madalena’s (1987) position that “highly accurate” sensory in-
formation about the aiming environment is available for “on-line
error reduction during the movement.” Specifically, Glover sug-
gests that:
movements made after delays much longer than two seconds will be ex-
ecuted entirely ‘as planned’ (i.e., without the benefit of on-line control).
(target article, sect. 1.1.3, para. 5)
The notion that a stored, visual representation of the aiming en-
vironment is available for “on-line error reduction” represents an
intriguing possibility; we wonder, however, whether there is em-
pirical evidence to support this view. Indeed, our examination of
the memory-guided reaching literature indicated that it is largely
unclear whether stored visual information about the aiming envi-
ronment is used for movement planning, on-line movement con-
trol, or both. This primarily reflects a limitation of previous work
and emphasis on the endpoint characteristics of memory-guided
reaches (e.g., Elliott 1988; Elliott & Madalena 1987; Westwood et
al. 2001a; 2003); no direct evidence (i.e., movement corrections or
kinematics) is available to support the position that stored target
information is used for on-line movement control following brief
delays. Hence, the reported residual accuracy of memory-guided
reaches might simply reflect the use of a stored representation of
the aiming environment for movement planning processes; that is,
stored information is not used for error-nullifying limb/target cor-
rections – regardless of the length of the memory delay (Flanders
et al. 1992; Plamandon 1995).
In an attempt to reconcile this issue, we (Heath & Binsted
2003), present very recent data in which participants (N15)
completed a number of reaching movements (450) to three mid-
line targets (20, 30, 40 cm) in three visual conditions: a visually-
guided one and two delay intervals (0 and 5 seconds of delay, re-
spectively). To infer movement control, we implemented a
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Figure 1 (Binsted & Heath). Predictability of movement endpoint from mid-trajectory limb positions. The proportion of endpoint vari-
ance (R2) in movement endpoints (primary movement axis) explained by the limb position at three positions (25% , 50% , and 75%
 of movement time) is presented for an exemplar participant. Note that R2 in Full Vision trials (Fig. 1A) do not increase in the later
stages of the trajectory (50% and 75% of MT). In contrast, 0-second (Fig. 1B) and 5-second (Fig. 1C) delay trials demonstrate larger R2
values later in the movement trajectory.
regression analysis to examine the proportion of variability (R2) in
endpoint position that can be explained by the position of the limb
at early (25% of movement time [MT]), middle (50% MT), and
later (75% MT) stages of a reaching trajectory (see also Heath et
al. 2004). We reasoned that if the motor system used on-line con-
trol processes, early undershooting or overshooting errors should
be detected and eliminated by adjusting the later reaching trajec-
tory. As a result, position of the limb during the middle and latter
stages of the reaching trajectory need not predict the ultimate
movement endpoint. According to the PCM, visually guided
reaches and the 0-second delay condition should demonstrate
such a pattern of results. Either direct visual input from the aim-
ing environment would serve as the basis for executing corrections
or a stored visual control representation would provide the basis
for on-line and feedback- and feedforward-derived, corrections to
the reaching trajectory. Conversely, if movements are executed
without on-line control, then the limb trajectory should unfold ac-
cording to a programmed spatiotemporal pattern; the final posi-
tion of the limb would be highly correlated with the position of the
limb at any other point in time during the reaching trajectory; that
is, early overshooting or undershooting errors would not be cor-
rected by compensatory adjustments to the later trajectory. Be-
cause the visual control representation is assumed to decay fol-
lowing two seconds of delay, the PCM would predict that reaching
movements involving a five-second delay would exhibit such a pat-
tern.
For the purposes of this commentary, we present the graphic
result (Fig. 1) of an exemplar participant in three visual conditions
(full-vision, 0-second delay, 5-second delay) while aiming to the
40-cm target. These figures quite nicely demonstrate the control
characteristics of each reaching condition. Not surprisingly, R2
values for visually-guided trials (Fig. 1A) did not increase in the
later stages (i.e., 50% and 75% of MT) of the reaching trajectory,
indicating that the participant used direct visual input from the
aiming environment for feedback-based corrections to their
reaching trajectory. In contrast, the 0- (Fig. 1B) and 5-second (Fig.
1C) conditions exhibited robust R2 values later in the movement
trajectory (i.e., 50% and 75%). The magnitude and strikingly sim-
ilar R2 values associated with the 0- and 5-second delay conditions
indicate that the movement endpoints for memory-guided reach-
ing movements are largely determined by central planning
processes operating in advance of movement onset. In other
words, a visual control representation was not accessed for on-line
control processing of very brief (0-second) or prolonged (5-sec-
ond) delay intervals. These data are inconsistent with the PCM’s
position that a stored visual representation plays an important role
in on-line reaching control when direct visual input is unavailable
from the aiming environment.
Finally, although Glover presents a barrage of data supporting
the PCM, both anatomically and behaviourally, our demonstration
of the absence of a viable store for use by on-line control systems
should not be surprising. According to the PCM representation
view, brief delay conditions should behave in a very similar fash-
ion to fully closed-loop conditions (i.e., full vision) – illusory bias
should be corrected immediately based on the held veridical ac-
count of space. This prediction is at odds with a significant num-
ber of empirical papers demonstrating that illusory vigilance in-
creases immediately upon removal of vision (e.g., Binsted &
Elliott 1999; Westwood et al. 2000c).
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Defining visuomotor dissociations and an
application to the oculomotor system
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Abstract: The perception/planning–control conception has a direct pre-
decessor in a cognitive/sensorimotor scheme, where the cognitive branch
includes Glover’s perception and planning functions. The sensorimotor
branch corresponds to Glover’s control function. The cognitive/sensori-
motor scheme, like the perception/planning–control scheme, differ-
entiates between motor planning and direct motor control, which is inac-
cessible to awareness or to long-term memory.
Distinguishing planning from control in visuomotor function is a
useful step in interpreting the relationships between vision and
action, but it is not a new step. Following the terminology of Pail-
lard (1987), Bridgeman (1991b), and Bridgeman et al. (1997) di-
vided visual perception, planning, and control into a cognitive
and a sensorimotor pathway. The cognitive pathway groups to-
gether Glover’s perception and planning functions, while the sen-
sorimotor pathway corresponds to Glover’s control function. In
this context, Glover’s additional contribution is a differentiation of
the cognitive pathway into perceptual and action planning func-
tions (Fig. 1).
The cognitive/sensorimotor mapping is consistent with Glover’s
demonstration that it is essential to differentiate planning, on the
one hand, from control, on the other. In the cognitive/sensorimo-
tor scheme, perception and planning are grouped into a single
“cognitive” function because they share several key features. Both
work over the long term, relying on memory to organize their con-
tent, and both rely strongly on context, thus exploiting the great
power of contextual information but becoming vulnerable to vi-
sual illusions and to relatively slow operation. And both engage
awareness, in the sense that a person can verbally describe their
content in the present and in the past. That is, a person can de-
scribe both perceptions of the outside world and plans for action.
The participation of the cognitive system in motor planning was
made explicit: “It is at the cognitive level that symbolic decisions
such as button pressing or verbal response are mediated” (Bridge-
man et al. 1997, p. 457).
The sensorimotor or control function, in contrast, operates only
in the here-and-now, without sensitivity to context, but it is there-
fore invulnerable to illusions. Unlike the cognitive function, it
manages real-time control of muscles without conscious aware-
ness. During a complex action we are profoundly unaware of
which muscle units, or even which muscles, are active, to what de-
gree, and in what order. Further, this brain mechanism possesses
a quantitative calibration of position that is unavailable to percep-
tion.
Further empirical studies have clarified this distinction: Appar-
ently, the cognitive system can inform the sensorimotor system
about which of two possible targets to approach, and the sensori-
motor system can use its own egocentrically calibrated spatial infor-
mation to guide the movement (Bridgeman et al. 2000, pp. 3549–
50).
These two systems were first differentiated in the context of sac-
cadic suppression (Bridgeman et al. 1979), and later in the con-
text of induced motion (Bridgeman et al. 1981). Both of these
methods, though, involved motion, and could also be interpreted
as cognitive and motor systems picking up different spatial values
from early vision at different times. The static Roelofs effect
promised to more cleanly separate the two systems (the Roelofs
effect is not a motion illusion, as Glover asserts). In the experi-
ments, a static rectangular frame offset from the observer’s cen-
terline induces a misperception of a target’s position in the direc-
tion opposite the frame’s offset (Bridgeman 1991a). This is really
a newly described, induced Roelofs effect. Nearly all observers
show a large Roelofs effect in perception, but they point accu-
rately to the target regardless of frame position (Bridgeman et al.
2000). Recent work, in collaboration with Paul Dassonville, has
shown that the unconscious sensorimotor system has no visual
map in this case, but possesses just what is missing from the cog-
nitive system – a representation of the observer’s own centerline,
calibrating visual with personal space (Dassonville et al., in press).
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Figure 1 (Bridgeman). Three ways of parsing perception, plan-
ning, and control functions.
The cognitive/sensorimotor distinction or Glover’s three-part
distinction can be applied to the oculomotor system, as Glover
notes. A first step in this analysis is to differentiate planning and
control functions in the oculomotor system. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, the planning function is very limited in the oculomotor sys-
tem – of all the types of eye movements, only saccades, and only
some of them, engage the planning function. All other move-
ments, including vergence, pursuit, and optokinetic movements,
are under real-time control of the visual stimulus and do not re-
quire planning. Saccades of the fast phase of optokinetic and
vestibular nystagmus are also executed without intevention of a
planning system. Voluntary saccades can be planned, but are usu-
ally executed in connection with the directing of attention.
Vision can be used to plan action, to execute action, or just to
store information for future use. In the latter case, activities such
as reading have a goal of collecting information about the world,
rather than driving behavior directly. The sensorimotor interac-
tions of reading involve the oculomotor system in the service of
collecting information, not doing things to objects or moving
through the world.
Using the same information for planning and
control is compatible with the dynamic
illusion effect
Anne-Marie Brouwera, Eli Brennerb, and
Jeroen B. J. Smeetsb
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Abstract: We argue that one can explain why the influence of illusions de-
creases during a movement without assuming that different visual repre-
sentations are used for planning and control. The basis for this is that
movements are guided by a combination of correctly perceived informa-
tion about certain attributes (such as a target’s position) and illusory infor-
mation about other attributes (such as the direction of motion). We explain
how this can automatically lead to a decreasing effect of illusions when hit-
ting discs that move in an illusory direction, and when grasping objects of
which the apparent size or orientation has been changed by an illusion.
It is likely that more aspects of the available visual information are
used to plan a movement than to control it. There are many attri-
butes that normally cannot change during the short time that the
movement is executed, such as the colour of a piece of fruit. Move-
ments, therefore, usually need not be adjusted to such informa-
tion. In this sense we agree with Glover that there are probably
differences between the use of information for planning and for
controlling movements. However, we doubt that the difference is
more fundamental than this. In this commentary we argue that it
is not necessary to assume that there are different visual repre-
sentations for planning and control in order to explain the de-
creasing effect of illusions during human movements.
When participants grasp objects that are presented in illusion-
inducing contexts, the effect of the illusion on the movement ap-
pears to decrease over time. Glover argues that this dynamic illu-
sion effect is caused by the increasing influence of on-line control
(using information about the target that is independent of the con-
text), which eliminates the errors that are made when the move-
ment is planned (using context-dependent information). Recently,
we found a very clear decreasing effect of an illusion within a study
in which participants hit discs that moved downwards across a
structured background on a screen (Brouwer et al. 2003). The
background could move to the right or the left, or it could remain
static. A moving background affects the perceived direction of the
target’s motion (Smeets & Brenner 1995b). In accordance with
the misperceived direction, we observed an effect of background
motion on the direction in which the participants’ hands started to
move. This effect of the illusion had disappeared by the end of the
movement, as indicated by a lack of effect of background motion
on the hitting error.
Although this dynamic illusion effect is consistent with Glover’s
model, it can also be explained without assuming that different
sources of information are used in the planning and the control
phase of the movement. The basis for this explanation is the ob-
servation that the illusion does not affect the target’s apparent po-
sition (Smeets & Brenner 1995b). We propose that participants
use the same (misjudged) direction information and (correct) po-
sition information for planning and controlling the movement. If
this information is used to extrapolate the target’s movement dur-
ing the time until impact, there will be a large effect of the illusion
at the start of the movement, because the trajectory of the target
that has to be extrapolated is still long. Near the end of the move-
ment, the effect of the illusion will be negligible, because there is
only a short distance from the most recent (correctly) perceived
position across which the target’s trajectory has to be extrapolated.
To illustrate how continuous extrapolation results in a dynamic
illusion effect, we simulated the lateral movement of a hand hit-
ting three moving discs. One disc moved straight down, one disc
moved at an angle of 9.5 degrees from the vertical, and one disc
moved straight down but had an illusory direction of motion of 9.5
degrees. For the latter case, as illustrated in Figure 1A, a new pre-
diction is made at every point in time, based on the present target
position and the (in this case, incorrectly) perceived direction of
motion. We assume that the hand always moves straight towards
the most recent prediction of the disc’s final position. The result-
ing directions of hand movement are shown in Figure 1B. If the
disc’s direction of motion is perceived correctly, the predicted fi-
nal position of the disc is correct from the moment that the hand
starts to move; thus, the hand follows a straight path to that posi-
tion. If the disc moves straight down but appears to move in a dif-
ferent direction, the hand follows a curved path. Figure 1C de-
picts the strength of the illusion according to the scheme of Glover
and colleagues. This is the ratio between the effect of a disc that
is actually moving at an angle of 9.5 degrees and the effect of a disc
that only seems to move at an angle of 9.5 degrees (both relative
to the vertical). At the start of the movement, the lateral move-
ments of hands hitting these discs are very similar. During the
movement, the lateral position of the hand hitting the disc with
the illusory direction moves toward that of the hand hitting the
disc that is (correctly) perceived to move straight down.
Examples of a dynamic effect of illusion on action that were pro-
vided to support Glover’s model (cf. target article; Glover 2002),
are focused on grasping: grasping the central disc in the Ebbing-
haus illusion (Glover & Dixon 2002a), the central bar of the Müller-
Lyer illusion (Westwood et al. 2000c; 2001b), and a bar affected by
an orientation illusion (Glover & Dixon 2001a; 2001b). These re-
sults can also be explained without assuming that different infor-
mation is used for planning and control if one realises that related
physical attributes (such as a target’s size and the positions of its
edges) might be processed independently (Smeets et al. 2002).
To explain the dynamic illusion effect for the examples above,
we can look at the predictions of a model for grasping (Smeets &
Brenner 1999; 2001). This model describes the movement of the
digits by the intended contact positions, which are assumed to be
perceived correctly, and the approach parameter, which describes
how much of the digits’ final trajectories is orthogonal to the sur-
faces around the intended contact positions. The approach param-
eter increases with required accuracy. A larger approach parame-
ter results in a larger maximum grip aperture.
Smeets et al. (2003) have demonstrated that the influence of the
Ebbinghaus illusion on grasping could be caused by considering
the grasp to require a higher accuracy (and therefore to have a
larger approach parameter) if the target circle is surrounded by
small circles than if it is surrounded by large circles. The dynamic
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effect of the illusion arises because of a timing difference between
the increase in grip aperture caused by a larger approach param-
eter and that caused by a larger target. Additionally, the illusion
necessarily decreases to zero because the digits continue to move
to the intended contact positions. In a similar vein, the model can
account for the dynamic effect of the Müller-Lyer illusion (a larger
approach parameter for the line with the inward directed arrows,
to avoid the protrusions). The model is also consistent with the ob-
served decrease in the effect of an orientation illusion on the
hand’s orientation during grasping (Smeets et al. 2002).
In conclusion, we believe that the dynamic illusion effect in ac-
tion does not justify the assumption of different visual represen-
tations for planning and control, or even the use of different
sources of information before and during a movement. We have
shown that the dynamic illusion in both interception and grasping
can be explained without assuming a change in the information
used.
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Abstract: Some data concerning visual illusions are hardly compatible
with the perception–action model, assuming that only the perception sys-
tem is influenced by visual context. The planning–control dichotomy of-
fers an alternative that better accounts for some controversy in experi-
mental data. We tested the two models by submitting the patient I. G. to
the induced Roelofs effect. The similitude of the results of I. G. and con-
trol subjects favoured Glover’s model, which, however, presents a paradox
that needs to be clarified.
Since the pioneering work carried out by Woodworth (1899), a re-
current issue in the studies relating to visuomotor control con-
cerns the way visual inputs are used to locate a target in the reach-
ing space. A large body of data in the recent scientific literature
has underlined the fact that planning a movement requires that
many spatial aspects of not only the target but also of the sur-
rounding contextual elements have been previously considered
together. As an illustration, a luminous target in a dark context is
perceived as being closer than its actual position and is undershot
when reached manually with no visual feedback about the hand
trajectory (Conti & Beaubaton 1980; Foley 1980). By contrast,
spatial performance improves when the visual environment is
structured; merely adding a textured background in the work-
space improves movement terminal accuracy (Coello et al. 2000).
Another line of evidence is the fact that having the hand and the
target in the visual field simultaneously improves the visuomotor
performance, which indicates that an accurate assessment of the
gap separating the hand and the target is one of the main deter-
minants of spatial performance (Rossetti et al. 1994). In agree-
ment with the latter point, the location of contextual information
in relation to the self and the target plays a crucial role in deter-
mining reaching accuracy, with elements placed in the space
through which the reach occurs conferring the most benefit
(Coello 2002; Grealy et al. 2003). Interestingly, structuring the vi-
sual field has a broad effect on the control of movement amplitude
but leaves the control of movement direction unaffected (Coello
& Magne 2000). We recently reported that unexpectedly append-
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Figure 1 (Brouwer et al.). Hitting a moving disc when the direc-
tion of motion is misperceived. Schematic illustration of the disc’s
predicted final positions (A), the direction of hand movement (B),
and the scaled magnitude of the effect of the illusion (C). The hand
was simulated to move for 250 msec (which was about the average
movement time in our experiment). A: The solid line indicates the
lateral position over time of a disc that moves straight down but is
perceived to move at an angle of 9.5 degrees from the vertical. The
dashed lines indicate the disc’s extrapolated movement at time
samples of 0, 50, 100, 150, and 200 msec after the hand started to
move. The disc’s correctly perceived position and its misperceived
direction of motion are used for the extrapolation. The white dots
represent the disc’s predicted final positions. B: The lateral posi-
tion of the hand over time when hitting (a) a disc that moves
straight down (vertical velocity of 18 cm/sec, horizontal velocity of
0 cm/sec) with a correctly perceived direction of motion, indicated
by the black solid line, (b) a disc that moves at an angle of 9.5 de-
grees (vertical velocity of 18 cm/sec, horizontal velocity of 3 cm/
sec) with a correctly perceived direction of motion, indicated by
the grey solid line, and (c) a disc that moves straight down, but is
perceived to move at an angle of 9.5 degrees (an illusory horizon-
tal velocity of 3 cm/sec), indicated by the curved dashed line. For
this disc, the straight dashed lines indicate that at each time sam-
ple, the hand moves straight towards the disc’s final position as pre-
dicted at that time sample. The dashed line for the first time sam-
ple overlaps the solid grey line. C: The effect of the illusion over
time. This is the lateral hand position for hitting a disc with an il-
lusory direction of motion of 9.5 degrees divided by the lateral
hand position for hitting a disc with an actual direction of motion
of 9.5 degrees. The effect of the illusion decreases during the
movement.
ing a textured background in the action space had an instanta-
neous concomitant effect on movement amplitude and peak ve-
locity (Magne & Coello 2002), indicating that the improvement in
the motor performance was mainly the consequence of a more ac-
curate visual system.
These observations are partly in agreement with Glover’s con-
tention that motor planning process depends on a number of fac-
tors including the object of the action (spatial and nonspatial char-
acteristics), the surrounding environment, and the internal state
of the actor, while control process focuses mainly on the on-line
minimisation of the spatial error of the movement (sects. 1.1.1,
1.1.2). Adjusting the planning process in flight, the control system
is restricted to the spatial characteristics of the target and is thus
immune to the interference of visual context (sect. 1.1.3). The idea
of a certain independence of planning and control processes is
supported by numerous data and has been already suggested in
the past (e.g. Pisella et al. 2000). However, assuming together that
(1) context information plays a crucial role in target coding (as
shown above), and that (2) the function of the control system is to
amend the planning process in flight on the basis of only the spa-
tial characteristics of the target, leads to a neglected paradox. Dis-
regarding the situation where direct visual control is available, one
may wonder what would be the benefit of a control system ad-
justing the displacement of the hand (estimated through proprio-
ceptive signal and efferent copy) towards a visual target that is per-
ceived at an erroneous distance (which is the case when contextual
information is not included in target coding). Furthermore, pro-
viding contextual information in the form of a textured back-
ground was found to improve the planning process – but also the
on-line control process. Indeed, the benefit of providing contex-
tual information during both movement planning and movement
execution (in the form of a textured background) was exactly equal
to the sum of the benefit of providing contextual information dur-
ing only movement planning or only movement execution (see
Fig.1). This additive effect cannot be accounted for by the fact that
the planning system overlaps the control system during movement
execution (sect. 1.1.4).
Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect was higher in the ex-
ecution than in the planning stage. This outcome supports the idea
of an independent use of visual information during planning and
control processes, in agreement with Glover’s model, but demon-
strates that the control process cannot be considered to be im-
mune to the interference of visual context (sect. 1.1.3), at least not
when distance coding is taken into account.
This parametric framework is of paramount importance to un-
derstand the dissociation between perception and action. As indi-
cated by Glover, the dominant theory during the past decade has
been the one propounded by Milner and Goodale (1995). Accord-
ing to this theory, a single visual representation is considered to sub-
serve actions, whereas a separate representation subserves percep-
tions (sect. 2.6.1). The core idea of the theory is that the processing
of visual information is thought to involve independent streams
from the primary visual cortex. Visual processing for goal-directed
behaviour is predominantly supported by the occipito-parietal
pathway (dorsal stream), while visual processing for conscious per-
ception is performed through the occipito-temporal pathway (ven-
tral stream). These two types of processing have been assumed to
give rise to the independent “sensorimotor” and “cognitive” repre-
sentations of visual space (Paillard 1987; Rossetti 1998).
Many findings are consistent with the idea that visual illusions
influence perception more than action. The first evidence came
from the Induced Roelofs Effect (IRE; Bridgeman 1991b). Ob-
servers were asked to estimate the egocentric position of a lumi-
nous target appearing inside a surrounding frame at various loca-
tions along the fronto-parallel axis. When the frame had a lateral
offset, the target was misperceived to be in the controlateral di-
rection when estimated verbally but not when located with a man-
ual reaching response. The interpretation of such dissociation was
that the cognitive system dealing with relative positions elaborates
an explicit qualitative representation, which includes information
relating to the whole visual scene even when the processing of con-
textual elements leads to localisation errors. Conversely, dealing
with absolute positions, the sensorimotor system elaborates an im-
plicit quantitative (metric) representation of visual space that is in-
sensitive to contextual information (Bridgeman 1991b; 2000). Ac-
cording to Glover, the lack of effect of the contextual frame on the
manual response might be due to the fact that the control system
adjusts the motor performance in flight on the basis of a spatial
analysis that remains immune to the interference of visual context
(sects. 1.1.3 and 2.6.2). However, we recently reported data that
support none of these interpretations (Coello et al. 2003). Using
the IRE, but in slightly different experimental conditions, we
found a dissociation in the influence of the off-centre frame on the
motor response that was dependent on the spatial dimension
tested. When the frame was displaced along the fronto-parallel
axis, the target was misperceived along the same axis but in the op-
posite direction, while the manual capture of the target remained
unaffected in keeping with the original study. However, the IRE
interfered with perceptual and pointing responses in identical ways
when the frame was displaced along the sagittal axis. Hence, the
processing of visual information for action is not always immune to
contextual influence, which appears to be dependent on the spa-
tial dimension (direction or distance) that the task emphasises.
The crucial issue that remains to be addressed concerns the
neurophysiological substrate which can subserve the distinct in-
fluence of visual context on distance and direction parameters.
Based on a case study of optic ataxia, Mon-Williams et al. (2001)
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Figure 1 (Coello & Rossetti). (a) Apparatus and visual scene
seen by the participant in presence of a textured background. (b)
Mean amplitude error and (c) mean direction error of pointing
movements as a function of the context condition: dark environ-
ment (DE), background during movement planning (MP), back-
ground during movement execution (ME), background during
movement planning and movement execution (MP-E). (*) Indi-
cates when performances were significantly influenced by the
presence of a textured background, with respect to the dark con-
dition. (Adapted from Coello & Magne 2000.)
suggested that the ventral stream is responsible for extracting dis-
tance information from monocular retinal cues, such as shading,
texture, and perspective, while the dorsal stream has access to
binocular information from disparities and vergence. This makes
our results compatible with the Milner and Goodale model. Thus,
the lack of dissociation between perception and action along the
sagittal axis with the IRE could be interpreted as a greater partic-
ipation of the ventral stream in distance processing, independent
of the type of response or the viewing condition. However, ac-
cording to Glover’s model, the ventral system is involved in any as-
pect of motor planning. In this model, simple movements, such as
reaching and grasping, tend to rely on the IPL for movement plan-
ning. Visual information can be projected to the IPL via the tem-
poral lobe (which carries out information about spatial and non-
spatial characteristics of a target and the surrounding context) and
the “third” visual stream (sect. 1.2.2; but see review: Rossetti et al.
2000; Rossetti & Pisella 2002).
One way to contrast these two models would be to evaluate the
performance of a patient with an impaired dorsal stream when
confronted with the IRE. According to the ventral-dorsal di-
chotomy, an impaired dorsal stream would lead the patient to be
unable to perform accurate motor acts considering the strong im-
plication of the dorsal stream in motor control. Previous observa-
tions have shown, however, that this is not the case (Rossetti et al.
2003). Another possibility would be that the participation of the
ventral stream is strengthened in the organisation and control of
the motor acts in order to compensate for the impaired dorsal
stream (Milner & Dijkerman 2001; Rossetti & Pisella 2002). One
would therefore expect an effect of the IRE in both the fronto-
parallel and the sagittal axes. By contrast, according to the plan-
ning-control dichotomy, the ventral stream participates in move-
ment planning in all aspects and therefore, no discrepancy
between the patient and the control participants is expected. We
recently tested patient I.G., a 31-year-old woman who had suf-
fered bilateral parieto-occipital infarction one and a half years ago,
resulting in a severe bilateral ataxia (see Pisella et al. [2000] for a
detailed description). As shown in Figure 2, when submitted to
the IRE, I.G. showed a pattern of results very similar to that of the
control subjects, which stands in support for Glover’s model.
In conclusion, many of the recent data concerning visual illusions
are hardly compatible with the simple perception–action model, as-
suming in particular that only the perception system is subjected to
context influence. The planning–control dichotomy offers an alter-
native that better accounts for the apparent controversy in experi-
mental data related to visual illusions. However, to provide a gen-
eral framework, it seems imperative to solve the paradox in the
model, which originates from the fact that the role of the control
system is thought to reduce spatial errors denying context informa-
tion, while it nonetheless has been demonstrated that visual context
broadly contributes to the accurate coding of target location.
The planning–control model and
spatio-motor deficits following brain damage
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Abstract: Glover’s planning–control model accommodates a substantial
number of findings from subjects who have motor deficits as a conse-
quence of brain lesions. A number of consistently observed and robust
findings are not, however, explained by Glover’s theory; additionally, the
claim that the IPL supports planning whereas the SPL supports control is
not consistently supported in the literature.
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Figure 2 (Coello & Rossetti). (a) Apparatus and sequence of stimuli presented to the patient I.G. The Reference Target was presented
simultaneously with a centred frame for 400 msec at two possible locations. Following a blank period of 500 msec, a Test Target was pre-
sented at a position similar to that of the Reference Target, at 8mm, or at 16mm along the fronto-parallel axis, or along the sagittal
axis. It was accompanied with an off-centre frame or was presented alone. The task was to determine whether the Test Target was at the
same position or not, compared to the Reference Target position, or to point towards the Test Target (for a detailed presentation of the
method, see Coello et al. 2003). (b) Induced Roelofs effect along the fronto-parallel axis (left) and sagittal axis (right) for the patient I.G.
Considering the fronto-parallel dimension, the induced Roelofs effect influenced the verbal response (open circle) but not the pointing
response (filled circle) though the patients showed a constant bias to the left. Considering the sagittal dimension, the induced Roelofs
effect influenced both the verbal response (open circle) and the pointing response (filled circle), the latter showing a constant overshoot
of the target. Control performances (adapted from Coello et al. 2003) are indicated by the diamond, but normalised with respect to the
no frame condition in order to allow a direct relative comparison of effect size in IG and controls.
Although we agree that the distinction between planning and con-
trol of action provides a useful framework for analyzing motor per-
formance, the claim that motor planning is mediated by the infe-
rior parietal lobe (IPL) and control by the superior parietal lobe
(SPL) appears to be too strong. Whereas the planning–control hy-
pothesis offers an adequate account of the basic features of ideo-
motor apraxia and optic ataxia, there are several important aspects
of these clinical syndromes that are not accommodated by the
planning–control model as articulated by Glover.
1. Planning and praxis. The planning–control model bears a
number of similarities to a model of apraxia we recently proposed
(Buxbaum 2001). We suggested that skilled action retrieval and
production is a constructive process, requiring that stored repre-
sentations of object-related actions mediated by the left IPL be
tempered on-line by the dorsal stream in response to current en-
vironmental contingencies. We argued that the most common
type of ideomotor apraxia is attributable to damage to what we
called the “representational” IPL system and relative preservation
of the “dynamic” dorsal system. The planning–control model goes
beyond this proposal to explicitly align the representational sys-
tem with planning stages of action, and we believe that this nu-
ance has the potential to offer additional insights about the be-
havior of apraxic patients.
One observation consistent with the planning–control model is
that IPL-lesioned apraxics are deficient in their ability to generate
or recognize hand postures associated with using familiar objects
in a skilled manner, but intact in their ability to generate and rec-
ognize postures for grasping the same objects. In fact, in the for-
mer situation, they often “default” to a generic grasping posture.
This suggests that their deficits in the IPL-mediated skilled knowl-
edge system force reliance on dorsally mediated on-line motor con-
trol (Buxbaum et al. 2002). Even more directly relevant to the plan-
ning/control distinction is the observation that apraxics are
deficient in motor imagery (Sirigu et al. 1996). Apraxics are im-
paired in planning grasp of objects based on their orientation in
space, as judged by their deficient motor imagery of the grasp pos-
ture they would use if they were to grasp the object. In contrast,
their actual grasping of the same objects is intact. Presumably, once
movement is launched, reliance upon intact feedback loops from
proprioception and sensation enables correction of error arising in
the earlier planning component (Buxbaum et al., submitted).
Another observation consistent with the proposed model is that
object manipulation knowledge (arguably a form of semantic
knowledge) appears to be mediated by the IPL. Knowledge of the
manner in which an object is manipulated (but not knowledge of
an object’s function) is disrupted in apraxics with IPL damage
(Buxbaum & Saffran 2002). In parallel, several recent fMRI stud-
ies have shown that questions about how objects are manipulated
activate regions of the IPL and intraparietal sulcus (Boronat et al.,
submitted; Kellenbach et al. 2003). These data are suggestive of a
relationship between action planning and semantic information
similar to that proposed by Glover.
On the other hand, there are at least two observations from
apraxia suggesting that the model requires refinement. One ob-
servation is that apraxics have difficulty learning new gestures
(Gonzalez Rothi & Heilman 1984). The model doesn’t account for
the links between motor planning, new learning, and retention of
previously learned motor skills. One possible explanation for this
relationship is that all three require the ability to generate and
maintain internal (forward and inverse) models of action. The sec-
ond observation is that there is a large and frequently cited dis-
parity between transitive (object-related) and intransitive (non-
object-related) gesture. Critically, left IPL-lesioned apraxics often
perform normally on tasks requiring retrieval of intransitive ges-
tures from memory. This suggests that the left IPL is specialized
not just for action planning, but for skilled object-oriented action
planning as well. This proposal is consistent with the putative im-
portance of this structure in mapping between ventral stream rep-
resentations of objects, on the one hand, and dorsal action sys-
tems, on the other (Buxbaum 2001).
2. The planning–control model and reaching. The hypothesis
that the IPL is specialized for planning skilled object-oriented ac-
tion (and not just action in general) would explain the apparent
preservation of planning of non-object-related movements (e.g.,
reach) in several patients we recently reported. One such patient
(J.D.; cf. Schwoebel et al. 2001) had a predominantly left IPL le-
sion in the context of generalized atrophy. She exhibited a striking
deficit in “motor control,” in that she was unable to reach to a tar-
get after passive movement of her arm. For example, when J.D.
reached toward a visually presented target after closing her eyes,
terminal error was relatively small. If, on the other hand, her arm
was passively moved to a new position after visualizing the target
and closing her eyes, reaching was grossly inaccurate. In a differ-
ent experiment, J.D. visualized a target, touched her nose, closed
her eyes, and reached. Performance did not differ substantially
from the condition in which she did not move her arm prior to
reaching. In contrast, if J.D.’s hand was passively moved to her
nose after visualizing the target and closing her eyes, reaching ac-
curacy deteriorated markedly. We suggest that J.D. is unable to
use proprioceptive feedback to guide reaching behavior, and de-
spite her IPL lesion, relies on a “forward,” or predictive, model for
motor control. These and other data from patients with predomi-
nantly IPL lesions (e.g, Schwoebel & Coslett 2002) suggest that
the claim that planning and control are mediated by the IPL and
SPL respectively is too strong.
Finally, the account of optic ataxia offered by the planning–con-
trol account fails to address the often robust effects of factors such
as the hemispace in which the action is performed. The fact that
optic ataxia may be manifested by the contralesional hand in only
one hemispace or exhibited in the contralesional hemispace by ei-
ther hand suggests that both the “control” and the “planning”
components of the model – and the boundaries between them and
related perceptual and motor representations – need substantial
elaboration (see Buxbaum & Coslett 1997, 1998; DeRenzi 1982).
In summary, we believe that Glover’s assertion regarding the
anatomic underpinnings of motor planning and control is overly
simplistic, and we note a number of respects in which the account
is underspecified. Nevertheless, as the hypothesis accommodates
a substantial amount of evidence from diverse sources and gener-
ates specific, testable predictions, the planning–control model as
articulated by Glover represents a welcome contribution to the
rapidly evolving field of motor cognition.
Scale errors by very young children:
A dissociation between action
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Abstract: Very young children occasionally commit scale errors, which in-
volve a dramatic dissociation between planning and control: A child’s vi-
sual representation of the size of a miniature object is not used in planning
an action on it, but is used in the control of the action. Glover’s planning–
control model offers a very useful framework for analyzing this newly doc-
umented phenomenon.
The target article by Glover focuses exclusively on research with
adults, but the planning–control model also has useful applica-
tions in the developmental domain. In particular, it is very helpful
for thinking about a new developmental phenomenon – scale er-
rors – that my colleagues and I have recently described (De-
Loache et al. 2003).
Scale errors involve a dramatic dissociation between planning
and control that occurs occasionally in the behavior of very young
children: A child’s visual representation of the size of an object is
basically ignored in the process of planning an action on it, though
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it is brought to bear in the motor control of the action. A proto-
typical example of a scale error, and one of the original observa-
tions that sparked our interest in this topic, is a toddler attempt-
ing to sit on a miniature (dollhouse-size) chair. Other examples we
have informally observed include young children trying to lie
down in a doll’s bed and attempting to get into a small toy car.
A scale error is defined as an attempt to perform an action that
is totally impossible because of extreme differences in size – in this
case, between a child’s own body and a target object. When com-
mitting scale errors, children appear to be completely serious,
with no indication of pretense or joking.
In our initial study designed to document the phenomenon of
scale errors, children between 18 and 30 months of age were in-
duced to play with three large toys in a laboratory playroom. They
climbed up and slid down an indoor slide, sat in a child-sized chair,
and got into and propelled a car around the room. Then, while the
child was out of the room, each of the three large items was re-
placed by a miniature replica.
When they returned to the room, almost half of the children com-
mitted scale errors that were captured on camera. Some of them
tried to climb up the stairs of the little slide, typically causing it to
tip over. Others sat on top of the slide and attempted to go down it,
often falling off in the process. Some of the children sat firmly down
on the tiny chair, whereas others perched gingerly on top. Most re-
markable of all, some children earnestly tried to get into the minia-
ture car. After opening the car door, they attempted – sometimes
quite persistently – to shove their foot in the small opening. The
best way to appreciate the nature of these scale errors is to see them
in action (which can be done by going to the following website:
http://faculty.virginia.edu/childstudycenter/projects.html).
A particularly intriguing aspect of scale errors is that although
the child’s general plan is impossible because of the size of the tar-
get object, some of the movements that the child makes toward
the object are accurately scaled. When trying to sit in a tiny chair,
children typically check visually to see where the chair is, some-
time even bending over and looking between their legs to locate
it precisely. They then squat over it, lowering themselves to the
point of contact. When trying to get into the miniature car, chil-
dren first use fine motor control to open the car door. In addition,
they sometimes hold on to the top of the car while trying to force
their foot through the door, especially if their initial effort to get
in has caused the car to skitter away.
It is this remarkable combination of wildly inaccurate and
highly accurate behavior for which we find Glover’s planning–
control model to be particularly helpful. Interpreting scale errors
in terms of his theory places their origin in the planning system.
When a very young child encounters a miniature replica of a highly
familiar type of object, visual processing of the replica activates the
child’s semantic representation of the larger object, or the class of
objects, it stands for. Included in the activated memory represen-
tation of the full-sized object is the motor program or routine for
interacting with it. Normally, visual processing of the size of the
replica inhibits execution of the activated motor routine, and the
child either does not attempt to act on the replica at all or carries
out a very different action, such as pretense (for example, setting
a doll in the miniature chair or pushing the car around on the floor
making “vroom” sounds). Occasionally, however, for some reason
an action plan is formed that does not take the available size in-
formation into account. Once the plan is initiated, the control sys-
tem draws on the visual representation of size and adapts the
child’s movements to the actual size of the object. Thus, in the
commission of a scale error, a child formulates an impossible plan
but then employs finely controlled motor actions in the futile pur-
suit of it.
The application of Glover’s theory to the scale error phenome-
non extends it in three ways. First, in contrast to most of the re-
search on which the model was originally formulated, here it is ap-
plied to full-body movements performed in large-scale space on
real objects. Second, the planning–control dissociation is shown in
the behavior of individuals, rather than by comparisons across par-
ticipants. The same child fails to use size information in the process
of formulating a fundamentally faulty plan, but does incorporate
perceived size in the attempted execution of the plan. Third, ap-
plying Glover’s planning–control model to the scale errors of very
young children extends it to the developmental domain. Some de-
velopmental researchers have profitably applied the dual visual
systems theory of Milner and Goodale (1995) to research on visu-
ally directed reaching in infants (e.g., Bertenthal 1996; Newman et
al. 2001; Vishton 2003; Von Hofsten et al. 1998), and further valu-
able insights are likely to result from the consideration of early be-
havior in the light of the planning–control model.
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Abstract: Several lines of evidence indicate that the on-line control of
rapid target-aiming movements can be influenced by the visual context in
which the movements are performed. Although this may result in move-
ment error when an illusory context is introduced, there are many situa-
tions in which the control system must know about context in order to get
the limb to the target rapidly and safely.
Beginning with the seminal work of Woodworth (1899), there is a
long history of theorizing about the separate contribution of move-
ment planning and on-line control processes to the regulation of
goal-directed movement (see Elliott et al. [2001] for a recent re-
view). However, Glover’s planning and control formulation does
have several features that make it a unique dual-process model of
motor control. The most important of these features is the postu-
late that separate visual representations subserve movement
preparation and on-line control. Although it is clear that different
types of visual information are important for response selection,
movement parameterization, and the rapid on-line modulation of
movement, we are not convinced that the dichotomy described by
Glover captures the flexible nature of on-line control. In this com-
mentary, we review evidence from several aiming studies that in-
dicates control processes can be sensitive to the visual context in
which the aiming movement is performed.
In two of our recent experiments (cf. Meegan et al., in press),
participants were required to aim a stylus from one vertex of
Müller-Lyer figures to the other. In the first experiment, vision of
both the limb and the figure was eliminated upon movement ini-
tiation, and in the second experiment participants were able to see
their limb but not the figure during the movement. Regardless of
whether there was a delay between elimination of the target fig-
ure and movement initiation, participants’ aiming accuracy was bi-
ased by the Müller-Lyer configurations. Measures of displace-
ment taken at peak velocity, at peak deceleration, and at the end
of the movement indicated that the absolute magnitude of illu-
sion-induced biases actually increased as the movement pro-
gressed. This was in spite of a dramatic trial-to-trial spatial vari-
ability decrease between peak deceleration and the end of the
movement, indicating that participants were engaged in on-line
control. These results are incompatible with both Glover’s plan-
ning–control model, and Goodale and Milner’s (1992) ventral-
dorsal model.
In this same theoretical context, Proteau and Masson (1997) re-
ported work that creates difficulty for the notion that the control
system is uninfluenced by the visual environment surrounding the
target. Their research involved participants making aiming move-
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ments to a stationary target embedded in a background that
moved in either the same direction as the effector or in the oppo-
site direction. These background perturbations, which were in-
troduced at movement initiation, produced systematic overshoot-
ing and undershooting of the target respectively. Proteau and
Masson postulated that when the background was moving in the
same direction, the effector was judged to be moving more slowly
than it really was and the movement was not terminated as soon
as it should have been (i.e., a target overshoot). When the back-
ground was moving opposite to the direction of the movement,
movement velocities were judged to be greater than they really
were and the movement was terminated too early (i.e., target un-
dershoot). Once again limb control appears to be susceptible to an
illusory visual context. In a related study, Brenner and Smeets
(1997) demonstrated that background motion introduced after
planning affected the trajectory of manual aiming movements di-
rected at foreground targets.
The notion that the control phase of an aiming movement is af-
fected by visual context is consistent with aiming experiments in
which the size-contrast illusion has been shown to influence
movement time (e.g., van Donkelaar 1999). Although we agree
with Glover that movement planning is partially responsible for
the movement time-target size relation (e.g., peak velocity and the
time to peak velocity), experiments in which target size changes
on movement initiation (e.g., Heath et al. 1998) indicate that the
time after peak velocity depends more on the target size after
movement onset than the size of the target prior to the initiation
of the movement. Moreover, the control system is able to adjust
the temporal characteristics of the movement very rapidly in or-
der to deal with target size perturbations.
While in some of the experiments described above, the visual
surround contributed to either spatial error or temporal miscal-
culation, under many normal circumstances, visual context may
prove to be important for efficient and safe on-line control. For
example, when picking a berry from a thorny bush, or removing a
steak from the grill, “good planning” may not always be enough to
avoid an injury. The control system needs to take into considera-
tion objects that surround the target or unexpectedly obstruct the
path to the object once the movement is already underway. Cer-
tainly our ability to intercept a moving target depends partly on
the expansion-contraction of the target’s image on the retina rela-
tive to other objects. Similarly, the velocity of the effector used to
intercept the target object will be judged relative to the visual en-
vironment in which it moves.
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Abstract: Glover’s planning–control model is based on his finding that vi-
sual illusions exert a larger effect in early phases than in late phases of a
movement. But evidence for this dynamic illusion effect is weak, because:
(a) it appears difficult to replicate; (b) Glover overestimates the accuracy
of his results; and (c) he seems to underestimate the illusion effect at late
phases.
Scott Glover draws a plausible picture of the visuo-motor system,
such that we might be tempted to follow his arguments and be-
lieve in a planning–control model of action. However, Milner and
Goodale (1995) also provided a plausible account of the visuo-mo-
tor system, as have other researchers (e.g., Livingstone & Hubel
1988; Schneider 1969; Trevarthen 1968; Ungerleider & Mishkin
1982). Logically, it seems unlikely that all these theories are cor-
rect. This necessitates a careful examination of the evidence used
by the researchers. Here, I argue that Glover’s most important ev-
idence, the dynamic illusion effect, is weak. In fact, the dynamic
illusion effect might not exist.
Glover and Dixon (2001a; 2001b; 2002a; 2002b) found that vi-
sual illusions exert a larger effect on early phases of a movement
than on late phases. However, a careful examination of the stud-
ies shows that there are a number of problems related to this find-
ing of a dynamic illusion effect. I will explain these problems us-
ing data from one of our studies (Franz et al. 2000), which I
reanalyzed to test Glover’s account (Franz 2003; submitted). In
this study, participants repeatedly grasped objects of different
sizes while perception of size was distorted by two different levels
of the Ebbinghaus illusion. The aperture between the fingers was
measured at different time points in the reach-to-grasp move-
ments. The illusion effects are shown in Figure 1a. At first sight,
the illusion seems to increase over time (instead of decrease, as
suggested by Glover).
However, at early time points, the grasp aperture hardly re-
sponded to any variation in size, even if the physical size was var-
ied (Fig. 1b). For an evaluation of the illusion effects, we have to
take into account this smaller degree of responsiveness: We have
to “correct” the illusion effects for the physical size effects. Only
after this correction, can we detect a dynamic decrease of the il-
lusion effect (if it exists).
In principle, the correction could be fairly easy: At each time
point, we simply divide the illusion effect by the physical size ef-
fect (cf. Franz et al. 2001; Glover & Dixon 2001a). However, we
also need to estimate confidence limits for the corrected illusion
effects. This is not trivial, because we have to take into account the
variability of the numerator and of the denominator. Consider the
case where the confidence interval of the denominator contains a
zero value. In this case, the corrected illusion effect can become
arbitrarily large (or small), with arbitrarily large variability.
The method Glover and Dixon used to calculate confidence
limits (or standard errors) for the corrected illusion effects ignores
the variability of the denominator. This underestimates the vari-
ability of the corrected illusion effects. As I have discussed in de-
tail (Franz, submitted), this problem can be most pronounced in
early phases of the movement because here the physical size ef-
fect (i.e., the denominator) is close to zero.
Figure 1c demonstrates this problem for our data: Using
Glover’s method, one might be tempted to interpret the large cor-
rected effect at t  0% as evidence for a dynamic decrease of the
illusion effect. The mathematically exact method (Fieller 1954;
Franz, submitted), however, clearly shows that this value is a sta-
tistical outlier (Figure 1d): The confidence limits are infinite, be-
cause the physical size effect is too close to zero.
Figure 1d shows that (except for the outlier at t  0%), the cor-
rected illusion effect is surprisingly constant, contrary to Glover’s
proposal. Now, it may be argued that these data have a drawback:
Time points occurring after the maximum grip aperture (MGA)
were not included in the analysis (t  100% corresponds to the
time of the MGA). However, the reason time points beyond the
MGA were not included is because the fingers are already very
close to the target after the MGA, and quite often will touch the
target object, which would contaminate the data. But what if the
dynamic illusion effect shows up only at time points after the
MGA? To test for this, we reanalyzed the data of another study
(Franz et al. 2003) and made sure that the trajectories were in-
cluded as long as possible, but without the fingers touching the tar-
get object. Again, we found constant illusion effects over time,
without any indication of a decrease. If at all, the corrected illusion
effects slightly increased over time (Franz & Scharnowski 2003).
Why, then, did Glover and Dixon find a dynamic illusion effect?
A close inspection of their results shows that the decrease of the
corrected illusion effect occurs mainly at very late time points,
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well beyond the time of the MGA. Most likely the fingers touched
the target object at these late time points, because the trajectories
were analyzed until the thumb ceased to move in a forward di-
rection. Try it yourself: Place an object in front of you, grasp it, and
move it back toward yourself (as participants did in the Glover &
Dixon [2002a] study). Usually, you will have touched the object
when your thumb no longer moves forward. Including time points
in the analysis when participants have already touched the target
object leads to a decrease of the illusion effects which is simply
due to the mechanical interaction with the object and not to neu-
ronal control processes.
In my opinion, the case of the dynamic illusion effect is not yet
resolved. One possibility is that a dynamic illusion effect only
shows up if participants can see their fingers during grasping. In
contrast, in our studies participants could not see their fingers dur-
ing grasping (note, however, that Glover and Dixon found the
largest decrease in such an open loop condition). Future research
should clarify this issue.
Finally, it would be interesting to know what the results of the
Glover and Dixon studies would look like, if they used the mathe-
matically exact method to calculate confidence limits and if they ex-
cluded parts of the trajectories at which participants touched the
target object. Will the dynamic illusion effect survive these tests?
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Abstract: We address three issues that might be important in evaluating
the validity of the planning–control model: (1) It could be artificial to dis-
tinguish between control and planning when control involves the re-plan-
ning of a new corrective submovement that overlaps with the initial re-
sponse; (2) experiments involving illusions are not totally compelling; (3)
selectively implicating the superior parietal lobe in movement control and
the basal ganglia in movement planning, appears questionable.
In this interesting article, Glover reviews evidence for a dichotomy
between the planning and on-line control of actions. Although we
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Figure 1 (Franz). Testing whether the dynamic illusion effect exists. (1a) Effects of the Ebbinghaus illusion on grasping as a function
of time: The illusion effect is the mean difference in aperture when grasping one or the other version of the illusion. (1b) Effects of a
physical variation of size on grasping: The physical size effect is the mean slope of the functions which relate grip aperture to physical
size. (1c) Corrected illusion effects (i.e., illusion effects divided by physical size effects) and 95% confidence limits as calculated by Glover
and Dixon’s method, which ignores the variability of the physical size effects. (1d) Confidence limits, as calculated by the mathemati-
cally exact method (Fieller 1954; Franz, submitted): The exact method gives infinite confidence limits at t  0%; only the points on the
dotted line are excluded from the confidence set, all other values are included! Data are from Franz (2003). Time is normalized, such
that t  0% corresponds to the start of the movement and t  100% to the time of the maximum grip aperture (MGA). The insets mag-
nify the data between t  25% and t  100%. Error bars depict 95% confidence limits.
are friendly to this hypothesis (Desmurget & Grafton 2000;
Desmurget et al. 1999), we believe that several key arguments put
forward in the target article are debatable.
The first issue we would like to address is the ambiguity of the
apparently obvious term on-line control. The “perturbation” par-
adigm illustrates this point: According to Glover, the pioneering
experiment by Paulignan et al. (1991a) demonstrates the ability of
the control system to accommodate a change in object location.
When the kinematic characteristics of these changes are analyzed,
however, it appears that the corrections are made, not by amend-
ing the current movement per se, but by aborting it and by re-
placing it by a new movement – that is, by re-planning a new re-
sponse. In Paulignan et al.’s terms, the response to the
perturbation “appeared to be composed of two submovements,
the first one directed at the location of the initial target and the
second one at the location of the new target.” This type of “itera-
tive correction” has also often been reported for movements di-
rected at stationary targets (Meyer et al. 1988; Milner 1992).
These corrections have been modeled using three different ap-
proaches, designated: (1) Sequential, in which the secondary
movements are initiated at the end of the primary movement
(Meyer et al. 1988). (2) Overlapping, in which the secondary
movements are initiated before the end of the primary movement;
the global motor response can then be characterized as a com-
posite of several submovements overlapping with each others
(Flash & Henis 1991; Milner 1992; Novak et al. 2002); (3) Abort
and replan, in which the primary movement is aborted and re-
placed by a new movement when the error is detected (Massey et
al. 1986; Paulignan et al. 1991a).
What is important here is that all these approaches rely on a
similar observation, namely, that corrections are achieved by plan-
ning a secondary movement and adding it to the current one. This
usage of the planning system to achieve movement corrections
emphasizes the lack of clear distinction between control and plan-
ning, which raises questions about the validity of the strict division
proposed by Glover in his model.
A second issue is the interpretation of several illusion experi-
ments. In his article Glover refers, for example, to the study of
Aglioti et al. (1995) to argue that illusions do not affect on-line con-
trol. A significant effect of the illusion on grip aperture was, how-
ever, observed in this study. The fact that this effect was less im-
portant than the perceptual estimate of the target size does not
mean that it was not present and that it could be disregarded. In
the same vein, Glover argues that visual feedback reduces illusion
effects. It may be that the lack of effect under visual feedback lies
in the fact that control is carried out, in this case, in allocentric co-
ordinates. In other words, when vision is available toward the end
of the movement, the correction is based on a retinal error signal
that compares the state of the target directly with the state of the
effector. This is what happens, for instance, when a subject wears
small prisms and moves slow enough to allow feedback loops to
operate: He reaches the target accurately without even being
aware that he is wearing prisms (Guillaume et al. 2000). This point
may explain the difference, emphasized by Glover, between the
results published by Glover and Dixon (2001c) and those reported
by Dyde and Milner (2002) in two similar studies involving the “tilt
illusion”: In the first study, the hand was visible during the last part
of the movement and no effect of the illusion was reported; in the
second study, vision of the hand was never available and an effect
of the illusion was observed.
A third issue we want to stress is the existence of a specific con-
tribution of the superior parietal lobe (SPL) to movement control
and of the basal ganglia (BG) to movement planning. Regarding
the SPL, imaging and patient data do not seem as clear as implied
in the target article. In particular, two PET studies investigating the
functional anatomy movement guidance have failed to reveal any
specific contribution of the SPL. For visual feedback loops Inoue
et al. (1998) reported a contribution of the inferior parietal lobe
(supramarginal gyrus; Table 3). For nonvisual feedback loops, an
activation was found over the intraparietal sulcus, but not within
the SPL (Desmurget et al. 2001). In addition, it seems perilous to
regard optic ataxia (OA) as a pure feedback-deficit on the basis of
a single case study (Pisella et al. 2000). Clinicians often report that
the hand goes “in the wrong direction from the beginning” in OA
patients. In agreement with this claim we have shown, in a recent
study, that the initial movement direction (a planning-related pa-
rameter) is affected in patients with OA (Desmurget et al., in
preparation). Regarding BG, a direct link has recently been pro-
posed between a deficit in on-line movement guidance and a dys-
function within the BG network (Lawrence 2000). The most con-
vincing argument supporting this view was reported by Smith et al.
(2000), who showed that patients with Huntington’s Disease (in
which early cell loss is restricted largely to the striatum) fail to cor-
rect for self-generated or externally imposed errors in movement
trajectory. To explain this result, it was proposed that the sensory
signal is biased when the BG are damaged, leading to an erroneous
forward estimation of the motor state. Electrophysiological obser-
vations support this view by showing that passive limb movements
activate the BG neurons (DeLong et al. 1985; Hamada et al. 1990)
and generate abnormal (exaggerated) sensory responses in the pal-
lidal neurons of Parkinsonian monkeys (Filion et al. 1988). This im-
paired responsiveness of the BG neurons to peripheral input could
lead to an overestimation of the distance covered by the hand, and
thus, hypometria (Klockgether et al. 1995).
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Abstract: Our commentary focuses, first, on Glover’s proposal that only
motor planning is sensitive to cognitive aspects of the target object,
whereas the on-line control is completely immune to them. We present
behavioural data showing that movement phases traditionally (and by
Glover) thought to be under on-line control, are also modulated by object
cognitive aspects. Next, we present data showing that some aspects of cog-
nition can be coded by means of movement planning. We propose a re-
formulation of Glover’s theory to include both an influence of cognition on
on-line movement control, and a mutual influence between motor plan-
ning and some aspects of cognition.
Glover proposes that motor planning and on-line motor control
are two separate processes which follow two separate and inde-
pendent visuo-motor pathways. In our opinion this seems too
schematic, especially when behavioural and anatomic-functional
data are taken into account.
Glover’s first proposal is that motor planning is under the influ-
ence of a wide variety of visual (including spatial and nonspatial)
and cognitive information, whereas on-line control is under the
control of solely spatial characteristics of the target. This arises
from both the assumption that the initial arm kinematics reflect
movement planning and the findings that only the initial arm kine-
matics are affected by cognitive information. However, let us con-
sider previous visual perturbation experiments (see, e.g., Gen-
tilucci et al. 1992; Paulignan et al. 1991b). Corrections to visual
perturbations occurred during the acceleration phase of arm
movements (80–120 msec after perturbation). Because percep-
tual and/or cognitive information can lead planning into errors on
target localization (see, for example, the illusion and the auto-
matic-word-reading effects on arm movements), these should be
quickly corrected (during the acceleration phase), if the on-line
control is solely under the influence of the spatial characteristics
of the target. Since this did not occur, it is possible that – at least
in the initial movement phases – the on-line control is penetrable
to cognitive aspects of the target object. Moreover, cognitive in-
formation affects the arm homing (deceleration) phase as well.
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Marteniuk et al. (1987) showed that an effect of object fragility was
also present in the last phase of arm movements (deceleration).
We can therefore suppose that the final movement phase is
planned as well, and that the on-line control is not immune from
effects of cognitive aspects of the target. If this were not true,
lengthening of the deceleration phase as a result of greater object
fragility (i.e., object familiarity) should be quickly corrected. Re-
cently, Gentilucci (2002; 2003b) observed that the familiarity of
target objects (in this case, fruits) affects grasp parameters (maxi-
mal finger aperture), which, according to Glover, should be under
on-line control. Summing up, behavioural studies suggest that on-
line control is partially affected by cognitive aspects of the target.
We can explain the final corrections of errors in target location, at-
tributable to perceptual/cognitive information, by proposing that
the strength of egocentric cues increases with movement pro-
gression. To this purpose, we found that fixation of the vertex of
the Müller-Lyer illusion, target of a pointing movement, reduced
the localization error when compared with the condition in which
the other vertex was fixated (Gentilucci et al. 1997a). In other
words, when the flow of information in egocentric coordinates ex-
ceeds other information, movement control is only egocentrically
driven.
According to Glover, the clear-cut distinction between motor
planning and on-line control finds an anatomical counterpart in
two sensorimotor pathways located in the ventral and dorsal pari-
etal-premotor cortices, respectively. An argument in favour of the
hypothesis that the dorsal parietal-premotor pathway is exclu-
sively involved in the control of movement execution is provided
by motor deficits observed in patients with optical ataxia due to le-
sions of the posterior dorsal parietal cortex. Recently, Roy et al. (in
press) studied the reaching-grasping kinematics of a patient with
a unilateral lesion restricted to the posterior part of the dorsal pari-
etal cortex. Although this patient showed an apparent recovery
from optic ataxia, the early kinematic aspects of the patient’s
reaching-grasping movements were not normally modulated by
either intrinsic or extrinsic visual properties of objects. These re-
sults constitute evidence that the posterior region of the dorsal
parietal cortex, besides playing a role in the on-line control of
movement execution, may also be involved in aspects of planning
such as implementing and coordination of the various phases of
arm movements (Gentilucci et al. 2000b; Roy et al., in press).
The ventral parietal-premotor circuit can also be involved in as-
pects related to perception and semantics other than those specif-
ically related to planning an action. Indeed, neuroimaging studies
have shown that the naming of tools or tool actions (Grabowski et
al. 1998; Grafton et al. 1997; Martin et al. 1995), as well as view-
ing pictures of tools (Chao & Martin 2000), activates the human
lateral premotor cortex. These findings suggest that the represen-
tations of an object (i.e., the actions associated with the object) can
be automatically activated or retrieved by simply naming or view-
ing the object, without executing (and probably preparing) an ob-
ject-related action. These results have their counterpart in behav-
ioural data (Gentilucci 2003c) showing that class of word can be a
factor selectively influencing motor control. Indeed, automatic
reading of verbs more strongly influenced arm kinematics than ad-
jectives.
Finally, action preparation and observation can be used to un-
derstand the meaning of an action (Rizzolatti et al. 2001) and to
communicate with other individuals (Gentilucci 2003a; Gentilucci
et al. 2001). The fact that the semantic face of speech and the arm
gestures are reciprocally related, is supported by a new observa-
tion (Chieffi et al., in preparation) showing a reciprocal influence
between the direction of deictic gestures (pointing towards a re-
mote position or one’s own body) and deictic terms (QUA, here,
or LA’, there) simultaneously pronounced. Indeed, the results
showed that arm kinematics and voice spectra were reciprocally
interfered with when the arm gesture was incongruent with the
meaning of the deictic term.
Summing up: In our opinion, the distinction and definition of
programming and on-line control of actions proposed by Glover
can be partially reformulated. First, definition of on-line move-
ment control should take into account that cognitive aspects of the
object can at least partially penetrate into the feedback control of
a movement. Second, definition of movement planning should
take into account that some aspects of cognition (in particular se-
mantics and speech) can be coded by action preparation.
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Abstract: It is our contention that the concept of planning in Glover’s
model is too broadly defined, encompassing both action/goal selection and
the programming of the constituent movements required to acquire the
goal. We argue that this monolithic view of planning is untenable on neu-
ropsychological, neurophysiological, and behavioural grounds. The evi-
dence demands instead that a distinction be made between action plan-
ning and the specification of the initial kinematic parameters, with the
former depending on processing in the ventral stream and the latter on
processing in the dorsal stream.
Introduction. For the most part, Scott Glover’s proposed “plan-
ning–control” model (PCM) bears a strong family resemblance to
our “perception–action” model (PAM: Goodale & Milner 1992;
Milner & Goodale 1995), and indeed it makes many similar pre-
dictions. But there are differences, and it is important to isolate
precisely what they are, as well as to give a fair and correct account
of the PAM. Take for example, this seemingly innocuous sentence
taken from Glover’s “Conclusions” section:
The studies reviewed here are less consistent . . . with a perception–ac-
tion model in which actions are thought to be both planned and con-
trolled using a single visual representation in the SPL. (target article,
sect. 5, para. 1)
Is this statement correct? Well, although it might be convenient
for Glover if it were, the stubborn fact is that we never proposed
that actions are “planned and controlled by a single visual repre-
sentation in the SPL.” It may suit the confrontational style of BBS
to set up a straw man of this kind, but a closer look at what we have
argued will show that the PAM makes no such simple-minded pro-
posal. But first let us examine Glover’s last clause in this sentence
more closely since it does carry the germ of the real disagreement
between us.
We can set to one side two relatively minor errors that are im-
plicit in the sentence. The first error is to locate the human dorsal
stream entirely within the SPL (superior parietal lobule). There is
now ample fMRI evidence that the dorsal stream, particularly
those regions involved in voluntary saccades and object-directed
grasping, is centered on the human IPS (intraparietal sulcus), on
the border between IPL and SPL (Binkofski et al. 1998; Connolly
et al. 2002; Culham 2004; Culham & Kanwisher 2001; Culham et
al. 2003). Only the region associated with visually guided reaching
(as opposed to looking or grasping) appears to be located entirely
within the SPL (Connolly et al. 2003). These neuroimaging results
broadly back up the lesion localization evidence of Perenin and
Vighetto (1988, Table 1), who found that a group of eight patients
with optic ataxia all had brain damage that included the IPS,
whereas only five of them had SPL damage. Indeed, the overlap-
ping region in their patients was largely centered on the IPS. The
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second error in the sentence is the implication that we envisage
that there are “visual representations” existing within the dorsal
stream to control action. In fact, we have always been careful to
emphasize our belief that visual information has direct control
over action in the dorsal stream, without any intervening “repre-
sentations.” As Frith et al. (1999) have argued, not all neural ac-
tivity is correlated with mental representations – at least in the
sense of enduring representations of objects in the world. In our
view, the neural activity in the dorsal stream does not reflect the
representation of objects or events but rather the direct transfor-
mation of visual information into the required coordinates for ac-
tion.
Much more central to our disagreement with Glover is that his
summary sentence imputes to PAM the view that the dorsal
stream plays a “master” role in the planning as well as the control
of actions. This we find a surprising suggestion. In the first chap-
ter of Milner and Goodale (1995) we wrote:
As we shall see, despite the complexity of their interconnections, pri-
mate cortical visual areas can be divided into two functional groupings:
one with rather direct links to motor control systems, and the other with
connections to systems associated with memory, planning, and other
more “cognitive” processes. (p. 19, emphasis added)
We have never associated planning with the dorsal stream, in
any of our publications, before or since. Indeed, like Glover, we
have argued for some time that the perceptual system, vested in
the ventral stream and elaborated in the right IPL, provides a per-
ceptual representation of the surrounding visual world that is used
in the planning of actions.
So how has this apparent misinterpretation come about? The
answer comes in section 1.1.2, paragraph 1 of the target article:
At a high level, planning is responsible for such things as selecting an
appropriate target, or choosing to grasp an object in a certain manner.
Beyond these selection processes, however, planning also determines
the initial kinematic parametrization of the movements, including their
timing and velocity.
In other words, for Glover, “planning” is given a very broad mean-
ing quite different from most usages of the term in the literature,
in that it includes what he calls the “initial kinematic parametriza-
tion of the movements.” According to Glover, planning includes
processes that extend from goal selection right through to the ini-
tial programming of the constituent elements of the goal-directed
action. To put it starkly, then, for Glover, the movements consti-
tuting the act of reaching out and grasping even a simple block are
initially calibrated by a rich visual representational system (in the
IPL) that is subject to the full panoply of contextual and cognitive
influences. This, as far as we can see, is the crux of the disagree-
ment between the PAM and the PCM.
According to our view, action planning and selection need to be
separated, both conceptually and empirically, from the specifica-
tion of initial movement parameters; and we have proposed that
these two sets of processes each use a different visual information
stream. We believe that action planning depends on visual pro-
cessing in the ventral stream and right IPL, but that the initial
movement parameters of the selected action are determined by
processing in the dorsal stream (i.e., IPS/SPL). Our chief dis-
agreement thus comes down to one crucial question:
Is the initial kinematic specification of an action performed using “bot-
tom-up” visual information within the dorsal stream, as we propose, or
is it a part and parcel of the “planning” process, along with target se-
lection and hand posture selection, and thus driven by the ventral
stream, as Glover proposes?
Evidence from neurophysiology and neuroimaging. Our be-
lief that movement parameter specification occurs within the dor-
sal stream rests on a consideration of a broad range of physiolog-
ical, neuropsychological, and behavioural data. A large amount of
single-neuron recording evidence reveals the existence of neurons
within the monkey’s posterior parietal cortex that have both visual
receptive fields and time-locked responses to the eye and arm
movements directed at targets located in different regions of the
visual field. A saccade-related area has been found in the lateral
bank of the IPS, in a region now known as lateral intraparietal area
(LIP) (Andersen et al. 1992). More recent neurophysiological
studies have also revealed a “parietal reach region” (PRR) located
in the posterior and medial part of the intraparietal sulcus ex-
tending into neighbouring area V6A (Galletti et al. 1997b; Snyder
et al. 1997). Damage to this region is reported to cause misreach-
ing with initial heading errors that are misdirected to the medial
side of the target as well as deficits in wrist orientation (Battaglini
et al. 2002a; Faugier-Grimaud et al. 1978). More anterior to LIP
lies an area (anterior parietal area [AIP]) where neurons respond
to the geometric appearance of objects and have motor responses
linked to grasping movements directed to these objects (Taira et
al. 1990). Therefore, contrary to previous belief – echoed here by
Glover – that “the dorsal stream in the macaque brain terminates
in the inferior parietal lobule” (see target article, sect. 3, and Fig.
3 caption), current evidence now locates it in and around the IPS.
Also, as we mentioned earlier, direct homologues of LIP, PRR, and
AIP have now been identified using functional MRI in humans
(Binkofski et al. 1998; Connolly et al. 2000; 2002; 2003; Culham
2004; Culham et al. 2003). It would therefore appear that the ar-
eas in and around the IPS make up the dorsal stream in both the
human and the monkey posterior parietal cortex.
The evidence from fMRI in humans, like the neurophysiologi-
cal studies in monkeys, suggests that the transformation of visual
information into the appropriate motor coordinates for action
takes place within the dorsal stream. Thus, in a recent event-re-
lated fMRI experiment, Connolly et al. (2002) showed that there
is no activation in the human homologue of LIP as subjects pre-
pare to make a saccade to a target that had not yet been presented.
Activity increased in this region only when the target appeared.
This suggests that LIP (unlike the frontal eye fields and other pre-
motor areas) does not play a significant role in preparing for ac-
tion – unless the location of the target has already been specified.
In other words, the activity in LIP is related to the programming
of eye movements to particular spatial locations but not to action
planning in general. These findings are entirely consistent with re-
sults from similar studies in the monkey (Andersen et al. 1992;
Snyder et al. 1997). In another event-related fMRI study, Culham
et al. (2003) demonstrated that the lateral occipital complex
(LOC), a ventral stream area implicated in object perception and
recognition, shows no differential activation during visually
guided grasping as compared to visually guided reaching – sug-
gesting that the visually driven specification of the required move-
ments for grasping is mediated entirely in AIP, which shows
greater activation during grasping as compared to reaching. In
short, the weight of physiological (and human neuroimaging) ev-
idence indicates that the visually defined movement parameters
are set within the dorsal stream in both monkeys and humans.
It is perhaps worth pointing out that not only is Glover’s review
of neuroimaging literature confined almost entirely to PET stud-
ies, but the evidence he presents on planning and control does not
differentiate between the predictions and theoretical assumptions
of the PCM and the PAM. None of the studies he discusses had
sufficient temporal resolution to establish whether the activation
that was observed corresponds only to the on-line control of move-
ment, and not also to the programming (“planning,” in the PCM
sense) of a visually guided movement. We surmise that both would
have contributed to the observed activations. Yet Glover goes on
to argue that the “results were generally not consistent with the
perception–action model . . . which predicts motor-related activity
in the SPL but not in the IPL” (sect. 3.3, para. 4). But as we have
already discussed, this argument is based on a misunderstanding
of the location of the dorsal-stream areas within the parietal cor-
tex, many of which are located within the IPS. This is compounded
by the fact that the spatial resolution of PET is not nearly as good
as that seen in fMRI, particularly in the high-field fMRI used to-
day. As a consequence, motor control activations that were appar-
ently localized to the IPL could sometimes have been located in
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the IPS. (The same arguments a fortiori apply to the TMS studies
cited by Glover.)
Evidence from neuropsychology. Our PAM is also, we believe,
supported strongly by neuropsychological evidence. This is prin-
cipally derived from patient D.F., whose profound visual form ag-
nosia we now know results from bilateral damage to the ventral-
stream area LOC (James et al. 2003), and patients I.G. and A.T.,
who both have bilateral optic ataxia from bilateral damage to the
dorsal stream (including IPS and SPL, though also more inferior
parietal regions in A.T.’s case). Glover’s PCM makes two strong
predictions about these patients, which he states as follows:
1. “Deficits in optic ataxics should be concentrated in the later
stages of movement” (sect. 4.4, para. 1).
2. “In the planning–control framework, damage to D.F.’s ven-
tral stream should impair many aspects of how she plans move-
ments, but should leave her control processes essentially intact”
(sect. 4.6).
Optic ataxia. In a recent study, we directly addressed the ques-
tion of whether optic ataxia affects only the later stages of move-
ment (Milner et al. 2003). We examined reach trajectories in both
of our patients right from the outset of each movement to see
whether there was any problem in their initial heading direction.
Strong and consistent heading errors were present in both pa-
tients right from the start of each of their reaches: In fact, the
heading error predicted the final error very accurately. In other
words, although these patients certainly do have serious problems
with the on-line control of their reaching (as demonstrated by use
of perturbation paradigms, Gréa et al. [2002]), they also have
problems with the initial specification of their movements. It is
important to bear in mind here that although A.T. has brain dam-
age that extends well into the IPL, I.G. has only slight damage
there (Pisella et al. 2000). Her heading errors therefore most likely
arise, as far as we can tell, from her IPS/SPL damage.
Consistent with these results is the well-established finding, as
Glover notes in his article (sect. 4.4.1), that optic ataxic patients
are impaired in open-loop reaching. In this case, no on-line visual
corrections are possible, because there is no visual feedback from
the hand. So in Glover’s terms, this task should be one of “pure
planning.” Why, then, are optic ataxic patients so inaccurate? The
reason seems likely to be the same as in our closed-loop reaching
task: The patients head off in the wrong direction from the outset,
something that is never observed in normal subjects. It is also
worth remembering that human optic ataxia looks strikingly sim-
ilar to the misreaching and misgrasping seen in monkeys with dor-
sal-stream lesions. In fact, a direct comparison between monkeys
with ventral- or dorsal-stream lesions (Glickstein et al. 1998) yields
the same double dissociation between perception and action that
we have observed in our patients. Glover seems to accept this, but
nonetheless insists that “the ‘what/how’ distinction found in mon-
keys cannot be easily translated into an explanation of human
brain organization” (sect. 3.1.1). It seems premature to dismiss so
cavalierly the striking similarities in visual processing at all levels
between humans and our primate cousins. The parsimonious and
indeed most plausible default assumption to make is always one of
biological continuity, and one should demand extremely persua-
sive evidence to reject it.
Visual form agnosia. In direct counterpoint to our optic ataxia
results, we have found that D.F. has no difficulty at all in the ini-
tial specification of her movement parameters. In our first study
of her visually guided movements (Milner et al. 1991), we video-
taped her reaches to post a card into an oriented slot. As docu-
mented in that study, she began to turn her hand toward the tar-
get orientation right from the very start of her movements. D.F.’s
reaching to point targets is also indistinguishable from normal,
with no sign that early aspects of the movements are not normally
programmed. This finding cannot be reconciled with Glover’s
view that the ventral/perceptual system plays a leading role in the
early stages of movement planning (e.g., programming the initial
movements of the hand in a reaching or grasping movement).
Yet, it is true that D.F. does have problems with certain high-
level aspects of action, such as her inappropriate (but highly
adept) grasping of tools. When, for example, she reaches out to
pick up a screwdriver that has been placed on the table with the
handle pointed away from her, she picks it up quite deftly but
grasps it by its shaft rather than its handle – and only then rotates
it in her hand so that she can hold it properly. In other words, be-
cause her damaged ventral stream is unable to process the
screwdriver’s shape, D.F. has no idea what it is ahead of time and
is therefore unable to generate the functionally appropriate grasp-
ing movement shown by normal subjects when faced with the
same task. Nevertheless, the intact visuomotor systems in her dor-
sal stream can still compute the required metrics to ensure that
her grasping movement, however inappropriate, is well formed
and efficient. To reiterate, we have never found any sign of faulty
specification of her movement parameters, strengthening our be-
lief that the selection of the appropriate functional hand posture
needs to be distinguished from the metrical scaling of the con-
stituent movements. We agree with Glover that D.F.’s “deficits in
motor behavior can be likened to those suffered by many apraxics,
whereas her spared abilities can be likened to those impaired in
many optic ataxics” (sect. 4.6.2), but for different reasons. Ac-
cording to the PCM, patients with ideomotor apraxia would be
predicted to have faulty specification of the initial movement pa-
rameters (as indeed should D.F.). Yet in fact most of these patients
(like D.F.) do not have any measurable visuomotor abnormalities
(Ietswaart et al. 2001) – and those who do (Haaland et al. 1999),
appear to have damage extending to more superior parietal re-
gions, including the IPS.
Before leaving this issue, it is important to emphasize that D.F.
does not have ideomotor apraxia. Her problem is one of identify-
ing the goal object on the basis of its shape, not one of selecting
an action appropriate to its function. If she knows what the object
is, she has no problem selecting a hand posture that matches its
function.
Evidence from visual illusions. The study of visual illusions in
healthy subjects does not bear directly on issues of visual process-
ing streams. But PAM theory has allowed us to make certain coun-
terintuitive predictions about illusions. Essentially the story goes
like this: The perceptual (ventral stream) system uses an obliga-
tory relative or contextual coding system for size, distance, and ori-
entation, while the visuomotor (dorsal stream) system is designed
to use “real world” metrics. We therefore predicted that some sim-
ple movements might be made without the influence of visual
context or top-down visual knowledge. The remarkable fact is that
the prediction has frequently worked: In several suitably engi-
neered situations (particularly with so-called pictorial illusions,
such as the Ebbinghaus and Ponzo), context really does have no –
or minimal – effect on action parameters. There are exceptions,
of course, but often these exceptions are highly instructive in
themselves.
The simultaneous tilt illusion (STI), extensively used by Glover,
is a good case in point. This illusion affects perception and action
in much the same way, and indeed the perceptual and action ef-
fects are highly correlated (Dyde & Milner 2002). This result can
be easily explained if we assume that the STI is mediated by an
early (e.g., area V1) mechanism, and would thus affect both visual
streams. Of course, the effect of the illusion on action is most ev-
ident in tasks in which observers receive no visual feedback dur-
ing their reaches. When feedback is available, unsurprisingly, sub-
jects do correct their actions, so that the illusion has a reduced
magnitude at the movement endpoint (e.g., Glover & Dixon
2001c). These results, obtained in several studies by Glover and
colleagues, would seem merely to reflect the fact that on-line
feedback causes on-line corrections, but Glover argues that his re-
sults are “much less consistent with the perception–action model”
(sect. 2.8, para. 2). In our view, it is obvious that on-line correc-
tions will negate illusory effects, by allowing the subject to com-
pare quite directly the orientation of the hand with the orientation
of the goal during the closing phases of the movement. After all,
that’s what (in part) the on-line correction system is there for.
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Our perception–action model, of course, has the major virtue
that it provides a theoretical rationale for those perception-action
dissociations that can be demonstrated using pictorial illusions. It
is true that the PAM and the PCM both agree that such illusions
can affect the planning of actions – the question is, why do illu-
sions affect such planning? Glover gives no reason, simply assum-
ing that the “planning representations” are contextually depen-
dent. It is unclear, furthermore, what he means by “planning
representations.” Are these just action plans or are they something
else? We provide a more specific answer: Illusions affect the ac-
tion planning because planning (a cognitive activity) requires per-
ceptual representations, and it is these representations that are
subject to illusory effects. This is a prediction, not an assumption.
For example, if we plan to pick up the smaller of two objects in an
Ebbinghaus display (in which the objects are in fact the same size),
our choice can clearly be influenced by the illusion. Nevertheless,
the programming of the actual movements to the selected object
can escape such illusions, because the visuomotor system is not in-
fluenced by the top-down contextual information that drives per-
ception. Parenthetically, if our theoretical position is correct, then
losing crucial perceptual processing hardware should thereby also
destroy the effects of pictorial illusions on action planning. There-
fore, we would make a prediction directly opposite to one made
by Glover, who argues that “the patient D.F. ought to . . . show
similar patterns of effects of visual illusions as healthy partici-
pants” (sect. 4.8, last para., emphasis added).
Another strong prediction of the PCM is that all perceptual il-
lusions should affect the initial phase of movements made toward
the illusory target – after all, all movements require planning of
some sort. Danckert et al. (2002), however, have provided rather
unambiguous evidence showing that the Ebbinghaus illusion does
not influence the finger-thumb aperture even at the very start of
the reach – a result that is difficult to square with the PCM (al-
though it is quite consistent with the PAM). In fact, even under
certain conditions in which perception intrudes and the Ebbing-
haus illusion affects grasping (Franz 2003), the size of that effect
does not appear to change during the entire movement – a find-
ing that is again inconsistent with Glover’s view. Finally, the PCM
predicts that there should never be a residual illusion at the end
of the reach, because the action control system will always kick in
during the final phase – even when visual feedback is not avail-
able. Yet this prediction is contradicted by Glover’s own data:
Glover and Dixon (2001c) found that a sizeable orientation illu-
sion remained in their STI reach data when visual feedback was
occluded (although they downplay this result). In contrast, when
Dyde and Milner (2002) used an orientation illusion where the in-
ducing background was changed from a contiguous grating (the
STI) to a distant frame (the rod and frame illusion or RFI), they
found no illusory effect on action at all, even though again no vi-
sual feedback was available. The PAM can explain this result by
invoking the usual account of the RFI as a contextual illusion par
excellence (Howard 1982), one that is presumably mediated by
the scene-based frames of reference characteristic of the ventral
stream. In contrast, the PCM can offer no explanation as to why
there should be any dissociation between the STI and the RFI –
both should affect hand orientation at the outset, and then the ef-
fects should disappear towards the end of the movement. The for-
mer prediction doesn’t hold for the RFI (there is no illusion), and
the latter prediction doesn’t hold for the STI (it is still present at
the end of the movement).
Summary. Our main criticism of Glover’s PCM is that the con-
cept of “planning” is used in a vague and overly broad fashion. It
encompasses not only cognitive control (the selection of the goal
object and, if necessary, an appropriate functional posture) but
also the detailed programming of the constituent movements re-
quired to acquire the selected object. We believe that this mono-
lithic view of planning is untenable on neuropsychological, neu-
rophysiological, and behavioural grounds. The evidence demands
instead that a distinction be made between action planning and
the specification of the initial kinematic parameters. It is this dis-
tinction, along with Glover’s failure to acknowledge it, that lies at
the root of our disagreement.
The organization of action representations
in posterior parietal cortex
Scott H. Johnson-Frey
Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH
03755-3569. scott.h.johnson@dartmouth.edu
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~psych/faculty/frey.html
Abstract: Glover suggests that representational systems for planning ver-
sus control are mapped exclusively to the inferior (IPL) versus superior
(SPL) parietal lobules respectively. Yet, there is ample evidence that the
IPL and SPL both contribute to action planning and control. Alternatively,
I distinguish between the parietal-frontal systems involved in the repre-
sentation of acquired manual skills versus nonskilled actions.
Glover advances an interesting and provocative hypothesis con-
cerning the organization of visual representations for action plan-
ning and control and their underlying neural substrates. Glover
makes a strong case that action planning and control can be dis-
sociated behaviorally, implying that these processes may depend
on functionally dissociable representational systems. When the
systems for planning versus control are respectively mapped to the
inferior (IPL) versus the superior (SPL) parietal lobules, however,
the theory goes awry. As I selectively review below, there is ample
evidence that both the IPL and SPL contribute to action planning
and control in primates. Based on this evidence, I offer an alter-
native model that distinguishes between parietal mechanisms in-
volved in representing previously acquired skills versus those con-
tributing to the planning and control of nonskilled actions.
Electrophysiological studies in macaques indicate that a variety
of visually guided actions are planned in and controlled by func-
tionally specialized parieto-frontal circuits involving both SPL and
IPL regions. Accumulating evidence from functional neuroimag-
ing suggests a similar organization in humans (see review by Cul-
ham & Kanwisher 2001). Counter to Glover’s assertions, regions
within the IPL are involved in movement control. For example,
saccadic eye movements involve the lateral intraparietal area
(LIP) in macaque IPL, and a putative homologue in humans has
been identified (Sereno et al. 2001). Likewise, another IPL region
– the anterior intraparietal area (AIP) – controls visually guided
grasping in macaques. A probable homologue of AIP is also asso-
ciated with grasping in humans (Binkofski et al. 1998). Further-
more, regions within the SPL participate in movement planning.
The parietal reach region (PRR), located within the medial intra-
parietal sulcus (IPS) of macaque SPL, is involved in the control of
visually guided reaching (Andersen et al. 1997). A homologous
area has also been reported in humans (Kertzman et al. 1997). Im-
portantly, cells in the PRR also engage in premovement planning;
during multi-step actions, they represent forthcoming, intended
movements (Batista & Andersen 2001). Consistent with this hy-
pothesis, we have observed activation in human medial IPS (pu-
tative PRR), during mentally simulated reaching (Johnson et al.
2002).
Contrary to Glover’s interpretation, the human lesion data also
do not support the hypothesis that planning occurs exclusively in
the IPL and control in the SPL. Patients with optic ataxia have dif-
ficulties controlling reaching toward and/or grasping objects lo-
cated in peripheral vision. Optic ataxia is associated frequently,
though not exclusively, with damage to the SPL (Perenin &
Vighetto 1988). Given the substantial variation in naturally occur-
ring brain injuries, this disorder is often likely to reflect damage to
regions within IPL as well (Guard et al. 1984). For instance, one
would expect IPL lesions in putative AIP to be an important fac-
tor in cases of optic ataxia where visually guided grasping is com-
promised (Goodale et al. 1994c; Jeannerod 1986). Indeed, Binkof-
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ski et al. (1998) have shown that damage to putative AIP results in
impairments of visually-guided grasping.
In contrast to optic ataxia, ideomotor apraxia is a disorder that
primarily affects planning of skilled actions, while leaving on-line
control relatively unaffected. For example, these patients often
have considerable difficulty pantomiming tool-use actions, yet
have little or no difficulty reaching and grasping visually presented
objects (for a comprehensive review see Heilman, 1997). Since
the turn of the previous century, it has been known that ideomo-
tor apraxia results almost exclusively from damage to, or discon-
nection of, the left cerebral hemisphere (Leiguarda & Marsden
2000). Recent analyses implicate both the IPL and SPL in this dis-
order. Lesion overlap is most frequent in areas within and adja-
cent to the left IPS, including SPL (BA 7) and IPL (BA 39 and 40),
as well as interconnected regions of the middle frontal gyrus
(GFm: Haaland et al. 2000). Corroborating evidence comes from
several functional neuroimaging studies of healthy adults showing
activation of these regions during overt or imagined tool use ac-
tions involving either hand (Choi et al. 2001; Johnson-Frey 2003;
Moll et al. 2000). Together, these findings indicate that represen-
tations necessary for planning skilled movements involve a left-lat-
eralized parieto-frontal system. Further, this cerebral asymmetry
appears to be true regardless of one’s hand dominance (Johnson-
Frey et al., submitted; Lausberg et al. 1999; Raymer et al. 1999).
This contrasts sharply with the apparent contralateral organization
of parietal mechanisms involved in on-line control that are dam-
aged in optic ataxia. These differences should serve as an impor-
tant constraint on theories concerning the organization of action
representations.
Glover is correct in asserting that the contrasting deficits of op-
tic ataxia and ideomotor apraxia patients suggest that actions do
not depend on a unitary representational system. However, the
distinction is not between planning and control but, rather, be-
tween actions that are planned and controlled entirely on the ba-
sis of immediate perceptual information versus skills that addi-
tionally involve accessing stored memories (Johnson-Frey 2003;
Johnson-Frey & Grafton 2003). As reviewed above, on-line man-
ual actions are controlled by functionally specialized parieto-
frontal circuits that include contralaterally organized regions be-
longing either to the SPL or the IPL. By contrast, in the vast
majority of individuals, manual skills (e.g., tool-use) are repre-
sented in a left lateralized parieto-frontal system. Of course, the
actual implementation of a skilled action in the real world neces-
sarily involves cooperation between these two systems.
In short, this position differs from Glover’s in at least two re-
spects. First, planning takes place in both representational sys-
tems, but for different types of actions; that is, skills versus non-
skills. Second, depending on nature of the movement(s) involved
(e.g., reaching, grasping, saccades), control can be accomplished
in the SPL and/or IPL.
Is there an independent planning system?
Suggestions from a developmental
perspective
Zsuzsa Káldya and Ilona Kovácsb
aDepartment of Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Boston, Boston,




Abstract: Glover argues that separate representations underlie the plan-
ning and the control phase of actions, and he contrasts his model with
Goodale and Milner’s perception/action model. Is this representation in-
deed an independent representation within a more general action system,
or is it an epiphenomenon of the interaction between the perception/ac-
tion systems of the Goodale–Milner model?
We contrast the Glover and the Goodale–Milner models in Fig-
ure 1. According to our understanding, one of the main differ-
ences between them is the way they conceptualize the represen-
tation that the motor program is based on. In the Goodale–Milner
model (Goodale & Milner 1992), it is the “action” representation
of the dorsal stream (Repraction); while in Glover’s model, it is a
representation underlying the planning phase (Reprplanning). The
two models disagree about the potential effects of visual context
on this representation. According to Glover’s model, context has a
potentially large effect on Reprplanning, while in the Goodale–Mil-
ner theory it does not (or the effect can only be small). Glover also
claims that Reprplanning determines certain parameters of the mo-
tor program, such as lifting force, posture choice, movement time
and grip acceleration, and these parameters can be strongly influ-
enced by illusion effects (see Glover, sect. 2.6.1. para. 4). Not all
motor program parameters are under the control of Reprplanning;
some – such as maximum grip aperture and pointing accuracy –
are driven by Reprcontrol, and these are the parameters that con-
text-induced illusions do not influence.
We propose an experiment motivated by our recent develop-
mental studies that could significantly contribute to this issue. We
have studied four-year-old children’s and adults’ performance in a
2AFC version of the Ebbinghaus illusion (Titchener circles) task
(Káldy & Kovács 2003; see also Kovács 2000). Both children and
adults were asked to decide which one of the target circles amidst
the context circles appeared larger. The task was entirely percep-
tual, that is, no action was required toward the target circles. Our
results have shown that the magnitude of the illusion effect was
significantly smaller in children than in adults, and our interpreta-
tion is that visual context integration is not fully developed in four-
year-olds. In terms of the Goodale–Milner model, we found an
age-dependent effect of the magnitude of the context-induced il-
lusion on Reprperception. We proposed earlier that the ontogenetic
development of the dorsal “action” system is faster than that of the
ventral “perception” system in humans (Kovács 2000). Based on
the age-dependent illusion effect on Reprperception, and on the
faster maturation of the “action” system, we suggest an experi-
ment that could decide about the independent existence of the
“planning” system in Glover’s model. As Glover suggests, there are
particular parameters of movement that seem to be affected by il-
lusions because they are determined by Reprplanning. Movement
time as measured in the Ebbinghaus illusion is one of those pa-
rameters (van Donkelaar 1999). Taking into account the faster
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Figure 1 (Káldy & Kovács). Comparison of the Glover and the
Goodale–Milner models. This schematic diagram represents the
temporal relations between the two separate visual representa-
tions according to the Glover versus the Goodale–Milner model.
In our view, the most significant difference is in how the two mod-
els conceptualize the acting representation between the begin-
ning of motor planning and action.
maturation of planning related areas, the Glover model would pre-
dict that children should demonstrate adult-like illusion effects in
terms of movement time well before they do in the perceptual ver-
sion of the Ebbinghaus illusion task. However, the Goodale–Mil-
ner model, in the strict sense, does not allow for illusion effects
arising from the “action” system; therefore, the origin of the illu-
sion should be in Reprperception. In this case, young children
should behave the same way as in the perceptual task: They should
demonstrate much smaller illusions than adults. This test would
be an interesting way to study the relationship between the two
hypothetical concepts, Reprplanning and Reprperception, and the
controversial period before the action starts.
Action planning in humans and chimpanzees
but not in monkeys
Nobuyuki Kawai
Graduate School of Information Science, Chikusaku, Furocho, Nagoya,
464-8601, Japan. kawai@info.human.nagoya-u.ac.jp
www.cog.human.nagoya-u.ac.jp
Abstract: Studies with primates in sequence production tasks reveal that
chimpanzees make action plans before initiating responses and making on-
line adjustments to spatially exchanged stimuli, whereas such planning
isn’t evident in monkeys. Although planning may rely on phylogenetically
newer regions in the inferior parietal lobe – along with the frontal lobes
and basal ganglia – it dates back to as far as five million years ago.
Glover argues that planning is largely the province of a phyloge-
netically newer cortex in the inferior parietal lobe (IPL), and he
suggests that “the role in the human IPL in action planning may
have arisen quite recently in evolution and may be manifest in the
uniquely human population lateralization in hand preference”
(target article, sect. 1.2.1). Although planning is limited in ma-
caque monkeys, as he suggests, a series of studies have revealed
that chimpanzees, which are hominoids, are greatly skilled in ac-
tion planning, just as humans are.
Ohshiba (1997) compared the reaction time of macaque mon-
keys and a chimpanzee in a sequence production task. Both
species of primates were taught to select differently sized circles
in an arbitrarily defined order. An analysis of the reaction times
suggested that the monkeys identified only the first target to be
selected in the task; and only after (and/or during) the selection
of that target – which resulted in its disappearance – would they
search for the next target to be selected. This was because reac-
tion times to subsequent targets decreased in a monotonic func-
tion. In contrast, a chimpanzee doing the same task spent the
longest amount of time in selecting the first item of the sequence,
followed by shorter reaction times for the remaining items. These
reaction times did not differ from each other. These results sug-
gest that monkeys employ a serial search strategy, whereas chim-
panzees plan before selecting the first item in a sequential task.
Kawai and Matsuzawa (2000b) provide more decisive evidence
for chimpanzees’ ability to plan. The chimpanzee named Ai
learned to count dots on a computer monitor as well as count real
objects, and to select the corresponding Arabic numerals on a
touch-sensitive monitor (Matsuzawa 1985). Ai also learned to or-
der the numbers from zero to nine in sequence, regardless of the
inter-integer distance. Utilizing her numerical skills, we set up a
memory task. In our experiment, three to five random but differ-
ent numerals picked from 0–9 were distributed on a touch-sensi-
tive monitor (e.g., 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9). Ai was required to select the
numerals in an ascending order. Immediately after selecting the
lowest numeral (i.e., “1”), all the remaining numerals were
masked by a white square (Fig. 1). Therefore, Ai had to memorize
the numerals (now masked) accurately to select the correct se-
quence. Ai attained more than 90% accuracy with four numerals
and 65% with five, significantly above chance in each case (17%
and 4%, respectively). In this and other similar studies (Kawai
2001; Kawai & Matsuzawa 2000a; 2000b; 2001a; 2001b), only the
reaction time for the first numeral was longer than those for the
remaining numerals, which did not differ (Fig. 2). These results
indicate that she could memorize the correct sequence of any five
numerals (Kawai & Matsuzawa 2000b).
The chimpanzee Ai also exhibits skillful on-line control of ac-
tion. In the same numerical ordering task with three different nu-
merals (e.g., 1, 3, 7), the on-screen positions of the remaining two
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Figure 2 (Kawai). Reaction times selecting the first, second,
third, fourth, and fifth items in the numerical ordering task with
the chimpanzee Ai (Kawai 2001). Only the reaction time for the
first numeral was longer than those for the remaining numerals,
which did not differ.
Figure 1 (Kawai). The chimpanzee Ai performing the numeri-
cal ordering task in the “masking” trial (Kawai & Matsuzawa
2000b). The numerals were presented on the touch-sensitive
monitor. Immediately after Ai had correctly chosen the lowest nu-
meral (1), the remaining numerals were automatically masked. Ai
continued to identify the numerals one by one in ascending order.
numerals were occasionally exchanged by the computer, immedi-
ately after she correctly selected the lowest numeral in a given se-
ries (Biro & Matsuzawa 1999). Her accuracy dropped to 45% in
these “switch” trials as compared to 95% correct in the normal
background trials. These indicate that Ai planned a trajectory for
a correct response; however, when the first and former “second”
numerals were relatively distant from each other, she made on-
line adjustments to the spatially exchanged stimuli.
Glover attributes the human planning system to the presence of
an enlarged parietal lobe, hand preference, and tool-use. The latter
two were once thought of as being unique to humans (sects. 1.2.1
and 3.1.1). We now know that a wide variety of tools is used by chim-
panzees (Whiten et al. 1999). Recent studies revealed that chim-
panzees exhibit preferential use of the right hand in gestural com-
munication (Hopkins & Cantero 2003). These findings may not
contradict Glover’s speculation. However, future comparative stud-
ies will be needed to clarify the contributions of hand preference
and tool-use to the evolution of a planning system. These should be
conducted by comparing great apes that exhibit neither tool-use nor
hand preference (e.g., gorillas), and those that use tools but have no
hand preference (e.g., orangutans) (van Schaik et al. 2003).
In summary, whereas planning may rely on phylogenetically
newer regions in the inferior parietal lobe along with the frontal
lobes and basal ganglia, chimpanzees, but not monkeys, seem to
share this advanced behavior.
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Abstract: Understanding neural anatomy and physiology depends on first
understanding the behaviour being mediated. Glover, in his review of ear-
lier work suggesting various dichotomies in visual processing, shows how
there is a tendency to oversimplification if this approach is ignored. His
own new proposals demonstrate the advantages of allowing function to
drive anatomical analysis. Nevertheless, the new planning–control di-
chotomy he proposes, though a valuable advance, is itself an oversimplifi-
cation of what must be a multi-channel system.
A particular visual function can be present only if there is a phys-
ical mechanism present in the brain to mediate it. However, it is
the visual function, or rather the behaviour dependent on that
function, that is selected for by evolution. Put simplistically, a
physical mutation in the structure of the brain will only be selected
for if it facilitates a behavioural capacity that enhances survival.
Glover provides a possible example of this in his suggestion that
the phylogenetically newer cortex in the human inferior parietal
lobule, not present in the monkey brain, has evolved to mediate a
planning function in motor control (sect. 1.2.1 and 3.1.1).1
A similar argument applies to environmentally modulated de-
velopmental processes. A world full of vertical lines will, through
the continual processing of those lines, lead to a different neural
structure from a world full of horizontal lines (Blakemore &
Cooper 1970). So in a real sense, in both evolution and develop-
ment, the function of the brain determines its structure. Form fol-
lows function.
The significance of this is that an understanding of behaviour is
essential, and arguably has to precede, an understanding of the
structure of the brain mediating that behaviour. The term behav-
ioural neuroanatomy2 perhaps best encompasses this approach.
Glover’s article is an excellent illustration of the value of using 
behaviour to drive a neuroanatomical analysis. By beginning with
a historical review of motor control, he focuses the subsequent
anatomical analysis on meaningful possibilities. Having presented
evidence for the existence of a separate planning function that is
independent of on-line motor control, he then looks at the neu-
roanatomical evidence to find where it might be mediated.
This, as Glover’s review demonstrates, is a very different ap-
proach from some of the earlier work, particularly lesion studies,
looking at the link between anatomy and behaviour. The empha-
sis in this earlier work tended, probably necessarily because of our
limited knowledge at the time of both anatomy and behaviour, to
be on rather open-ended searches for a behavioural deficit, ide-
ally achieving a double dissociation of lesion and deficit to control
for nonspecific effects (Teuber 1955). The dichotomy in visual
processing between the “what” of the cortical pathway and the
“where” of the retino-collicular pathway proposed by Schneider
(1969) was an influential example of this approach. This emphasis
on the binary division of visual behaviour continued with the sub-
sequent subdivision of primate cortical systems into their own
“what” – ventral – and “where” – dorsal – pathways (Ungerleider
& Mishkin 1982). This was subsequently refined into the “per-
ception for recognition,” ventral and “perception for action,” dor-
sal pathways of Goodale and Milner (1992). Now, Glover, very
convincingly, proposes a binary sub-division of the dorsal pathway
into separate planning & control systems with distinct visual in-
puts. So we have a binary cascade model of scientific advance with
a significant division roughly every ten years (Fig. 1).
Binary subdivisions are a powerful way of getting to specifics, as
anyone who has played the party game of finding a secretly chosen
word in a dictionary by this means will know, but does it create an
accurate description of the behavioural neuroanatomy of the brain?
It fits well with the experimental designs most commonly used, for
example, double dissociations, and this may be one of the reasons it
is so common. We like to compare things and divide them into two
categories.3 Many behavioural studies are deliberately designed to
discriminate between just two alternatives. This can be fruitful, as
in the present case, but it usually leads to oversimplifications of the
actual picture. Particular problems arise when there are sets of over-
lapping binary divisions that do not integrate easily. One of many
possible examples of this in the motor control area is line bisection
in neglect patients. There is good evidence that visual information
feeding this relatively simple task both varies according to whether
the line is in peripersonal or extrapersonal space (Cowey et al. 1994;
1999) and also depending on whether the patient is using a stick or
a laser to indicate the line centre (Pegna et al. 2001). Another ex-
ample is the differential role of subcortical and cortical oculomotor
systems in practised (predominantly superior colliculus) and un-
practised (frontal eye-fields) visual search (Latto 1978a; 1978b). As
far as I can see, these various binary subdivisions do not map in a
simple way onto the control-planning model.
The alternative approach is much more complex. It involves pro-
ducing a global model of motor control that can then be mapped on
to the neuroanatomy. This kind of approach is beginning to be fruit-
ful in visual perception with attempts to link the modularity of pro-
cessing to anatomical modularity (Livingstone & Hubel 1988; Zeki
1978). However, it is probably a little way off in our attempts to ex-
plain visuomotor processes. Meanwhile, we have to move forward
in a more piecemeal way through insightful articles like the present
one, always bearing in mind that the ultimate explanation will be a
multifactorial one, with the nature of the neural processing driven
by the needs of the outcome. Form follows function and there will
be as many different neural systems, and visual inputs to those sys-
tems, as there are different kinds of motor outputs.
NOTES
1. It is perhaps worth noting that it seems unlikely that nonhuman pri-
mates do not have some element of planning in their motor control and
that neural mechanisms in the frontal lobes, particularly the frontal eye-
fields, have been suggested in this context (Collin et al. 1982; Latto 1986).
2. The first usage of this useful term that I can find is Mesulam (1985;
1989).
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3. The fact that English has a specific part of speech, the comparative
inflection of the adjective, to identify a binary category (higher, lower, etc.)
raises the possibility that the tendency to form binary subdivisions is a fun-
damental process in human thought. Maybe, as with some primitive count-
ing systems (“one, two, many”), two subdivisions are as many specific cat-
egories as we can easily cope with.
Automaticity and inhibition in action planning
Matthew R. Longo and Bennett I. Bertenthal




Abstract: We question the generalizability of Glover’s model because it
fails to distinguish between different forms of planning. The highly con-
trolled experimental situations on which this model is based, do not reflect
some important factors that contribute to planning. We discuss several
classes of action that seem to imply distinct planning mechanisms, ques-
tioning Glover’s postulation of a single “planning system.”
Glover characterizes planning as a discrete and monolithic system
operating, to a large extent, prior to the initiation of an action. While
this model is a welcome addition to recent models distinguishing
perception and action, we believe that the mechanisms underlying
planning may be much more diverse than suggested by the target
article. Humans are unquestionably adept at planning skillful ac-
tion, yet this function need not be meditated by a single system any
more than memory, say, need consist of a single mechanism. The
mechanisms underlying planning in the highly controlled experi-
mental situations cited in support of the planning–control model do
not do justice to the full diversity and complexity of human action.
It has been noted, for example, that apraxic patients demonstrate
strikingly few difficulties interacting with objects in naturalistic sit-
uations even as they fail completely to demonstrate such ability in
controlled laboratory situations (see Cubelli & Della Sala 1996). It
is important to further differentiate the construct of planning if the
planning–control model is to generalize beyond simple actions in-
volving pointing, reaching, and grasping at isolated objects.
One important distinction made by researchers in diverse
fields is that between direct and mediated actions. The former
category assumes a direct mapping between perception and ac-
tion, whereas the latter assumes that action is mediated by stored
representations. Glover emphasizes the role of mediated actions,
focusing on the relation of so-called visuokinesthetic engrams in
the inferior parietal lobe (IPL) to planning (sect. 4.1.1, para. 4).
In addition to the evidence he cites, such representational medi-
ation is implied by patients with visuo-imitative apraxia who are
able to imitate familiar but not unfamiliar gestures (Goldenberg
& Hagmann 1997). Patients with so-called pantomime agnosia,
on the other hand, are able to imitate gestures that they are un-
able to recognize (Rothi et al. 1986), implying a separate pathway
from perception to action that bypasses stored representations
used by patients with visuo-imitative apraxia. To account for such
dissociations, recent models of deficits in apraxia (e.g., Cubelli et
al. 2000; Rothi et al. 1991) have found it necessary to include mul-
tiple pathways from perception to action. There is no place for a
single “planning system” in these models. Rather, planning is con-
ceptualized as consisting of multiple and diverse neural circuits
that differentially contribute as a function of task, context, expe-
rience, and the available control and coordination of the relevant
actions.
Some researchers have also distinguished between actions that
are externally versus internally motivated, the former made in re-
sponse to some distal cue, the latter generated volitionally by the
subject on the basis of stored representations. These two types of
behavior are mediated largely by distinct lateral and medial pre-
motor systems respectively (Goldberg 1985; 1987; Passingham
1993).
A related distinction is that between automatic and volitional
actions. In some cases, perceptual stimuli seem to elicit corre-
sponding action plans automatically. Rizzolatti and colleagues, for
example, have identified neurons in the monkey’s premotor cor-
tex that code goal-directed actions and are also activated visually
by objects affording that action (“canonical neurons”; Rizzolatti et
al. 1988) or by the same action being performed by the experi-
menter (“mirror neurons”; di Pellegrino et al. 1992). Recent be-
havioral studies in humans have demonstrated similar effects.
Gentilucci (2002), for example, has demonstrated that the affor-
dances of task-irrelevant objects systematically influence reach
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Figure 1 (Latto). The binary cascade model of the development of our understanding of the organisation of the visual system.
kinematics. Subjects’ grip aperture is increased when reaching for
a dowel sitting on a larger as opposed to a smaller sphere, even
though the target dowel does not differ between conditions. Sim-
ilarly, when attention is diverted, individuals have been observed
to unwittingly engage in behavioral mimicry (Chartrand & Bargh
1999; Stengel 1947). Hommel (2000) reviews evidence of at least
four distinct forms of automatic stimulus response translation
which appear to arise from different processes.
Such automatic activation is most apparent when inhibitory
control is lacking, either following brain insult or during early in-
fancy. Denny-Brown (1958), for example, observed that following
lesions of the medial frontal lobes, patients showed a compulsive
drive to interact with objects in their environment, what he
termed magnetic apraxia. Similar compulsivity was observed by
Lhermitte (1983; Lhermitte et al. 1986) following frontal lobe
damage. These patients demonstrated a total dependence on en-
vironmental stimuli to guide their actions, compulsively using ob-
jects (utilization behaviors) and mimicking the experimenter (im-
itation behavior). Similar behaviors can be observed in infancy.
Baldwin (1892) described the young infant as “suggestible,” in that
environmental stimuli would automatically evoke congruent be-
havior. Such behaviors were observed by McGraw (1941), who
found early reaching movements in response to objects notable for
their “autonomous quality,” in that these reactions seemed “in no
way connected with a desire on the part of the child to possess or
manipulate the object” (p. 130).
Our own work (Longo 2003) demonstrates that perseverative
search can be elicited in nine-month-old infants to a location
where they had seen the experimenter reach is but had not
reached to themselves, suggesting that the perception of the ex-
perimenter’s action had activated analogous motor responses in
the infant. This is consonant, as well, with findings of imitation in
very young infants (e.g., Meltzoff & Moore 1977), which can also
be explained in terms of motor priming (Kinsbourne 2002), fol-
lowed by a decline over the first few months of life (Fontaine 1984;
Maratos 1982), presumably on account of increased inhibitory
control.
Glover describes planning as having “the goal of selecting and
initiating an adaptive motor program” (sect. 1.1.2, para. 1). In
complex ecological situations, however, planning frequently has
the goal not only of selecting adaptive motor programs, but also
inhibiting non-adaptive motor programs which have been auto-
matically activated by environmental stimuli. Consider, for exam-
ple, the mostly automated actions of a skilled baseball player hit-
ting a pitched ball, relative to the tentative and uncoordinated
actions of a novice. The former player not only does a better job
of anticipating and coordinating his or her movements, but also is
more adept at inhibiting erroneous movements, such as swinging
at balls out of the strike zone. Such inhibitory control does not fit
easily into the planning–control framework articulated by Glover
and, therefore, we question the sufficiency of the current model
to account for much of naturalistic behavior.
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Evidence from optic ataxia does not support
a distinction between planning and control
mechanisms in human motor control
Roger Newport, Sally Pears, and Stephen R. Jackson
School of Psychology, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham,





Abstract: Evidence from optic ataxic patients with bilateral lesions to the
superior parietal lobes does not support the view that there are separate
planning and control mechanisms located in the IPL and SPL respectively.
The aberrant reaches of patients with bilateral SPL damage towards ex-
trafoveal targets seem to suggest a deficit in the selection of appropriate
motor programmes rather than a deficit restricted to on-line control.
Glover is to be commended for his extensive review of this largely
unresolved current issue in motor control. His planning–control
model, however, is not as parsimonious as many existing models
and is unconvincing for several reasons. Furthermore, the dis-
tinction between planning and control processes appears rather
arbitrary and unnecessary when a single continuous mechanism
for both would be far more practical and elegant. Glover’s dis-
tinction between planning and control mechanisms is an expan-
sion of traditional models based upon the observation that on-line
adjustments are usually seen only towards the latter stages of fast
aiming movements. The lateness of such adjustments, however,
probably has as much to do with the inertial properties of the limb
as they have with a putative switch between planning and control
mechanisms. Although the model might successfully explain ex-
perimental data more accurately than the perception and action
model (Milner & Goodale 1995), a more succinct and parsimo-
nious model is the inverse-forward model (Wolpert & Ghahra-
mani 2000). The latter not only allows for a single continuous re-
cursive process active from before movement onset until
movement endpoint but can also be applied to eye movements,
whereas the planning–control model cannot. Overall, the plan-
ning–control model does not advance our understanding of mo-
tor control above and beyond existing models; although we believe
the model has numerous flaws, this commentary will focus specif-
ically on optic ataxia and deficits of on-line control.
According to the planning–control model, a patient suffering
from optic ataxia has deficits that are limited to on-line control but
has unimpaired movement planning. The “planning” stage has ac-
cess to all of the necessary spatial characteristics relating to the ac-
tor, effector, and target in order to plan a goal-directed reach and
specify the velocity and timing of the reach. The “control” phase
of the movement determines the fine-tuning of certain elements
of the reach, such as grip aperture, hand configuration, and target
acquisition. We could therefore expect the reaches of optic ataxic
patients to head generally in the right direction, under the influ-
ence of an efficient motor plan, but expect their final endpoint or
grip formation to be inaccurate. This is not the typical observation
with many optic ataxic patients, however, for whom the initial
reach direction is also often grossly inaccurate. For example, non-
foveal patients (see Buxbaum & Coslett [1997] for this distinction)
typically misreach towards fixation when reaching to extrafoveal
targets. It is important to note that, contrary to what Glover’s
model suggests, it is not the case that (a) their initial reach direc-
tion is accurate, and (b) their subsequent aberrant on-line control
makes the reach inaccurate.
This is particularly apparent in patients with bilateral damage
to the superior parietal lobes. Patients Mrs. D. (Carey et al. 1997),
D.P. (Buxbaum & Coslett 1997), J.J., and M.U. (Jackson et al.
2004) all present with bilateral superior parietal damage and all
show a type of “magnetic misreaching” akin to nonfoveal optic
ataxia. For example, Mrs. D., with asymmetric slowly progressive
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bilateral lobe degeneration largely restricted to the SPL, could
reach only towards the point of fixation with either hand. J.J., a
right-handed male with asymmetrical bilateral posterior atrophy
(damage to the left hemisphere involving the SPL and IPS, angu-
lar gyrus; damage to the right hemisphere involving the IPS and
also over the posterior aspect of the angular gyrus), also tended to
reach towards his point of fixation rather than towards the target.
For example, when reaching bimanually for separate targets
placed shoulder width apart while looking only at the left hand tar-
get, his right hand would err towards the fixated target for the left
hand. As can be seen from Figure 1, reaching, for both patients,
is inaccurate from the outset of the movement consistent with a
deficit in both planning and on-line control, suggesting that a sin-
gle mechanism might be responsible for both. It was not the case
that the initial movement direction was correct and that aberrant
on-line control then caused the hand to be directed towards the
fixation; rather, the initial movement direction was incorrect and
movement direction remained incorrect throughout the move-
ment. This data is inconsistent with Glover’s account of both op-
tic ataxia and the role of the SPL. Glover also suggests that reach-
ing errors in optic ataxia should be most evident in circumstances
in which large corrections are required, including reaches towards
extrafoveal targets. This implies the unlikely notion that the
reaches of a neurologically intact individual towards an extrafoveal
target would initially be as inaccurate as those of Mrs. D. and J.J.
(because planning mechanisms are intact in both patients and
controls), but that in normal subjects, unimpaired on-line control
processes would correct for this error to make the final outcome
accurate.
Furthermore, Glover cites the inability of patient I.G. to make
in-flight adjustments to perturbed targets (Gréa et al. 2002) as ev-
idence for the locus of on-line control within the SPL (I.G. pre-
sents with bilateral SPL damage). I.G., however, has preserved
grip aperture formation, which according to Glover is also the pre-
serve of on-line control. Patient J.J., on the other hand, does not
adapt to prisms under terminal exposure conditions, which sug-
gests a deficit of movement planning; terminal exposure does not
allow time for on-line corrections. The erroneous hand position is
seen only at the very end of the movement, and adaptation there-
fore requires that a reach be planned away from the direction of
gaze (as gaze direction specifies the perceived rather than the ac-
tual target location). J.J. is unable to select the appropriate motor
programme and as a consequence consistently reaches to the per-
ceived target location (i.e., his point of gaze). According to Glover,
however, such movement planning should be intact as J.J.’s IPL,
the supposed locus of planning, is spared bilaterally. It is likely that
the parietal lobes are responsible for comparing and maintaining
current internal representations of the body, which are then com-
municated to the cerebellum, rather than having specific planning
or control functions.
Planning and control of action as solutions to
an independence of visual mechanisms
James G. Phillips, Thomas J. Triggs, and
James W. Meehan




Abstract: Glover proposes a planning–control model for the parietal lobe
that contrasts with previous formulations that suggest independent mech-
anisms for perception and action. The planning–control model potentially
solves practical functional problems with a proposed independence of per-
ception and action, and offers some new directions for a study of human
performance.
Glover proposes roles for the inferior and superior parietal lobes
in the planning and control of action. He is somewhat at variance
with the independent roles for the dorsal and ventral visual path-
ways previously hypothesized for the control of action and object
identification (Goodale 2001; Milner & Goodale 1995). However,
we agree that a reformulation of Milner and Goodale’s position is
required. Glover’s planning–control model is laudable because it
potentially solves a problem with a proposed independence of ac-
tion and object identification, namely that of independence of
mechanism within a context of functional and evolutionary de-
pendence. By establishing the conditions under which these pro-
cessing modes interact, Glover offers insights into coordinative
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Figure 1 (Newport et al.). Evidence that optic ataxia involves a deficit of movement planning. A. Mrs. D., pointing with left (upper)
and right (lower) hands towards foveal and extrafoveal (10, 20, and 30) targets (from Carey et al. 1997). B. J. J. reaching bimanually
while foveating left target.
mechanisms, and potentially offers new directions for studies of
stimulus-response compatibility.
Although action and perception are considered to involve sep-
arate mechanisms (Goodale 2001), a hypothesis of independence
is equivalent to accepting a null hypothesis. This is a statistically
weak position, and if there is good reason to suppose that the
mechanisms for the identification of an object interact with action,
then there is reason to suspect a Type I error. A hypothesis of in-
dependence is liable to generate challenges, because researchers
can potentially identify weak interplay between the mechanisms
responsible for object identification and action, or establish the
limiting conditions under which the mechanisms interact. Effec-
tively, Glover has commented upon the conditions under which
the independence between object identification and action breaks
down, and described the processes whereby this would occur.
Goodale’s independence of perception from action offers a po-
tential functional paradox, as object properties can be important
for human movements. As tool users, humans can detect the af-
fordances offered by an object and employ it as a tool. And from
this viewpoint, the motor system has to be able to take into account
object properties to allow tool-users to achieve desired endpoints.
If separate mechanisms are involved for perception and action,
this leads to questions about how the affordances of objects such
as tools are mapped into ongoing behavior. By offering planning
and control as separate visual streams, Glover offers some starting
points for such considerations.
In particular, the functional interplay of perception and action
seen in tool use is important for human evolution. For humans,
tool use has been assigned a key ancestral role and it is associated
with evolutionary changes in brain size or structure. From an evo-
lutionary perspective it is thus surprising that there would be an
independence of pathways responsible for object identification
and control of movement (Goodale 2001), as it offers no insights
as to how humans can use tools. At least in humans, this indepen-
dence is liable to cause problems. There is therefore a need for a
better understanding of how one of these systems operates in the
context of the other to bring about the sorts of fine motor coordi-
nation humans are known for. Glover offers a redescription that
assists in this regard. The inferior parietal lobe plays a part in plan-
ning, presumably identifying the affordances of objects, while the
superior parietal lobe engages in on-line supervisory adjustments.
According to Glover, an independence occurs at shorter time pe-
riods, but is resolved with the passage of time.
Glover reviews the circumstances under which object proper-
ties influence action. Glover’s studies reveal that object properties
influence the early part of movement trajectories. Others have
demonstrated that object properties assume a greater role when
there is a reduced availability of visual information for the control
system. We have recently observed that precision (rather than
time) can moderate these effects. Phillips et al. (2003) examined
the potential conflict between object properties and action during
cursor positioning within the graphical user interface. When pre-
cision requirements were low, the arrowhead cursor shape influ-
enced cursor placement, with the effects in keeping with those ef-
fects of arrowheads seen in optical illusions. Namely, as for the
Müller-Lyer illusion, extent was overestimated and overshooting
occurred in the direction the arrowhead pointed. When precision
requirements were low, the arrowhead cursor shape influenced
movement durations instead, with the effects again as might be ex-
pected from illusory figures.
Such studies indicate that object properties can interfere with
action. Indeed, one of us has delineated a number of forms of
stimulus-response compatibility that involve a conflict between
the cues offered by object properties and required action (cf. Kan-
towitz et al. 1990). For example, arrowhead cursors cue both lo-
cation and direction (Kantowitz et al. 1990), and thus offer a po-
tential source of conflict between the mechanisms responsible for
processing objects, and those controlling action. Other confusions
arise when users of tools have to decide whether the tool is figure
or ground, that is whether to move the tool or move the back-
ground, and these have clear implications for subsequent coordi-
nation (Guiard 1988).
There is therefore a need for a better understanding of how one
of these systems functions in the context of the other to bring
about the sorts of fine motor coordination humans are known for.
If separate mechanisms are involved for perception and action,
this is particularly important for humans, as it leads to questions
as to how the affordances of objects such as tools are mapped into
ongoing behavior. A consideration of such matters is likely to ad-
dress a phylogenetically important ancestral trait of humans. Un-
fortunately, research into motor coordination tends to focus upon
simpler and less directly human phenomena (e.g., pointing or
walking). There is therefore a need to address the challenges to
motor coordination posed by the use of tools, considering the im-
pact of object properties upon coordinative mechanisms. Indeed,
the disturbances of coordination caused by incompatible tools po-
tentially offer insights into the adaptive mechanisms that feature
prominently in human evolution.
Two types of object representations in the
brain, one nondescriptive process of
reference fixing
Athanassios Raftopoulos
Department of Educational Sciences, University of Cyprus, Nicosia, 1678,
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Abstract: I comment on two problems in Glover’s account. First, seman-
tic representations are not always available to awareness. Second, some
functional properties, the affordances of objects, should be encoded in the
dorsal system. Then I argue that the existence of Glover’s two types of rep-
resentations is supported by studies on “object-centered” attention. Fur-
thermore, it foreshadows a nondescriptive causal reference fixing process.
Glover argues that the dorsal system controls the on-line execu-
tion of action, while planning for action is subserved by a third vi-
sual stream that leads from the occipital lobe to the frontal lobes.
Along this pathway, in the inferior parietal lobe (IPL), represen-
tations of objects are stored (IPL-r) that integrate information
from both the ventral and the dorsal system. The former delivers
to the IPL information regarding nonspatial properties of objects.
The latter delivers spatio-temporal, size, viewer-centered shape,
and orientation information, which is stored in the superior pari-
etal lobe (SPL-r). The information in the SPL is retrieved bottom-
up (i.e., in a cognitively impenetrable way), evades awareness, and
precedes the information encoded in the IPL-r. The information
stored in the IPL-r has a semantic conceptual component, re-
quires reference to stored memories, and enters the realm of con-
sciousness (target article, sects. 1.2.2, 2.5, 2.7).
I comment, first, on two problems in Glover’s account: (1) It is
not clear that representations with semantic content are always
available to awareness. (2) Some functional properties are not en-
coded in the IPL; the affordances of objects should be encoded in
the SPL. Next, I argue that Glover’s postulation of two types of ob-
ject representations in the brain accords with evidence adduced
from studies on “object-centered” attention. Furthermore, it al-
lows recasting of the problem of grounding representations, by
providing the tools to construct a viable version of a causal refer-
ence fixing process.
Glover claims that the IPL-r contains semantic information and
that the viewer is aware of the content of this representation.
However, there are studies (Kanwisher 2001; Merikle et al. 2001)
suggesting that semantic information can be processed without
the person being aware of that content. Lamne (2003) postulates
a distinction between phenomenal awareness and access aware-
ness related to different kinds of representations, which corre-
spond roughly to the SPL and IPL representations, that are both
located in the ventral system. Hence, there are additional compli-
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cations with respect to the issues of awareness, and the types of
representations and where they are stored.
Glover states that the functional properties of objects are stored
in the IPL. The affordances of objects, though, are retrieved from
a scene directly, and are perceived independently of object-spe-
cific knowledge and of the subject’s will (Bickhard 1993; Norman
2002). Petitot (1995) discusses the early vision processes that re-
trieve bottom-up from a scene its aspectual properties, such as
“transfer.” The affordances of objects, therefore, cannot be among
the contents of the IPL-r.
Let me move to Glover’s postulation of two types of object rep-
resentations. There is substantial evidence for an object-centered
component to visual attention, in which attentional limitations are
characterized in terms of the number of defined discrete objects
which can be processed simultaneously (Pylyshyn & Storm 1988;
Scholl 2001; Scholl & Leslie 1999). This attentional mechanism is
designed to provide a representation of objects as discrete spatio-
temporal entities. The representation encodes primarily spatio-
temporal information. It functions as an indexing mechanism that
focuses on and individuates objects. Object-centered attention
may override featural information other than spatio-temporal in-
formation. Thus, there is evidence that there exists a level of vi-
sual processing in which objects in a scene are parsed and tracked
as distinct entities without being recognized as particular objects.
Object individuation precedes object identification.
It is at this point that Glover’s dual representation comes into
the scene. The SPL-r provides the content of the representation
needed for object individuation, whereas the IPL-r is related to
object identification and recognition. Recall also that the infor-
mation stored in the SPL (i.e., spatio-temporal information, and
information about size and viewer-centered shape) is retrieved
bottom-up from the scene (see also Norman 2002; Raftopoulos
2001).
The descriptive theories of reference hold that a symbol is as-
sociated with a concept in the mind, which constitutes its mean-
ing. This concept determines what the symbol refers to, since it
allows one to pick out the objects that are “described” by it. By ex-
plaining references by descriptive means, these theories of refer-
ence appeal to descriptions of other words; they explain reference
by appealing to the reference of other words. To escape from the
infinite regress, there must be some words whose reference is
founded directly in the world. If the fixing of reference of per-
ceptual demonstratives could be achieved by means of a direct
causal link with the environment without the mediation of de-
scriptions, then the first move toward grounding representations
in the world would be achieved, since the direct causal link would
ground perceptual representational content in the world.
The content of the SPL-r that is retrieved bottom-up from a vi-
sual scene without any conceptual involvement provides the direct
causal link that fixes the reference of perceptual demonstratives.
A plausible neural mechanism that implements this is expounded
in Ballard’s theory of deictic codes. The shortest time at which ac-
tions and movements can be observed is the 1/3 sec time-scale.
This is the embodiment level. Computations at this level govern
the deployment of the body’s sensors and effectors.
Suppose that one looks at a scene and, through eye focusing, se-
lects a part of it for further processing. The resulting brain repre-
sentation is about (i.e., refers to) that part of the scene. When an
internal representation refers to an object through such a deictic
representation, this is a “deictic reference.” Thus, when fixating a
location, the neurons that are linked to the fovea refer to infor-
mation computed from that location. The object present at that
location is the referent of the deictic reference. The act of fixation
assigns to this object a pointer that allows object individuation and
tracking; this is due to the fact that the fixation of the gaze creates
a reference to a point in space and time and the properties of the
referent can enter computations as a unit. It should be noted that
the term “object,” as used here, does not denote the objects of our
experience. Rather, being the content of the SPL-r, the referent
has only the content that is stored there. In this sense, the “ob-
jects” referred to above are really segmented perceptual three-di-
mensional viewer-centered surfaces.
Strong modularity and circular reasoning
pervade the planning–control model
Verónica C. Ramenzoni and Michael A. Riley
Department of Psychology, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221-
0376. ramenzvc@email.uc.edu michael.riley@uc.edu
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Abstract: We believe the dichotomy of processes introduced in the target
article is highly speculative, because the dichotomy is shaped by the ques-
tionable assumption of modularity and the complementary assumption of
locality. As a result, the author falls into a line of circular reasoning that bi-
ases his analysis of the experimental and neuropsychological data, and
weakens the proposed model.
The planning–control model proposed by Glover in the target ar-
ticle explores the existence of two distinct but interacting psycho-
logical processes for controlling reaching-grasping movements di-
rected toward environmental objects. We believe the evidence
provided is simply not compelling enough to warrant the assump-
tion of two distinct processes (planning and control) under the
control of distinct neurocognitive modules (located in the IPL and
SPL, respectively). The functional and structural dichotomy be-
tween control and planning processes defended by Glover, is only
one among different interpretations that could be drawn consid-
ering the evidence provided. We believe that the planning–con-
trol model reflects certain epistemological and ontological biases
related to the concept of modularity, and that Glover offers a cir-
cular line of reasoning according to which experimental and neu-
ropsychological evidence serves as proof for the processes that are
supposed to explain the evidence.
Critically, Glover seems to hold a strong modular approach that
precedes the analysis of the evidence, which in turn is portrayed
as supporting the modular properties of the processes included in
the model. Both control and planning are believed to be inde-
pendent processes because of their reliance on two different sets
of information (i.e., two different visual representations) about the
spatial and nonspatial characteristics of the object. The separation
between the processes is justified by the assumed informational
encapsulation of the two modules.
This strong modularity assumption pervades the design and in-
terpretation of experiments conducted to test the planning–con-
trol model, in terms of a separation between different movement
parameters associated with each process. Although Glover rec-
ognizes the methodological difficulties inherent in finding a task
that targets only one of the processes, he insists upon defending
the independence of the processes. The proposed independence
leads him to introduce indeterminations in the assessment of the
experimental evidence. Among them, parameter crossover –
when one movement parameter (e.g., hand orientation) repre-
sents the effects of planning during some part of the movement,
and control during some other part of the movement – is vaguely
stated.
Particularly troubling to us is that no means is offered for de-
termining at what time(s) a given parameter reflects either plan-
ning or control. Furthermore, the fact that 29 of the 52 entries
listed in Glover’s Table 2 are characterized as reflecting either
“mostly” control or “mostly” planning is, we believe, diagnostic of
the fact that so-called planning and control processes are not dis-
tinct. Moreover, parameter crossover seems to reflect the kind of
interactivity that violates the additive-factors logic demanded by
the modularity assumption (cf. Van Orden et al. 2001). The inter-
action between processes is systematically neglected in Glover’s
account, opening the door to the counterargument that planning
and control may as well be two extremes in the on-line unfolding
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of a single, more complex process, rather than being two inde-
pendent processes.
Glover’s model also seems to depend on the locality assumption
– the position that planning and control processes (in this case)
are independently implemented in two distinct brain areas, the
IPL and SPL, respectively. According to this assumption (and cen-
tral to Glover’s model), damage to one of those brain areas will
produce a discrete impairment that can be identified with and cir-
cumscribed to the affected module without affecting critically the
workings of the remaining components of the system (Farah
1994). The IPL and SPL, however, are believed to be part of the
fronto-parietal network, which functions as an integrated system
during the execution of movements (Wise et al. 1997). Glover’s use
of neuropsychological evidence to support the planning–control
model relies on the locality assumption. Glover assumes that local
damage to the brain produces only a selective behavioral impair-
ment, which can be identified with the malfunction of a distinct
cognitive process. It is one thing to assume the independence of
the brain centers putatively responsible for planning and control,
but it is another to assume that the planning and control processes
are thus necessarily independent (Farah 1994). The functional
distinctions drawn on the basis of anatomical evidence artificially
reduces the complexity of movement control to a dichotomy in the
planning–control model, even though the brain system responsi-
ble for the execution of reaching-grasping is believed to be distrib-
uted among a complex network of connections linking different
brain centers (Ietswaart et al. 2001).
Glover presents a host of neuropsychological case studies to
support his planning–control model. His strategy is one of estab-
lishing a double dissociation: Damage to the IPL disrupts plan-
ning, but not control, and damage to the SPL disrupts control, but
not planning. That double dissociation is supposed to provide ev-
idence that planning and control reflect the activity of indepen-
dent neurocognitive modules, respectively located in the IPL and
SPL. But the argument for the existence of independent neu-
rocognitive modules for planning and control based on double dis-
sociations entails a circular reasoning (see Shallice 1988) – double
dissociations are assumed to occur only in the case of modular ar-
chitectures, and therefore cannot be used to verify the existence
of neurocognitive modules (Van Orden et al. 2001).
In addition, Glover explicitly states that the neuropsychological
evidence he provides is inconsistent and in some cases may fit the
alternative model (perception–action) as well as the planning–
control model. Nevertheless, that evidence is included because of
its parallels with the results of PET studies. The taxonomy of cases
used is strongly reminiscent of the classical model proposed by
Liepmann (1900), even though Liepmann’s model and the line of
reasoning introduced by it are recognized as an oversimplification
(Cubelli et al. 2000). This is not an innocent fact, given the simi-
larities between Glover’s and Liepmann’s models. (Liepmann’s
model stresses the importance of the division between two sepa-
rate stages in the production of movement: the formulation of a
motor plan – planning, in this case – and the implementation of
the planned spatio-temporal sequence of movements – control, in
this case.) The argument for the existence of representations or
memories of movement is a critical point of discussion in the neu-
ropsychological literature; it is conceived by some authors as a bot-
tleneck in the study of apraxia (Iestwaart et al. 2001).
We feel that Glover’s model is constrained by the assumptions
of neurocognitive modularity and locality, while the experimental
evidence is either inconsistent with these assumptions (e.g., pa-
rameter crossover), or inconclusive with respect to them (e.g., the
neuropsychological case studies). These assumptions have been
criticized by several authors (e.g., Farah 1994; Uttal, 1998; 2000;
Van Orden et al. 2001; Weldon 1999) and seem, in this case, to
lead us down the wrong path in our efforts to understand move-
ment control.
Is efficient control of visually guided
movement directly mediated by current
feedback?
Patrice Revol and Claude Prablanc
INSERM U534, Space and Action, F-69500 Bron, France.
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Abstract: The main issue addressed here concerns the central notion of a
forward internal model, through which efficient control and planning are
linked together and to the related online predictive error processing. The
existence of such a model has strong implications in action production and
may question Glover’s model.
Glover’s approach to hand-reaching follows a view current since
Woodworth (1899), Fitts (1957), Keele and Posner (1968), and
Meyer et al. (1988), according to which the movement results
from two basic components: one planned action determining the
gross organization of the response and a final part including a fine
control of the hand movements based on the simultaneous vision
of the hand and target (in Glover’s model, supposed to involve, re-
spectively, the IPL and SPL). The extent to which visually guided
movements are planned in advance or controlled on-line during
the execution, is still a matter of debate. Whereas many studies
have searched for the origin of planning errors (see Desmurget et
al. [1998] for a review), another series of experiments have tried
to identify whether the so-called planning phase was really
planned and not under the control of either central or peripheral
feedback. These studies have been carried out in normal subjects
(Bridgeman et al. 1979; Desmurget et al. 1999; 2001; Goodale et
al. 1986; Pélisson et al. 1986; Prablanc & Martin 1992), but also in
deafferented patients (i.e., those who have lost the sense of posi-
tion) (Bard et al. 1999). Basically, their overall finding is that a
third component does exist, namely, an unconscious control ap-
plied during the first phase of the movement. In all these experi-
ments, a target perturbation inducing a planning error was ran-
domly introduced during the so-called saccadic suppression,
making these perturbations unconsciously perceived. The speci-
ficity of the corresponding corrections was both their smoothness
and their early stage as compared with the corrections observed
under conscious double step experiments. In these latter experi-
ments, despite sometimes a nonspecific early short reaction time,
the path deviation indicating the corrections occurred with a nor-
mal reaction time, and with a clear double peak velocity profile
(Georgopoulos et al 1981, Soechting & Lacquaniti 1983). One im-
portant point to notice is that the smooth online corrections were
mostly observed for unconsciously detected errors. In Glover’s
planning–control model, online adjustments to perturbations of
the spatial characteristics of the target should occur relatively
quickly, irrespective of the nature of the perturbation.
However, this unconscious error detection may not be the only
prerequisite for producing fast and smooth corrections. The de-
lays introduced by conduction processing times at the different re-
lays along the visuomotor stream have led some authors to postu-
late the existence of a “look-ahead” or Smith predictor (Hoff &
Arbib 1992, Miall et al. 1993). More recently, Desmurget and
Grafton (2000) have emitted the hypothesis that the correct exe-
cution of a hand movement is based mainly upon a forward inter-
nal model. This “internal model” is a predicted output of the up-
per limb endpoint derived from the real command signals fed to
the motor apparatus, together with the updated passive visual and
proprioceptive information of the end-point effector (the hand).
In another paper, Prablanc et al. (2003) have also suggested that
the fast error correction was not directly derived from the avail-
able retinal error signal between hand and target, but resulted
from a comparison between a central representation of both the
target and hand, mixing both sensory signals (visual and proprio-
ceptive) and an efferent copy of the upper limb motor commands.
According to Desmurget and Grafton (2000), if the normal vision
of the hand and target is available during the motor response, the
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detected errors should not be taken into account by the control
system, whereas Glover’s planning–control model should cope
with these error signals irrespective of the existence of a correct
or biased internal model.
We present the paradigm in brief here. A way to unexpectedly
bias the internal model is to introduce a random shift in the ini-
tialization of the model by the most efficient inflow signal (i.e., vi-
sion of the hand and fingers in their resting state) (Revol et al.
2003). Although the initial position of the endpoint effector is de-
fined through multisensory cues such as vision and propriocep-
tion, the weight of the former is high enough to create a bias when
viewing the hand through prisms goggles. Pointing performance
of control subjects were thus compared: (1) when an erroneous
planning together with a biased internal model occurred (using
left or right prisms to displace the initial vision of the hand); or (2)
when a planning error was induced by a small target displacement
throughout the saccadic suppression while the internal model re-
mained intact. When an initially displaced vision of the hand oc-
curred, pointing became inaccurate showing an incapability to
correct the erroneous planning despite the undistorted target po-
sition and the natural visual reafferences from the moving limb.
In contrast, a similar planning error induced by an intrasaccadic
target jump was unconsciously corrected despite the lack of visual
reafferences of the moving limb. These results are hardly com-
patible with Glover’s planning–control theory. Rather, they fit the
hypothesis that an intact internal model enables fast corrections
as proposed by Desmurget and collaborators (Desmurget et al.
2001).
Glover refers to a possible generalisation of the planning–con-
trol model to the oculomotor system. In fact, the opposite should
rather apply, as the most influential model of the saccadic oculo-
motor system since thirty years (Robinson 1975), relies on a sin-
gle efference copy signal being used as a feedback signal to the
saccadic controller, without any need for a visual feedback. The
theoretical concept of a feedback taking into account both the ef-
ference copy of the multi-joint upper limb, and the visual and ki-
naesthetic reafferences and their underlying neural structures,
had appeared much later, even very recently (Desmurget et al.
2001). However, one has to keep in mind that the simplicity of
Robinson’s saccadic model lies in the absence of a planning com-
ponent: The whole saccade duration is devoted to control,
whereas the control phase of Glover’s model cannot operate prop-
erly without a subtle combination of coherent efferent and affer-
ent signals reconstructing the instantaneous state of the moving
limb, as explained above.
Another point raised by Glover’s planning–control model is re-
garding the effect of illusion on movement. In contrast to the per-
ception–action model (Milner & Goodale 1995), Glover’s model
suggests that only planning should be affected by the illusion of a
surrounding context. Recently, Revol and Honoré (in preparation)
asked control subjects to point, without any visual feedback, either
at a central target or in the perceived direction of the same target
under optokinetic stimulation. The pointing errors recorded were
linked to the specificity of the pointing task, that is, only pointings
performed at the target location were unaffected by visual illusion.
These results fit neither Glover’s model nor the action–perception
model, but rather, suggest an action-perception gradient depend-
ing on the processing of the visual information (see Rossetti &
Pisella 2002).
Parallel visual pathways from the retina to the
visual cortex – how do they fit?
Luiz Carlos L. Silveira
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Pará, Belém, State of Pará, 66075-900, Brazil. luiz@ufpa.br
Abstract: Which roles are played by subcortical pathways in models of
cortical streams for visual processing? Through their thalamic relays, mag-
nocellular (M) and parvocellular (P) projecting ganglion cells send com-
plementary signals to V1, where their outputs are combined in several dif-
ferent ways. The synergic role of M and P cells in vision can be understood
by estimating cell response entropy in all domains of interest.
The planning–control model proposed by Scott Glover in the tar-
get article, as well as the “what” versus “where” model of Unger-
leider and Mishkin (1982) and the perception versus action model
of Milner and Goodale (1995), all try to explain the roles played
by the major streams of visual processing in the cerebral cortex.
In these models, room must be left for the function of the sub-
cortical visual pathways that feed the visual cortex with the essen-
tial information needed for their function. Originally, the magno-
cellular (M) and parvocellular (P) pathways were regarded as
dedicated to specific visual functions, such as movement and vi-
sual acuity plus color vision. As such, many attempted to associate
M and P activity to the functions of the dorsal and ventral cortical
streams, respectively. This view was abandoned once it was
demonstrated that the M and P signals mix largely inside V1; ex-
amination of the temporal and spatial requirements assigned to
perception and action lent further support to this decision.
Visual information travels in a series of parallel pathways from
the retina to V1. The M and P pathways are the best characterized
(Silveira et al. 2003). They have their own set of bipolar cells that
convey information to the M and P ganglion cells, which in turn
project respectively to the magnocellular and parvocellular layers
of the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN). From there, the M and P
relay thalamic neurons connected to specific V1 entrance layers.
There are other ganglion cell classes connecting to the LGN ko-
niocellular layers and pulvinar, from which visual information can
reach V1 and other visual cortical areas (Hendry & Yoshioka
1994). These pathways remain separate until they reach V1 and
then mix shortly after, as the information passes from V1 entrance
layers to the other V1 compartments, and from the latter to the
next visual cortical areas (Yoshioka et al. 1994).
All the models for visual cortical processing require the exis-
tence of multiple representations of the visual field, which are
built either in egocentric coordinates or in coordinates centered
with respect to the object (Milner & Goodale 1995). The infor-
mation provided by the visual system is combined with a wide va-
riety of nonvisual sensory and cognitive information to fulfill indi-
vidual aims, including object perception, motor planning, and
motor control. The visual information carried by light emanating
from objects located in the ever-changing visual field has to be
coded with enough precision in space and time to allow behavioral
tasks to be adequately performed. However, because of the limits
of quantum catch by the photoreceptor array, any gain in the ca-
pacity of locating an object in space more precisely is accompa-
nied by a loss in the ability to measure precisely the moment of
occurrence of a visual change, and vice versa (Land & Nilsson
2002). In addition, natural scenes are composed by singularities
and periodicities, both in space and time, and the visual system has
to have enough precision to evaluate not only spatiotemporal co-
ordinates, but also their spatiotemporal frequency content. The si-
multaneous precision in time, temporal frequency, space, and spa-
tial frequency is a general, basic problem in the design of
measuring devices, and there is no way to increase the perfor-
mance in all these domains at the same time (Gabor 1946; Silveira
& de Mello 1998). All real devices, either natural or man-made,
built to store, transmit, or analyze visual information, represent
different degrees of compromise between precision in the space-
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time domain and precision in the spatiotemporal frequency do-
main.
The uncertainty principle of Gabor (1946) establishes in a
mathematical identity the impossibility of unlimited increase in
the precision of measuring the time and temporal frequency of a
phenomenon, t . f  1/2, where t and f represent the un-
certainty in any measurement carried out simultaneously in the
time and temporal frequency domains. The number of terms in
this identity, called joint entropy in Gabor’s information theory,
can be expanded to accommodate the six dimensions of the reti-
nal image or the eight dimensions of the visual field or the praxic
field.
The visual coding required for perception of objects, motor
planning, and motor control will vary with the function per-
formed: No single brain representation of the space-time will ful-
fill all requirements. For instance, good spatial frequency dis-
crimination can be critically important for some tasks, such as the
recognition of a tree by its foliage; or precise representation of spa-
tial coordinates might be essential to reach and grasp an object.
Building a representation of the visual world adequate to the task
to be performed is therefore essential to models like the planning–
control model. This cannot be done by using a single retinal gan-
glion cell class to convey the information from the photoreceptor
array to the visual cortex, because each retinal ganglion cell class
is bound to a particular joint entropy combination. However, hav-
ing two or more cell classes, such as the M and P cells, can solve
the problem. What is needed is to combine their output in differ-
ent ways in accordance with the task to be performed.
The synergic role of M and P cells in vision can be understood
by estimating the cell response entropy in all domains of interest.
For this, it is necessary to measure their impulse function in the
domains of space and time, using discrete, localized stimuli. In ad-
dition, extended, periodic stimuli in the domains of spatial fre-
quency and temporal frequency can be used to measure cell fre-
quency response. The results are critically dependent on cell
eccentricity; once M and P cell dendritic fields change dramati-
cally with distance from fovea, it is hypothesized that all the func-
tional properties would change accordingly. In addition, it has
been shown that retinal illuminance also influences the response
time course and receptive field size of retinal ganglion cells. The
evidence so far indicates that the M and P cell responses differ in
all domains, though displaying a considerable degree of overlap.
The M and P cell properties in space and time, spatial frequency
and temporal frequency, are complementary and result in differ-
ent loci in Fourier space. Each pathway represents a particular
trade-off to reduce joint entropy, and the visual system codes the
spatiotemporal content of natural scenes more efficiently by using
two or more channels having different entropy loci in the infor-
mation diagram. M and P cells perform simultaneous and over-
lapping analyses of the visual field using different strategies to
minimize entropy. This enables higher order visual neurons, sim-
ilar to those of the dorsal and ventral cortical streams to combine
M and P information in different ways and could explain why M
and P outputs converge in the visual cortical pathways.
The requirements for perception, motor planning, and motor
control are such that refined information about target location,
time of occurrence of an event, and spatial and temporal fre-
quency discrimination are needed in different degrees for each
task. Each subcortical pathway conveys information with different
degrees of precision in each dimension. The information is com-
bined in V1 and sent to the different cortical streams as requested
to build visual representations for perception and action. Each
representation is a trade-off in the information space optimum for
each task.
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The control process is represented in both
the inferior and superior parietal lobules
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Abstract: Glover postulates that the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), along
with the frontal lobes and basal ganglia, mediates planning, while the su-
perior parietal lobule (SPL), coupled with motor processes in the cere-
bellum, regulates the control process. We demonstrate that the control
process extends beyond the cerebellum and SPL into regions hypothe-
sized to represent planning.
The target article by Scott Glover separates planning and control
processes into distinct, separate representations spanning multi-
ple cortical and subcortical networks. In particular, Glover argues
that the planning process initiates and selects an adaptive motor
program in the context of environmental and task goals, whereas
the control process is focused on the on-line correction of the spa-
tial parameters of the action. The specific thrust of Glover’s thesis
states that the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), along with the frontal
lobes and basal ganglia, mediates planning, while the superior
parietal lobule (SPL), coupled with motor processes in the cere-
bellum, regulates the control process. Two lines of empirical evi-
dence suggest that this dichotomy may be too simplistic to com-
pletely understand the complex integrity of human brain function
in the control of movement.
The first line of evidence is developed from research in patients
with Parkinson’s disease (PD). PD results from a loss of dopamin-
ergic neurons in the substantia nigra pars compacta, leading to ab-
normal basal ganglia outflow from the substantia nigra pars retic-
ulata and the internal segment of the globus pallidus to the
thalamus (Albin et al. 1989; Wichmann & DeLong 1996). PD pa-
tients were shown to have more variable force output than age-
matched healthy control subjects during a continuous grip force
production task that required on-line visuomotor processes (Vail-
lancourt et al. 2001). Also, Ghilardi and colleagues (2000) found
that movement kinematics and accuracy were similar between PD
subjects and controls in the absence of visual feedback, but move-
ments of individuals with PD had a shorter transport phase and
reduced velocity compared with control subjects with on-line vi-
sual feedback. Direct neural recordings from primates have
shown that a considerable number of globus pallidus neurons
specifically respond to a visually-guided reaching task (Mushiake
& Strick 1995). The findings on PD and the work from primate
electrophysiology suggest that Glover’s control process is associ-
ated with basal ganglia function – a region hypothesized by Glover
to only mediate the planning process.
The second line of evidence comes from work in human neu-
roimaging. We conducted a whole brain echo-planar functional
magnetic resonance imaging study at 3 Tesla (Vaillancourt et al.
2003), in which human subjects controlled continuous force out-
put by grasping an apparatus with their middle finger and thumb.
Subjects produced force at 15% of their maximum for 30 sec
blocks while using on-line visual feedback, and rested by fixating
on the visual target. Figure 1 depicts a group map of the signifi-
cant activation found in the parietal cortex during the comparison
of force with on-line visual feedback compared with rest. Both the
inferior and superior parietal lobules were active bilaterally dur-
ing the force control task. The task of producing force to the tar-
get required subjects to initiate the force, acquire the force target,
and regulate force for the remainder of the 30 sec block. All sub-
jects initiated force and acquired the target within 500 msec, and
this time period was not included in the analysis shown in Figure
1. Only the force control period was included in Figure 1. Ac-
cording to Glover’s definition, the task used in Figure 1 would fall
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under the control process – and include the activation of the su-
perior parietal lobule and the cerebellum. However, the findings
from that study demonstrate that the control process may also oc-
cur in the inferior parietal lobule. Although not depicted in Fig-
ure 1, a distributed network within the anterior prefrontal cortex,
premotor cortex, putamen, lateral cerebellum, intermediate cere-
bellum, and the dentate nucleus assisted the parietal lobules in
regulating the on-line visual control of force.
The implications from the work in PD and the findings from the
neuroimaging studies lead us to two possible conclusions: (1) that
Glover’s control process occurs in a more widely distributed net-
work that includes multiple cortical and subcortical regions; or (2)
that the on-line visual control of the force task includes a planning
component not recognized within Glover’s theoretical framework.
To reconcile these differences we turn to a postulated model of
the visual control of force that may support the latter conclusion.
Slifkin and colleagues (2000) examined the influence of inter-
mittent visual feedback on the variability and frequency of con-
tinuous force production. During the force task, subjects received
visual feedback at different frequencies that were presented at in-
tervals as slow as every 5 sec to as fast as every .04 sec. Slifkin and
colleagues found that there was a hyperbolic reduction in the
dominant frequency of force output at 1–2 Hz, reaching asymp-
totic values near a visual feedback frequency of 6.4 Hz (or 150
msec). Slifkin et al. proposed a model where force error is accu-
mulated at a maximum frequency of 6.4 Hz. Each successive force
error is then held in short-term storage (with a maximum tempo-
ral capacity of 1–2 sec (Elliott & Madalena 1987; Vaillancourt &
Russell 2002), and, after approximately one second, an error cor-
rection signal is computed. In the context of Glover’s theory and
the Slifkin et al. model of continuous force production, the con-
trol process would operate at a fast time scale where the maximum
is 6.4 Hz, and the planning process computes the error signal
about once per second.
In summary, the above explanation reconciles the apparent con-
tradictory findings with Glover’s postulated dichotomy of planning
and control processes. While the proposed dichotomy of planning
and control elegantly links historical models of Woodworth (1899)
with theories of perception and action (Milner & Goodale 1993),
the model does not account for the fact that the visuomotor feed-
back network extends into multiple cortical and subcortical re-
gions (Vaillancourt et al. 2003).
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Abstract: We summarize a number of recent results from our own exper-
iments as well as those from other laboratories. Some of these results sup-
port Glover’s planning/control dissociation and some are at odds with it.
We suggest that the model needs to be further refined and expanded.
In his target article, Glover has provided a welcome alternative
theory for the evidence related to the perception-action/dorsal-
ventral visual stream controversy. Like many new theories, it leads
to more questions than answers, but this is not necessarily a bad
thing, if it motivates those of us doing sensorimotor research to
delve more deeply into the issues surrounding this controversy. In-
deed, because Glover’s planning–control dichotomy appears to
map onto a circumscribed set of brain areas, it makes several pre-
dictions regarding activation patterns or the effects of lesions. For
example, he suggests that transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) delivered to sensorimotor areas underlying planning or
control should lead to corresponding deficits in these behaviors
under appropriate conditions. A recent study from one of our labs
has addressed this very question in the context of the perception-
action debate (Lee & van Donkelaar 2002). Subjects were asked
to point to the central circle in an Ebbinghaus display while TMS
was delivered to either dorsal or ventral stream sites. Previously,
we had shown that when the target circle appeared to be large,
pointing movement times were shorter and velocities were greater
than when the circle appeared to be small (van Donkelaar 1999).
When TMS was delivered over either dorsal or ventral stream
sites, this effect was significantly reduced. Interestingly, dorsal but
not ventral stream stimulation also reduced the effects of target
size even in a control condition without surrounding circles.
We interpreted these findings, taken together, to suggest that
the dorsal stream contribution to the effect was mainly related to
the motor aspects of the task, a conclusion that does not appear to
differ drastically from Glover’s point of view. A key issue with re-
spect to his theory, however, is whether we were stimulating in the
IPL or the SPL. According to the planning–control model, pro-
cessing that occurs within the IPL is proposed to underlie the
planning of the motor response and thus be susceptible to illusion
effects. By contrast, SPL processing is thought to contribute to on-
line control and to correct for any illusion effects induced during
planning but to otherwise be immune to their influence. There-
fore, according to the planning–control model, TMS over the IPL
should significantly reduce the illusion effect because of a disrup-
tion of the planning process. By contrast, SPL stimulation should
actually enhance the effect because of a disruption to the on-line
control underlying the corrections in response to the illusion.
Clearly, we observed the former result, which implies that we
were in fact stimulating the IPL.
Localizing TMS sites is not the most exact science, but various
clues can be used to make good approximations. For example, the
site of stimulation in our study was 7 cm posterior to the motor hot
point. By comparison, in a study by Desmurget and colleagues
(1999) examining the effects of TMS on on-line corrections within
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Figure 1 (Vaillancourt et al.). Visuomotor Process in IPL and
SPL. The group functional map was obtained from a group Fisher
test of the force with visual feedback minus rest t-map across the
ten subjects. The group map was overlaid on a single subject’s Ta-
lairach transformed brain. The image is shown from a radiological
perspective.
the posterior parietal cortex (PPC), a site 4 cm posterior and 0.5
cm medial to the motor hot point was stimulated. This difference
in the relative locations of the stimulation sites in the two studies
and the typical underlying layout of the intraparietal region sug-
gest that we were in fact affecting IPL processing. The results
from our TMS study therefore appear to be consistent with
Glover’s planning–control model.
More generally, however, we feel that Glover’s theory does not
place enough emphasis on the contributions to planning and con-
trol from areas such as the premotor cortex, supplementary mo-
tor area, and motor cortex. There is a tendency in the target arti-
cle to focus on the functional distinctions between the SPL and
IPL, with only a limited discussion of some of the areas to which
these dorsal stream sites project. Indeed, perhaps a more appro-
priate approach is to think of planning/decision-making as a pari-
etal-prefrontal process and control/execution as a motor area
process with an evolution from planning to control as one moves
from input to output areas. For example, one criterion for control/
execution should be the ability to elicit responses by direct stimu-
lation. This definitely holds for motor areas such as the motor and
premotor cortex, and (for eye movements) the frontal eye fields
and superior colliculus. Moreover, there is clear evidence that
control processes can occur within the motor cortex. In particular,
Desmurget and colleagues (2001) have used brain imaging to
demonstrate that the motor cortex (along with the cerebellum and
PPC) is activated specifically during the on-line control of reach-
ing movements. It would therefore seem that control can occur at
even fairly low levels in the sensorimotor system. We think that it
is vital to expand the model to include the contributions from
these levels to the control process.
Finally, although Glover explicitly states that the planning–con-
trol model is not meant to generalize to eye movements, we feel
that the well-documented relationships between hand and eye
movements can provide further insights with which to judge the
model. For example, Glover uses the results of a study on the
Roelofs illusion (Bridgeman et al. 1997) as evidence for his plan-
ning–control model of reaching – while the illusion does affect
movements to remembered targets, movements with no delay are
presumably corrected through on-line control so that the illusion’s
effect on planning is eliminated. However, recent work here (Das-
sonville & Bala 2002) demonstrates that saccadic eye movements
show the exact same pattern of accurate and inaccurate localiza-
tions for immediate and remembered saccades, respectively.
Given the ballistic nature of saccades, though, on-line control can-
not be used in an analogous way to explain the lack of illusory ef-
fects for immediate saccadic responses. It follows that either the
saccadic system uses an altogether different mechanism to over-
come the illusion than does the manual motor system, or that they
both use a single mechanism that is not based on a planning–con-
trol distinction – to us, the latter possibility seems more parsimo-
nious. Thus, a better understanding of the relations between eye
and hand under illusory conditions (e.g., Binsted & Elliot 1999)
will undoubtedly provide further insight into this issue. For now,
though, it seems that the jury is still out.
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Human vision focuses on information
relevant to a task, to the detriment of
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Abstract: Glover offers an account for why some pictorial illusions influ-
ence early but not late phases of an action. His proposed corrective con-
trol process, however, functions normally in the absence of continuous vi-
sual information, suggesting that the stimulus is registered veridically prior
to action onset. Here I consider an alternative account, based on differing
informational constraints of behaviors (and phases of behaviors).
Glover’s planning-versus-control (PVC) model provides an in-
triguing explanation as to why pictorial illusions affect some be-
haviors much more than others. Earlier theories, most notably the
Milner and Goodale (1995) perception-versus-action (PVA)
model, have described the presence of separate visual streams for
“perception” and “action,” and acknowledged that the two streams
must, of course, interact with one another. However, the form of
that interaction has been only vaguely described. The PVC ap-
proach takes on the important task of describing the details of this
interactive process.
The PVA model could be extended in some straightforward
ways to account for most of the findings reviewed by Glover, if one
simply presumes that the “perception” stream is involved in plan-
ning and early execution of actions, and the “action” stream con-
trols the final stages of a behavior. This tremendous flexibility of
the PVA theory, however, is one of its great limitations. The PVC
model makes far more precise predictions – predictions that could
potentially be refuted by further experimentation because of their
specificity. Only by increasing the precision of our models do we
make progress toward developing a better understanding of hu-
man perception and action.
With these strengths in mind, there are some decided limitations
to the PVC approach that should be noted in the realm of size-me-
diated judgment versus reaching, described in much detail in this
commentary. As Glover summarizes, it is generally believed that
pictorial illusions exert large effects on (a) judgments and the early
stages of visuomotor actions, while exerting small or nonsignificant
effects on (b) the latter portions of a visuomotor action. The PVC
approach claims that the planning of a reaching action is strongly
influenced by pictorial illusions, and a corrective control process
removes that error during the course of the reach. Implied by this
theory is a closed-loop action control process that uses information
from a “quickly updated visual representation in the SPL, coupled
with visual and proprioceptive feedback, and an efference copy of
the movement plan” (sect. 1.1, para. 2). Glover later states, “Put
simply, the control system is focused on the on-line correction of
the spatial parameters of the action” (sect. 1.1.3, para. 6).
One property of visuomotor actions from Glover’s own studies,
however, does not fit well with this story. Even when the view of
the stimulus is removed at the onset of the action, the corrective
process proceeds normally, just as when the stimulus is fully visi-
ble. Glover specifically states that the “dynamic illusion effects”
are apparent when vision of the hand and target are blocked dur-
ing the reach (Glover & Dixon 2001c; 2002a). If the control sys-
tem operates by providing on-line corrections to the process, then
having visual information available on which to base the correc-
tion should be important. The fact that it is not suggests that the
information for fully specifying the action, including the correc-
tion, is available before the action begins, that is, during the plan-
ning phase.
My collaborators and I have pursued an alternative account for
the differences in the effects of pictorial illusions on judgment ver-
sus reaching behaviors based on the differences in the informa-
tional demands of the tasks (Vishton & Fabre 2003; Vishton et al.
1999; submitted). For nearly all judgment tasks that have been
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studied in this context, participants compare multiple elements of
the display. For instance, the Titchener circles illusion is com-
monly assessed by asking participants to compare the sizes of the
two central disks. Nearly all action tasks in these studies, however,
involve a two-finger pincer grip, which is mediated by the size of
only one element of the display. While the judgment versus reach-
ing difference between these two tasks has been highlighted, this
“one versus two elements” difference provides an alternative ex-
planation for the observed effects.
We have repeatedly found that if judgments are based on a sin-
gle element, the effects of pictorial illusions are greatly reduced,
often to the same levels observed with reaching behaviors. Con-
versely, in some situations, we have found that when actions are
simultaneously based on multiple elements of a display, actions
are more strongly influenced by pictorial illusions (Fig. 1).
Whereas the studies related to this approach cited by Glover used
only two-dimensional stimuli (Vishton et al. 1999), leaving the
findings open to the interpretation that they were specific to “pan-
tomime” reaches, we have more recently extended these results
to reaches for three-dimensional targets as well (Vishton & Fabre
2003; Vishton et al., submitted). These effects are not present at
the very conclusion of the reaching action, when the size of the
target object determines the size of the grasp, but the effects are
apparent well past the midpoint of the reach. This work has also
suggested that the familiarity of a task plays an important role in
determining the effects of an illusion. For most people, reaching
is a far more common, familiar task than overt judgment.
This account is not directly at odds with the PVC model, per se.
My claim here is that there are facets of the interaction between
response task and illusion magnitude that are better explained by
alternative approaches. The PVC distinction may be present, but
other important factors must be included in any complete under-
standing of how visually registered information leads to precise ac-
tion choice, planning, and implementation.
Glover’s focus on how different phases of an action are influ-
enced by different sources of information (e.g., contextual vs. spa-
tial information) is quite consistent with our approach, advancing
it to a much more precise level. As Glover clearly points out, the
choice of an action plan is mediated by different information than
the control of the action once the general action plan has been set.
We should therefore expect the distribution of visual attention to
be different at these two moments. Differences such as these may
influence how pictorial illusion displays are processed, whether
separate visual processing streams are involved or not.
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Abstract: Several aspects of Glover’s planning–control model (PCM) ap-
pear incompatible with existing data. Moreover, there is no logical reason
to suppose that separate visual representations should be required for the
“planning” and “control” of actions in the first place. Although intuitively
appealing, the PCM appears to lack strong empirical support.
No need for separate representations. It seems clear that dif-
ferent types of information are relevant for regulating different as-
pects of an action. However, it is not clear why separate visual rep-
resentations of the same object feature (e.g., size) should be
necessary for the initial programming and the on-line control of
the same aspect of the action (e.g., grip aperture). On-line control
requires a representation of the desired state of the effector (e.g.,
the desired grip aperture), a representation of the current state of
the effector (e.g., the moment-to-moment size of the grip), a com-
parator, and a means by which to influence the effector. Of these
components, visual information about the target object can be
used to update only the desired state of the effector. Once an ac-
tion has been initiated, however, no new sources of visual infor-
mation about the target become available. Even if the target were
to change in some way during the action (e.g., increase or decrease
in size), the computations necessary to derive the size of the ob-
ject are not any different than if the object were to change size be-
fore the action was initiated. That is, the precise (and absolute)
metrics of the target object can be computed in the same way be-
fore and during the action. Why, then, would it not be advanta-
geous for the motor system to make use of the same computations
(or, the same “visual representation,” in Glover’s parlance) for
movement programming and on-line control?
Nonspatial object features. Glover proposes that a putative ac-
tion planning system “is responsible . . . for all movement param-
eters relating to nonspatial target characteristics” (sect. 1.1.2, para.
4). According to Table 1 in the target article, the specification of
grasping and lifting forces should be the domain of the action
planning system – a system that accesses a host of cognitive infor-
mation about the object. One would suspect, then, that larger
grasping and lifting forces should be observed when the actor
picks up an object that is judged to be heavier (or larger) than an-
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Figure 1 (Vishton). The start (a) and end (b) of a reach mediated
by sizes of two target elements. The grip-scaling component of
one-handed, pincer grip reaching is largely immune to the effects
of the Titchener circles illusion, but, if a two-handed reach is
made, based simultaneously on both central disks in the display,
the effects are significantly larger. For both “perception” and “ac-
tion,” it thus seems that illusions are small when based on a single
element of a display and large when based on multiple elements.
other object. Contrary to this prediction, Flanagan and Beltzner
(1999) showed that a perceptual size-weight illusion (in which a
larger object is consistently judged to weigh less than an equally
massive but smaller object) does not influence the scaling of grip
and load forces when the target objects are lifted a few times. This
was true for force measurements taken well before proprioceptive
and haptic feedback loops could modulate the grasping forces –
in other words, the measured forces must have been programmed
well in advance of contact with the object. In a similar vein, West-
wood et al. (2000b) showed that a pictorial size illusion affected
the perceived size of target objects, but not the force with which
the objects were grasped when they were lifted. Importantly, all
of the objects in that experiment had the same mass. Clearly, cog-
nitive judgments about object size and mass are not always taken
into account when programming grasping forces.
Grasping remembered objects: A rapid transition in control.
Glover suggests that a “control” representation of the target object
gradually fades from memory when vision is taken away, leading to
an increased influence of a “planning” representation for actions
made to remembered objects. We have shown in several studies
that the effects of pictorial illusions on action are exquisitely sensi-
tive to the time at which vision of the target object is removed. In
one recent study (Westwood & Goodale 2003) we show that a size-
contrast illusion does not influence grip aperture when the target is
visible during the reaction time interval, even if vision is removed
at movement onset. However, the illusion reliably influenced grip
aperture when vision was removed during the reaction time period
(i.e., for the 250 msec between response cueing and movement on-
set). This finding is difficult to reconcile with a gradual transition
from a “control” to a “planning” representation when vision of the
target object is removed. The data are more consistent with a “real
time” view of visuomotor programming in which retinal information
about the target object is converted into a calibrated motor program
at the time the action is actually required. Movement planning that
takes place before this time likely accesses a visual representation
of the target object that is laid down by the perceptual mechanisms
in the ventral visual pathway (Goodale et al. 2004).
The “dynamic illusion effect”: A methodological illusion? The
key piece of evidence in favour of the PCM is the finding reported
by Glover and Dixon (e.g., Glover & Dixon 2001a) that visual il-
lusions have a greater influence on movement kinematics that oc-
cur earlier rather than later in the movement. Glover uses a scaled
illusion effect to demonstrate this phenomenon. The scaled illu-
sion effect is simply a ratio of the illusion’s absolute effect on a
movement parameter (I) divided by the effect of a veridical
change in an object’s features on the same movement parameter
(O); this measure is calculated for a number of temporal points
throughout the movement duration. Glover argues that this ratio
is necessary to take into account the fact that visual object features
do not have a constant influence on movement kinematics during
execution: For example, the slope of the psychophysical function
relating object size and grip aperture increases monotonically
throughout the course of a grasping movement. When scaled illu-
sion effects are plotted as a function of relative movement dura-
tion, Glover reports a gradual decrease over the course of the
movement. This is interpreted as evidence that a “control” system
that is impervious to visual illusions corrects spatial errors intro-
duced by a “planning” system that is quite sensitive to visual illu-
sions. The problem with this type of analysis is that the same ef-
fect would be obtained even if the absolute effect of the illusion
were to remain stable over time (or even increase slightly), be-
cause of the monotonically increasing term in the denominator of
the ratio. In this case, one would surely not wish to conclude that
an illusion effect was being corrected as the response unfolded! If
the PCM is correct, one should be able to demonstrate statistically
that the absolute illusion effect decreases over the duration of the
action. Such proof has not been provided in many of Glover’s key
experiments. Moreover, at least one recent study has looked for
but failed to find such statistical evidence (Danckert et al. 2002).
Summary. There is little empirical support for the notion that
separate visual representations underlie the planning and control
of manual actions. Indeed, there is no good theoretical reason to
suppose that separate representations would be necessary in the
first place.
Planning differences for chromaticity- and
luminance-defined stimuli: A possible
problem for Glover’s planning–control model
Charles E. Wright and Charles Chubb





Abstract: We report data from an experiment using stimuli designed to
differ in their availability for processing by the dorsal visual pathway, but
which were equivalent in tasks mediated by the ventral pathway. When
movements are made to these stimuli as targets, there are clear effects
early in the movement. These effects appear at odds with the planning–
control model of Glover.
The interpretation of the ventral and dorsal visual processing
streams (first identified by Ungerleider & Mishkin [1982]) as
“what” and “how” systems, respectively (Milner & Goodale 1995),
marked a turning point in understanding the functional role of this
anatomical distinction. In his target article, Glover provides a
compelling summary of the evidence supporting the planning–
control model. By suggesting that initial planning and current con-
trol are functions of different parts of the parietal cortex, Glover’s
model gives substance to a distinction first introduced by Wood-
worth (1899). Equally important, this model marks another stage
in our developing understanding of the ventral-dorsal distinction.
Our aim in this commentary is to describe data, recently col-
lected using a new procedure (Wright et al., submitted), which ap-
pears inconsistent with the planning–control model. Our goal in
this experiment was not to test the planning–control model. In-
stead, the objective was to assess the relative sensitivity to lumi-
nance- versus chromaticity-defined targets of “how” tasks, in
which the goal is to produce a movement to an object, and “what”
tasks, in which the goal is to perceive some aspect of an object.
The impetus for this experiment was the what-how distinction
(Milner & Goodale 1995) and a long line of evidence suggesting
reduced color sensitivity in the dorsal stream. Although the evi-
dence is far from clear-cut, it appears that the dorsal visual stream
receives direct inputs from only the magnocellular pathway. In
contrast, the ventral stream appears to receive projections directly
from both pathways. Livingstone and Hubel (1988) have argued
that these two channels differ physiologically in four major ways:
color sensitivity, temporal resolution, contrast sensitivity, and acu-
ity. Specifically, they suggest that the parvocellular system is highly
color selective but the magnocellular system does not code color
differences.
In one procedure of our experiment, subjects had to identify
briefly presented, masked stimuli as one of four shapes. A given
target was defined relative to the gray background by a difference
either in luminance or in chromaticity. Luminance-defined targets
had the same hue and saturation as the background, whereas sat-
uration-defined targets were green and equiluminant with the
background. Various luminances and saturations were used to de-
fine targets.1 The results from this procedure identified levels of
luminance and saturation that produced equivalent levels of per-
formance in this identification (“what”) task.
In a second procedure, matched gray and green stimuli were
used to define targets for rapid, high-accuracy, three-dimensional
pointing movements. Consistent with our expectations, move-
ments to green targets took longer and had larger endpoint errors
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than movements to matched gray targets. This result is consistent
with both the perception–action model (Milner & Goodale 1995)
and the planning–control model outlined by Glover. To use this
result to distinguish between these two models, we can, as Glover
suggests, look at the full movements and not just their endpoints.
Figure 1 displays the results of such an analysis.
We used targets defined by either their luminance or their chro-
maticity in this experiment, because the literature on the magno-
cellular versus parvocellular distinction suggests that there should
be large differences in dorsal- but not ventral-stream sensitivity
for these stimuli. The planning–control model, as we understand
it, suggests that that the visual inputs to the movement planning
process pass primarily through the ventral stream and therefore
should not be affected by this manipulation. To reach this conclu-
sion, we assume that the sensitivity of the movement-planning sys-
tem to luminance- and chromaticity-defined target stimuli is
roughly equal to the sensitivity of the system used to perform our
shape identification (“what”) task.
The results shown in Figure 1 clearly contradict this expectation.
For duration, the difference between the green and gray stimuli is
evident one-third of the way into the movement and continues to
grow until roughly two-thirds of the movement is complete. The
difference in the XY-distance to the target starts out large and then
falls to zero midway through the movement. At the end of the
movement, however, a small but significant effect re-emerges.
A major contribution of the planning–control model is bringing
the planning/control distinction, long central to the motor-control
literature, into this arena. Although our results appear at odds with
the predictions of the planning–control model, given the number
of assumptions necessary to arrive at this conclusion, we hesitate
to assert that they clearly contradict the model. The general ap-
proach that gave rise to these data is, however, one that we feel
merits further exploration for the light it can shed on this and re-
lated questions.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This research was supported by a grant from the office of Research and
Graduate Studies of the University of California, Irvine.
NOTE
1. Equiluminant greens differing in saturation were determined for
each subject using a flicker-fusion procedure.
Planning and control: Are they separable in
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Abstract: We argue that planning and control may not be separable enti-
ties, either at the behavioural level or at the neurophysiological level. We
review studies that show the involvement of superior and inferior parietal
cortex in both planning and control. We propose an alternative view to the
localization theory put forth by Glover.
The distinction between planning and control has a long-standing
history in neuroscience and robotics. It hinges on a scheme of se-
rial organization of motor functions. For robotics, the separation
may be justified by algorithmic and implementation constraints.
In neuroscience, uncontroversial experimental evidence for sepa-
rate neural implementation of planning and control is still lacking.
Current notions favor the opposite view, that movement is orga-
nized over massively parallel distributed networks with coexten-
sive and sometimes simultaneous processing of parameters once
deemed to belong exclusively to either the planning or the control
stage (Burnod et al. 1999; Kalaska et al. 1998; Lacquaniti 1997).
Psychophysics. Glover claims that the planning stage incorpo-
rates both spatial and nonspatial motor goals, whereas control
deals only with spatial goals. His theory predicts that “the motor
system should not be able to make a fast change to the force used
in lifting the object, as this relies on a new computation of weight
(a nonspatial characteristic)” (sect. 2.4.4). In fact this prediction is
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Figure 1 (Wright & Chubb). This figure summarizes differ-
ences in the trajectories of movements to matched gray and green
targets based on more than 4,000 movements (500 each for
eight participants). The two panels of this figure share the same
abscissa: Z distance. Z distance is the (perpendicular) distance
separating the stylus (being moved by the subject) from the plane
of the display containing the target. The movements begin with
Z10 cm and end with Z0 cm, so decreasing values of the ab-
scissa progress from the start of the movement (on the left) to the
end (on the right). The ordinate in the upper panel is the mean
difference (when pointing to green minus when pointing to gray
targets) in the time required to reach the Z-distance given in the
abscissa (with time measured from the start of the movement).
The ordinate in the lower panel is the mean difference (when
pointing to green minus when pointing to gray targets) in the X-Y
distance (i.e., ignoring the Z dimension) of the stylus from the tar-
get point. This panel also includes a data point on the far left of
the abscissa, labeled “Lat,” which shows this difference at the in-
stant the movement began. The “Lat” point is absent in the upper
panel because, by definition, movement duration is zero at this
point in both conditions. In both panels, the error bars show 95%
confidence intervals, computed based on the between-subject
variability of that measure at that point. Points joined by solid lines
differ at the .05 level of significance based on a paired t-test.
contradicted by the well-established on-line corrections to unex-
pected slippage of objects (Johansson & Cole 1992). When a sub-
ject repeatedly lifts a fixed weight with his or her hand, an unex-
pected change in weight leads to fast on-line corrections triggered
by skin mechanoreceptors. Responses in FA II afferents trigger
the corrective reactions that compensate for the unanticipated
slippage at a short latency. Not only does object slippage trigger
feedback control, but it also updates memory of the object prop-
erties to be used in the next lift, thus demonstrating the strict in-
terconnection between planning and control.
There are other examples of the difficulty of ascribing specific
kinematic or kinetic parameters to distinct stages of planning and
control. Consider reaching for a visual target with the hand. Visual
information about target location must be transformed into com-
mands that specify the patterns of muscle activity bringing the
hand to the target. Movement endpoint must be specified, but
what about arm trajectory? Is there a kinematic plan that includes
a specification of the path and law of motion of the limb? There is
no consensus on this issue.
At the phenomenological level, a number of lawful relationships
have been described for the kinematic trajectories of the hand in
external space, and of the individual limb segments in the angular
coordinates of the joints. Thus, the spatial trajectories of both the
hand and the joints are essentially unaffected by wide changes in
speed and load. In point-to-point movements, the velocity profile
of the hand tends to be bell-shaped, while the velocity profiles of
shoulder and elbow angular motions tend to be temporally corre-
lated. In curved movements, the instantaneous tangential velocity
of the hand is inversely related (by a power law) to the local curva-
ture of the path (for a review, see Lacquaniti 1997). However, these
kinematic regularities could arise either from the explicit specifica-
tion of limb kinematics provided by a detailed kinematic plan, or
from the implicit inner working of the execution control stage.
Therefore, they could arise from optimization principles. Opti-
mization may involve endpoint trajectory or joint angular trajecto-
ries; it could involve kinematic or kinetic criteria. One interesting
optimization idea, the minimum variance principle, collapses to-
gether planning and control (Harris & Wolpert 1998). This princi-
ple states that the neural control signals are corrupted by noise
whose variance increases with the size of the control signal. In the
presence of such signal-dependent noise, the shape of a trajectory
could be selected to minimize the variance of the final arm position.
Neurophysiology. Is there evidence for explicit representations
of desired trajectories prior to the execution phase of a motor task,
as predicted by the planning/control dichotomy? Such an explicit
representation should be apparent in the neural activity during an
instructed-delay period, when information about the direction and
distance of an upcoming movement is presented prior to the in-
struction to start the movement. One would expect that, during this
instructed-delay period, trajectory planning should take place as
soon as movement metrics are specified, with no need to recapit-
ulate after the Go signal. Instead, during this period, the cortical
neural activity does not differ appreciably from that seen during
simple reaction tasks (Crammond & Kalaska 2000). Glover claims
that the planning stage relies on the inferior parietal lobule (IPL),
whereas control relies on the superior parietal lobule (SPL). How-
ever several recent electrophysiological studies in the monkey in-
dicate that both SPL and IPL neurons participate during all stages
of motor organization, not just the execution phase (Battaglia-
Mayer et al. 2000; 2001; Buneo et al. 2002; Hyvärinen & Poranen
1974; Mountcastle et al. 1975; Snyder et al. 1997). Many neurons
in different parts of the SPL, such as areas 7m, PEc and V6A
(Battaglia-Mayer et al. 2000; 2001) are thus involved during both
the delay time preceding movement onset and during movement
execution. Similarly, in different areas of the IPL, neurons fire not
only during memorized delays, but also during movement time
(Mountcastle et al. 1975; Snyder et al. 1997). Finally, neural activ-
ity in area 7a is modulated by hand-tracking movements (Hyväri-
nen & Poranen 1974), a task that Glover considers to be mostly de-
pendent on on-line control. It is worth mentioning that a recent
fMRI study (Astafiev 2003) has found regions activated by prepa-
ration for pointing in both the SPL and the IPL, as well as in the
premotor cortex. The same study has reported a good spatial cor-
respondence between parietal areas in humans and monkeys, sug-
gesting that the same architectural and evolutionary plan underlies
the organization of the parietal cortex in both species, contrary to
what is assumed by Glover.
Burnod et al. (1999) proposed that different classes of reach-
neurons are not confined within individual cortical areas of the
parieto-frontal-network, but are common to different areas, with
gradient tangential distribution of eye and hand signals related to
both planning and execution. Computation of commands for the
combined eye-hand movements occurs as a simultaneous recruit-
ment of discrete populations of neurons sharing similar properties
in different cortical areas, rather than as a serial process from vi-
sion to movement, engaging different areas at different times.
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Abstract: The views expressed in the commentaries challenge
many of the tenets of the planning–control model as espoused in
the target article. This response is aimed at addressing the most
serious of these challenges as well as clarifying errors of interpre-
tation. It is argued that the majority of the challenges from brain
and behavior, although meritorious, can nonetheless be incorpo-
rated within the planning–control model. It is concluded that only
some minor revision of the model with regard to anatomy is nec-
essary at this time.
R1. Introduction
The target article has elicited a number of stimulating and
challenging commentaries. I here endeavour to address
what I see as the main issues raised with the planning–con-
trol model: (1) the definition and characterization of “plan-
ning”; (2) the definition and characterization of “control”;
(3) the evolutionary, neurophysiological, and developmen-
tal aspects of the model; (4) the effects of visual illusions
(and contextual information in general) on actions; (5) the
neuroimaging of planning and control; and (6) the neu-
ropsychology of planning and control. In many cases, ap-
parent discrepancies between the views propounded in the
target article and the views held by the commentators ap-
pear to have arisen quite accidentally and require only a
clarification of the model’s tenets. In other cases, there are
challenges to the model that require attention.
R2. The definition and characterization of
planning
A number of commentators have addressed the definition
and characterization of “planning” in the target article. To
begin with, certain clarifications are required.
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R2.1. Planning is not perception
Given that the planning–control model was proposed as an
alternative to the two-stream perception-action model, it is
perhaps understandable that Bridgeman, Goodale &
Milner, Raftopoulos, and Wright & Chubb have all in-
ferred that planning and control must also use the same two
“ventral” and “dorsal” systems. Specifically, they seem to
have inferred that planning in the planning–control model
can be equated with perception in the perception-action
model. However, the planning–control model is not simply
a reformulation of the two-stream hypothesis. Rather, the
posterior regions of the cortex involved in planning are held
to be centered in the inferior parietal lobe (the IPL, the ter-
minus of the putative “third” visual stream). Because the
IPL receives visual input from both the ventral and dorsal
streams, the output of planning often possesses character-
istics of both. The implication is that ventral stream
processes can influence planning, but that is not the same
thing as equating planning with perception. For example,
when Wright & Chubb argue that color coding should af-
fect planning because it is a ventral stream function, they
appear to be equating planning with perception, when, in
reality, planning is its own process. Although color may af-
fect planning when color is associated with a spatial char-
acteristic of the target in long-term memory (Haffenden &
Goodale 2000), there is nothing in the planning–control
model to suggest that color perception in and of itself
should affect planning.
R2.2. Kinematic planning is subject to cognitive/
perceptual influences
Goodale & Milner have correctly identified the clearest
point of difference between the planning–control and per-
ception-action models. In the planning–control model,
planning and control are entirely separate: Cognitive and
perceptual influences are posited to potentially impact the
planning of movement kinematics – but never their on-line
control. Conversely, in the perception-action model, both
the planning and the control of movement kinematics
should be immune to cognitive and perceptual influences.
Although this reflects a clear understanding of one of the
main differences between the planning–control and per-
ception-action models, it is surprising that Goodale & Mil-
ner choose to contest this point. Indeed, not only has it
been shown that many kinematic parameters are affected
by cognitive and perceptual variables (including visual illu-
sions – e.g., Aglioti et al. 1995; Brenner & Smeets 1996;
Glover & Dixon 2001a; and semantics – e.g., Gentilucci et
al. 2000a; Glover et al. 2004), but even data from their own
studies supports the planning–control model. For example,
Haffenden and Goodale (2000; 2002a; 2002b) showed that
learned associations between a cue and a characteristic of a
target (e.g., between a color and a target’s size) can affect
the kinematics of movements directed towards the target.
Indeed, the Haffenden and Goodale (2000; 2002a;
2002b) studies seem remarkably consistent with what I
have claimed as the role of long-term memories (presum-
ably encoded in either the ventral stream or the IPL) in the
kinematic planning of actions; and in fact, such a role for
long-term memories was acknowledged by Haffenden and
Goodale in these studies. However, this is in contrast to
Goodale & Milner’s traditional view (e.g., Milner &
Goodale 1995), which holds that the dorsal stream is wholly
responsible for movement kinematics made to visible tar-
gets through computations carried out de novo each time a
movement is made.
Goodale & Milner have often addressed the inconsis-
tency between de novo (i.e., based entirely on low-level vi-
sual inputs and independent of “representations”) planning
and the varied effects of cognitive/perceptual factors on
planning by invoking the idea that the ventral and dorsal
streams can “interact” (e.g., Haffenden & Goodale 2000;
2002a; Milner & Goodale 1995; Milner et al. 2003). How-
ever, they have been much less clear on what circumstances
should lead to an interaction. To an outsider, their general
approach seems to be this: If an action is immune to a cog-
nitive or perceptual variable, it is because the dorsal stream
is planning and controlling the action (this supports the per-
ception-action model). On the other hand, if an action is af-
fected by a cognitive variable, it is because of an “interac-
tion” between the ventral and dorsal streams (this also
supports the perception-action model).
As pointed out by Phillips, Triggs & Meehan (Phillips
et al.) and Latto, however, such “interactions” provide
weak, post hoc explanations. In contrast to this, the plan-
ning–control model has the virtue of making strong, a pri-
ori predictions. Cognitive and perceptual variables will of-
ten affect planning but will never affect on-line control. A
characteristic of a strong approach such as this is that the
predictions can be contradicted. This allows for many chal-
lenges to the planning–control model, such as appeared in
some of the commentaries, for example, in the cases of the
optic ataxics who show direction errors from early in the tra-
jectory (Gentilucci & Chieffi, Goodale & Milner, and
Newport, Pears & Jackson [Newport et al.]), or in cases
in which the context has been shown to influence both plan-
ning and control (Coello & Rossetti). In contrast, it is un-
clear what evidence, if any, could ever be found to falsify
the perception-action model.
R2.3. Planning is not monolithic
Coslett & Buxbaum, Longo & Bertenthal, and Good-
ale & Milner suggest that the definition of planning in the
target article is too vague and does not take into account
many of the various processes that go into planning. They
argue that my characterization of planning is monolithic
and thus incomplete. In some sense, this is not an unrea-
sonable criticism; certainly a single article cannot fully ex-
plore the many components of a system as diverse as action
planning. However, I did touch on planning’s complexity
when I described the various deficits that can occur follow-
ing damage to the planning regions, from hypokinesia in
Parkinson’s disease following damage to the basal ganglia
(Zigmond et al. 1999), to ideational apraxia following dam-
age to the premotor cortex (Heilman & Gonzalez Rothi
1993), to ideomotor apraxia following damage to the left
IPL (e.g., Clark et al. 1994). Even so, there can be many
variants of planning deficits, and each is instructive as to the
overall organization of the brain, as Coslett & Buxbaum and
Longo & Bertenthal elucidate.
R2.4. Planning and grip force
Vaillancourt, Mayka & Corcos (Vaillancourt et al.),
Westwood, and Zago, Lacquaniti, Battaglia-Meyer &
Caminiti (Zago et al.) voiced concerns regarding the role
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of planning and control in the application of grip force, ar-
guing that both systems appear to influence grip force. To
reiterate my own views, grip force is dependent on weight
(a nonspatial target characteristic) and therefore falls within
the domain of the planning system. Just as with any plan-
ning parameter, grip force can adapt over a number of tri-
als on the basis of memories of past experiences (the size-
weight illusion adaptation – Flanagan & Beltzner 1999).
This is not surprising, given that grip force computations
rely heavily on past experiences whether or not a size-
weight illusion is present (Johansson & Westling 1984;
1988). Naturally enough, when grip force is calculated er-
roneously by the planning system, it can still be adjusted
once the target has been contacted and lifted (Johansson &
Westling 1988). However, it is unlikely that the application
of grip force corresponds with activity in the “control” sys-
tem as I define it. For one, the adjustment to target slip-
page has been shown to be too rapid to involve processing
in the CNS (Eliasson et al.1995). For another, neurologi-
cally induced deficits in maintaining a constant grip force
most likely reflect an elementary motor deficit also outside
the domain of the “control” system (e.g., Fellows et al. 1998;
Nowak & Hermsdorfer 2003).
R3. The definition and characterization of control
The criticisms leveled by commentators at the description
of the control system in the target article can be classified
into two main categories: the use of immediate visual feed-
back by the control system (Goodale & Milner; Vishton)
versus the existence of a short-term memory in the visual
representation used by the control system (Binsted &
Heath; Westwood); and the nature and timing of on-line
corrections (Gaveau & Desmurget; Gentilucci &
Chieffi). Because the issue of visual feedback also pertains
to illusion and action studies, I will address it in section R4.
R3.1. Visual feedback and the transience of the control
representation
The planning–control model argues that a short-term visual
representation subserves on-line control such that on-line
corrections are possible for up to two seconds following the
removal of visual information. New evidence described by
Binsted & Heath appears to contest this point, however.
From this evidence it appears that the control process is im-
paired immediately upon removal of visual input, as is
shown by an increase in the correlation between hand po-
sition early and late in a movement when visual feedback is
unavailable. Further and more important, this impairment
appears to be identical after a zero-second delay to after a
five-second delay. Similarly, Adamovich et al. (1998; 1999)
have also noted that on-line corrections do not appear to oc-
cur when visual feedback is unavailable. Conversely, West-
wood et al. (2001a) found that errors in accuracy accumu-
lated gradually over increasingly long delay periods.
Whereas the majority of the aforementioned results sug-
gest that on-line visual feedback is crucial to the control
process, other results suggest differently. Perhaps the most
dramatic of these instances was in Goodale et al. (1986), de-
scribed in section 2.5.1 of the target article, in which on-line
corrections were made to a target that had jumped during
a saccade, despite the fact that vision of the hand was not
allowed. This result using the saccadic suppression para-
digm has been upheld several times since then (e.g., Bard
et al. 1999; Prablanc & Martin 1992), and so seems reliable.
How then to reconcile these on-line corrections with the
lack of corrections found in more recent studies?
One way to do this relies on the fact that whereas vision
of the moving limb is absent in all the aforementioned stud-
ies, vision of the target was available throughout the move-
ment in the saccadic suppression studies. Similarly, it has
been shown that on-line vision of the target can be an im-
portant factor in making in-flight corrections in visual illu-
sions (Gentilucci et al. 1996; Glover & Dixon 2001c), and
that vision of the hand can be important in making on-line
corrections under normal (i.e., nonillusory) conditions
(e.g., Carlton 1981). No doubt a number of factors feed into
on-line corrections, not just vision but also proprioception
(Gentilucci et al. 1994; Jackson et al. 2000; Jeannerod et al.
1984; Sainburg et al. 1993), and efference copy (Craggo et
al. 1976; Evarts & Vaughn 1978), and the respective con-
tributions of these factors remain to be fully teased apart.
What then, does this imply for the current characteriza-
tion of the control system? On the one hand, it does appear
that under some circumstances at least some continuous vi-
sual input is important for on-line corrections to occur. As
yet, however, it is less clear exactly what these circum-
stances are, or what the crucial visual input is. Clearly, more
work will be needed in order to elucidate the respective
roles of visual feedback of the hand/target, proprioception,
and efference copy, in on-line control.
R3.2. The nature of on-line adjustments
Whereas Silveira acknowledged the need for distinct vi-
sual information in the on-line control of actions, Gaveau
& Desmurget and Revol & Prablanc raised the issue of
the nature and timing of on-line adjustments. Gaveau &
Desmurget argued that on-line corrections are, in fact,
planned, and therefore no evidence is available that two
separate processes occur. The argument for this is based
largely on evidence from the perturbation paradigm, in
which large adjustments were required (Paulignan et al.
1991a). In that study, subjects were made to grasp a target
that on some trials could be switched with another target of
larger or smaller size coincident with the onset of the move-
ment. In the case of a switch from a small to a large target,
the adjustment was paradoxical, inasmuch as, rather than
showing an immediate increase in the size of the grip aper-
ture, there was instead a brief deceleration of the opening
of the hand (see also Castiello et al. 1993; Glover et al., in
press). Paulignan et al. (1991a) took this as suggesting that
the adjustment was planned. However, such “backwards”
effects are anomalous in the perturbation literature. One
possibility is that the size perturbation paradigm is a rather
unnatural circumstance. Whereas it may be relatively com-
mon for targets to change their position after a movement
has begun (imagine potential food running away!), it is
much less common for them to change their size. Indeed,
an unfortunate coincidence of the size-perturbation para-
digm as developed by Paulignan et al. is that the target
changes quite drastically, not only in size, but in the verti-
cal position at which it can be grasped (a narrow cylinder –
the small target – protrudes out of a broad cylinder – the
large target – and either one or the other is lit from be-
neath). The small target is therefore grasped at a higher ver-
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tical position than the large target. Hence, the apparent re-
planning of the movement seen in this case need not be
considered as representative of control in a more “natural”
setting. An experiment using virtual reality could address
this issue by maintaining a constant vertical height (reach-
ing component) while manipulating target size (grasping
component).
Even if one is convinced that control involves some ad-
vance planning, this is not at all troublesome for the plan-
ning–control model. Rather, what the model emphasizes is
the existence of distinct visual and cognitive inputs into the
two stages, not that the outputs of the two stages must nec-
essarily be implemented in fundamentally different ways.
One could easily argue that whereas both are pre-planned,
the “planning” system uses a much richer and detailed vi-
sual representation than the “control” system.
R4. Evolution, neurophysiology, and development
Although the issue of evolution is an interesting one, I did
not delve into it in the target article as much as I would have
liked because of space restrictions. Goodale & Milner ar-
gue that biological continuity should be supposed until ev-
idence suggests otherwise; but, in fact, the evidence already
does suggest otherwise – quite dramatically so (Kolb &
Whishaw 1995; Tootell et al. 2003; Van Essen et al. 2001;
Zeki 1993; 2003). Indeed, given that macaques belong to a
different biological family (Cercopithecidae) than humans
(Hominidae), and that the two families diverged tens of mil-
lions of years ago, is it really sensible to assume that macaques
and humans have very similar brains? Instead, I think the
question really should be: Where do we draw the line? How
much of what goes on in the macaque brain should we as-
sume also goes on in the human brain? And just as impor-
tant, when similar processes exist, should we assume that the
same processes go on in the same place in both brains?
R4.1. Humans are not scaled-up macaques
In the target article, I argued that given the differences be-
tween humans and macaques, both neurological and be-
havioural, strong parallels should not be drawn between the
two species. For one, the human parietal lobes have ex-
panded considerably compared with the macaque, and this
is evident in the expansion of visual areas in the human
brain relative to the macaque – this expansion is especially
apparent in “higher order” visual areas such as exist in the
parietal lobes (Van Essen et al. 2001). For another, the hu-
man IPL seems to be important in the human propensity
for tool use, and hence should play an important part in
planning as well. The macaque parietal lobes have no such
area that seems critical for tool use, in contrast; thus there
exists at least one fundamental difference in how the two
species plan actions. Similarly, as pointed out by Kawai,
macaques show no evidence of advance planning, and
therefore one can only conclude that the planning regions
of the macaque brain are relatively undeveloped as com-
pared to the planning regions of the human brain (or, for
that matter, the chimpanzee). It is indeed notable that avail-
able evidence suggests that macaques do not plan even sim-
ple reaching and grasping actions in the way that humans
do (Fogassi et al. 1991). Whereas humans scale their move-
ments to the size and distance of a target (Jeannerod 1984),
macaques do not.
R4.2. The evolution of planning
Kawai makes an interesting behavioural contribution to
this argument by showing that certain planning processes
go on in chimpanzees as they do in humans, but are not ap-
parent in macaques. In his commentary, he explains how
chimpanzees (another member of the Hominidae family)
appear to be aware of the consequences of future actions
and to be able to plan accordingly, a skill that humans also
develop quite early in life. Macaques, however, have never
been shown to possess this skill. The evolution of such skill
clearly shows that humans and macaques differ more so,
than do humans and chimpanzees, but what does this im-
ply about how macaques and humans plan their actions?
There has long been evidence of pre-movement kine-
matic planning in the brains of macaques (e.g., Gentilucci
et al. 1988; Kettner et al. 1996). Generally speaking, activ-
ity in the frontal lobes of the macaque follows a progression
from rostral to caudal as movement initiation looms (e.g.,
Crammond & Kalaska 1996; Godschalk et al. 1981). Given
the consequences of damage to various regions of the
frontal lobes in humans, one may assume a general similar-
ity across species, though the human system is clearly more
elaborate. Damage to more rostral regions of the frontal
lobes in humans impairs planning in the longer term – in
the case of the “frontal syndrome,” linked with damage to
the prefrontal cortex, this may be evident over the course
of a day’s errands (Shallice & Burgess 1991). In contrast,
damage to more caudal areas such as the premotor and sup-
plementary motor cortex tends to lead to more immediate
planning deficits; deficits in the sequencing of actions
(Heilman & Gonzalez Rothi 1993).
R4.3. Differences across species
What makes humans and macaques different? For one, it
appears that laterality largely evolved with the human brain.
This laterality is the most obvious in functions that are
(more or less) uniquely human, such as language, which is
strongly left-lateralized (Kimura 1979). However, it is also
evident in functions that would appear to be more basic. A
deficit in the seemingly basic function of attention is man-
ifest in humans as unilateral neglect. Neglect tends to fol-
low damage to the right hemisphere in humans, most often
including the right IPL and temporal-parietal junction
(Bisiach & Vallar 1988). Although Rizzolatti and his col-
leagues have proposed a neglect syndrome in the macaque
(Rizzolatti & Berti 1990; Rizzolatti et al. 1983), this differs
from the human syndrome of neglect in at least two ways:
First, the macaque version of neglect is strictly motor, char-
acterized by a hypokinesia of movement into the contrale-
sional hemispace. Second, whereas the human version is
most common following damage to the parietal lobes,
macaque “neglect” follows damage to the frontal lobes. An-
other deficit following damage to the IPL is ideomotor
apraxia, described in the target article. This deficit follows
damage to the left hemisphere, most often including the
left IPL (Heilman & Gonzalez Rothi 1993). As of yet, there
is not even the remotest candidate for a macaque model of
ideomotor apraxia.
What is even more interesting is that the monkey model
for optic ataxia, though often touted as evidence that hu-
mans and macaques have very similar dorsal streams, is in
fact an approximate model at best. Whereas humans with
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optic ataxia most often show a visual field and a hand effect
(wherein damage affects movements in the contralateral vi-
sual field and executed with the contralesional hand), mon-
keys tend to show only a hand effect (Jeannerod 1988). Fur-
ther, macaques tend to make errors in the direction of the
lesion, regardless of target position (Lamotte & Acuna
1978), whereas humans tend to show errors towards fixa-
tion. Further, monkeys with optic ataxia generally are more
accurate when visual feedback is available than when it is
not (Lamotte & Acuña 1978; but see Rushworth et al.
1997a). Conversely, humans with optic ataxia may be
equally inaccurate regardless of whether or not visual feed-
back is available (Jakobson et al. 1991; Perenin & Vighetto
1983), and are sometimes even worse when visual feedback
is available (Buxbaum & Coslett 1997; Damasio & Benton
1979).
Despite these differences, much has been made of the
properties of cells in the monkey posterior parietal cortex,
and given that macaques show deficits in action that are at
least coarsely similar to those seen in humans with optic
ataxia, these studies are of interest. However, many of those
who study macaque vision have cautioned against drawing
clear links between human and macaque vision (e.g.,
Tootell et al. 2003; Van Essen et al. 1993; Zeki 1993; 2003);
and arguing for human homologues of areas in the macaque
that differ both functionally and neurologically, appears to
me to be considering the problem a bit too simplistically.
R4.4. The neurophysiology of planning and control
Putting aside the clear differences across species, I find it
interesting to consider the monkey data when it comes to
the planning and control of goal-directed movements, as
the characteristics of the planning and control of kinemat-
ics are the main point of contention between the planning–
control and perception–action models. According to the
planning–control model, different areas of the brain ought
to be involved in the two stages of action; according to the
perception–action model, both planning and control
should be represented uniformly within the dorsal stream.
Many cells in the monkey parietal cortex respond differ-
entially prior to movement initiation (i.e., during planning)
versus its execution (i.e., during control). For example, 
the Fattori et al. (2001) study, discussed by Battaglini,
Bernardis & Bruno (Battaglini et al.), showed that
whereas only 30% of responsive cells in the macaque area
V6A were active during the planning phase, a much greater
percentage (70%) were active during the control phase.
This represents a significant change in activity related to
the two stages of action. Similarly, Johnson et al. (1996) ob-
served greater activity in cells in the superior parietal lobe
(SPL) during execution, whereas cells in more lateral areas
of the parietal lobe showed greater activity during the pre-
movement (planning) phase. Therefore, even if one insists
on holding to the biological continuity belief, as Goodale
& Milner seem to, there appears to be a ventral-dorsal
gradient of activity between planning and control even in
the macaque.
R4.5. Ontogeny follows phylogeny
Not only phylogeny but ontogeny is instructive when it
comes to planning and control, as Káldy & Kovács point
out. The study described by DeLoache is an excellent ex-
ample of the immaturity of the planning system early in life.
This follows the principle that more recently evolved sys-
tems tend to develop later in life. DeLoache and her col-
leagues observed that children presented with scaled down
versions of real objects (e.g., a toy car) often attempt to in-
teract with the object as if it were its usual size. Surprisingly,
the actual movements made towards the scaled-down ver-
sion acknowledge the real spatial characteristics of the tar-
get, such that a child who tries to get into a toy car will ac-
tually grasp the toy door accurately despite the insensibility
of the entire act! The fact that the children not only make
scale errors in movement selection, but then go on to exe-
cute the same movements with splendid precision, nicely il-
lustrates the dissociation between planning and control. It
can be argued from this that the planning process likely ma-
tures at a later date than the control process in humans, just
as it seems to have evolved later in evolution along the pri-
mate lineage.
R5. Visual illusions and context in action
A number of commentators discussed the effects of visual
illusions on action, and this is not surprising given the
amount of research that is being conducted in this area, and
the controversy that has arisen. Table R1 summarizes the
various interpretations of this research and the predictions
that follow.
R5.1. Evaluating models of illusions and action
How to evaluate these numerous models? In one sense,
they each postulate a dissociation between illusory and non-
illusory visual information (with the exception of the com-
mon representation model, which postulates no such disso-
ciation). The question is under what circumstances illusions
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Table R1. Illusions and actions: Models and predictions
Contrast Predictions Basic References
Planning vs. Illusions affect Glover & Dixon 
Control planning of actions (2001a)
but are corrected Glover (2002)
on-line
Perception vs. Illusions have small Bridgeman et al. 
Action or nonexistent (1979)
effects  on actions Aglioti et al. (1995)
Absolute vs. Illusions affect relative Vishton et al. (1999)
Relative judgments but not Bruno (2001)
absolute judgments
Common  Illusions affect both Franz (2001)
Represen- perceptions and Franz et al. (2001)
tation actions equally
Task Demands Illusions affect actions Brenner & Smeets 
when they utilize the (1996)
affected characteristic 
Allocentric/ Illusions affect actions Daprati & Gentilucci 
Egocentric more, the less – or (1997)
less recent – visual Gentilucci et al. 
information is (1996)
available 
should affect actions and why. It is clear from Table 2 in the
target article that illusions often do have effects on action,
and any simple interpretation based on a perception-action
dissociation, with illusions affecting the former and not the
latter, must therefore be incorrect as Coello & Rossetti
point out. However, there are ways in which the percep-
tion–action model may be reincarnated to accommodate
these findings (e.g., Carey 2001), through invoking numer-
ous “interactions” between perception and action. In cases
where illusions have effects on action, this is said to be be-
cause the “perception” system is being used to guide the ac-
tion on account of some inherent limitation of the action
system.
A problem with most of the other models is that they
seem to explain only the data with which they are presented
(e.g., the absolute/relative model, the allocentric/egocen-
tric model), without any attempt to integrate their predic-
tions with the results of the broad wealth of studies on illu-
sions and actions. For example, how would any of these
models explain the dynamic illusion effect, in which illu-
sions have large effects early in a trajectory that dissipate as
the hand approaches the target? In both cases, there must
be presumed a shift between a relative/allocentric repre-
sentation and an absolute/egocentric representation during
the course of the movement. Of course, this is analogous to
what the planning–control model already holds, thus mak-
ing these explanations redundant.
The task demands model (e.g., Brenner & Smeets 1996),
advocated in the commentary of Brouwer, Brenner &
Smeets (Brouwer et al.), attempts to explain the dynamic
illusion effect as resulting from a crossover of sorts between
the visual information used when the trajectory is initiated,
and the visual information used to guide the hand to the tar-
get. For each case of the dynamic illusion effect, there is a
new way of modelling how the effects might be observed in
a way consistent with the task demands model (Smeets et
al. 2002; 2003). As a consequence, the task demands model
becomes increasingly cumbersome and ad hoc.
One might criticize the planning–control model for not
explaining the entire set of results presented in Table 2 of
the target article. Indeed, it is hard to deflect this criticism
if only because many of the results contradict one another.
For example, Aglioti et al. (1995) found significant effects
of the Ebbinghaus illusion on grasping, as did Franz et al.
(2000) and Glover and Dixon (2002a), whereas Haffenden
and Goodale (1998; Haffenden et al. 2001) do not. It is
therefore not surprising that a model has difficulty accom-
modating 100% of the results of such studies; this is what
makes the area controversial. The question then becomes:
Why are these results so contradictory? The ensuing sec-
tion will attempt to address this issue with respect to the dy-
namic illusion effect.
R5.2. The dynamic illusion effect depends on (proper)
methodology
Goodale & Milner, Elliott & Meegan, and Franz have
criticized the dynamic illusion effect (Glover & Dixon
2001a; 2001b; 2001c; 2002a) by arguing that an analysis of
their own data does not show these effects. However, a
careful examination of their methods leads one to question
this assertion. For example, Danckert et al. (2002 – cited
by Goodale & Milner) reported no evidence that the ef-
fect of the Ebbinghaus illusion on grasping changed over
time, except in one case in which the effect actually seemed
to increase over time! Why did they find this result and not
the dynamic illusion effect found by Glover and Dixon
(2002a) using the very same illusion?
One very good reason, already alluded to in section 2.6.7
of the target article, is that Danckert et al. did not scale the
illusion effect by the relevant parameter relating grip size
to target size. This is absolutely vital in determining the real
impact of the illusion over time. This can be made clear if
one considers what a “raw” illusion effect really represents.
For instance, when the hand is at rest prior to beginning a
trial, one would expect to see no effect of either the size of
the target or of the illusion on the size of the grip aperture.
As the hand begins its movement towards the target, the ef-
fect of target size on grip aperture slowly and gradually in-
creases until the target is grasped (Glover & Dixon 2002a;
2002b). Given the gradual evolution of this target-grip size
effect, there is no reason to expect a large raw illusion ef-
fect early in the movement. Rather, one would expect the
illusion effect to evolve gradually along with the effect of
target size. One would not expect the hand to suddenly
open very quickly (for a “large” illusion) at the outset of the
movement, or remain completely closed (for a “small” illu-
sion) at the outset of the movement simply because of the
presence of the illusion. Instead, the effects of the illusion
and the effects of target size should both evolve over
roughly the same time course.
Therefore, the correct way to measure the impact of the
illusion over time is to scale it by the effect of the actual size
of the target (Franz 2003; Franz et al. 2000; 2001; Glover
& Dixon 2001a; 2001b; 2001c; 2002a). One may do this
most correctly by using Fieller’s theorem, as advocated by
Franz, although it seems unlikely from Franz’s Figure 1
that this will make a significant difference to using the
method of Glover and Dixon (2001a; 2001b; 2001c; 2002a)
at any time point other than 0% MT (movement time).
Another shortcoming of the Danckert et al. study is the
lack of any power analysis. If one is going to argue on the
basis of a null effect, as Danckert et al. do, then one must
at least prove that there existed sufficient power to detect
the effect in the first place (Cohen 1988; Loftus 1996)! A
similar argument can be made for the lack of dynamic illu-
sion effects reported by Franz and by Elliott & Meegan.
Another shortcoming of the Danckert et al. (2002) and
Franz (2003) studies is that they omit any movement period
following the maximum grip aperture (i.e., after roughly
two-thirds of the way through the reach), even though these
are the very times at which the on-line control system is
known to be most active, and in which evidence for the dy-
namic illusion effect is most likely to be observed. Their ar-
guments for this are that the hand may be contacting the
object after the maximum grip aperture is achieved, and by
then there would be no reason to expect an illusion effect
due to the influence of haptic feedback. However, there
certainly does exist a significant period of time between
when the maximum grip aperture is achieved and the tar-
get is contacted (Glover & Dixon 2002a; 2002b; Glover et
al. 2004; Jakobson & Goodale 1991; Jeannerod 1988; Wing
& Fraser 1983; Wing et al. 1986), and it is important to in-
clude measures from this period. Further, it is incorrect to
criticize the Glover and Dixon studies (Glover & Dixon
2001a; 2001b; 2001c; 2002a) for including “100%” MT, be-
cause those studies used a velocity criterion of at least 5 cen-
timeters per second forward velocity of the thumb, and thus
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the measured duration of the movement ended before the
target was contacted by the thumb, much less before the
forefinger closed around it. Indeed, even when we con-
ducted an analysis that excluded 100% MT, but retained
95% MT, a dynamic effect was still observed (Glover et al.
2004).
Other considerations include validating the normaliza-
tion procedure itself. In our studies, we always ensured
both that movement times were not affected by the direc-
tion of an illusion, and that the baseline kinematics of the
hand (i.e., acceleration, velocity) did not differ across illu-
sion conditions (we did not always report these null effects
in our papers). These considerations are important in any
normalization procedure, and a failure to meet them could
result in artifacts in the data. For example, grip aperture
normally corresponds with the distance travelled by the
hand, so that the closer the hand moves to the target, the
larger the grip (at least to the point of maximum grip aper-
ture). Therefore, if the hand (for whatever reason) moves
faster in one condition than in another, then normalizing
both together will result in a spurious effect of condition,
which is in fact an artifact of the hand’s velocity.
So what guidelines are important for examining the ef-
fects of illusions over the course of a movement? First and
foremost, the effect of the illusion (or any cognitive/per-
ceptual variable for that matter) must be scaled by the ef-
fect of the target feature it corresponds to (e.g., size) on the
effector (Franz 2003; Franz et al. 2000; 2001; Glover &
Dixon 2001a; 2001b; 2001c; 2002a; 2002b; Glover et al.
2004). The most rigorous statistical procedure for doing this
is Fieller’s theorem, as advocated by Franz. Second, the
study must possess sufficient statistical power to be able to
detect a dynamic illusion effect. This can be estimated be-
fore the study is begun, using the method given by Cohen
(1988). Third, the analysis must include as much as the
movement as possible. Finally, there must be equivalence
in movement times/kinematics across conditions of inter-
est. It is only after all of these factors have been adequately
accounted for that fair tests of the dynamic illusion effect
will be possible.
R5.3. Visual feedback and illusions
Goodale & Milner appear to agree that visual feedback
leads to smaller illusion effects on actions as compared to
when no visual feedback is available, a finding reported of-
ten throughout the literature (e.g., Gentilucci et al. 1996;
Glover & Dixon 2001c; 2002a; Glover et al. 2004; West-
wood et al. 2000c). Implicitly, then, Goodale & Milner seem
to agree that the on-line control system is able to use visual
feedback to correct for illusion effects on actions. Yet, they
then go on to argue that this does not support the plan-
ning–control model. Curiously, this runs counter to their
earlier claim that the planning of actions is “refractory” to
the visual illusion (Aglioti et al. 1995; Haffenden & Goodale
1998). Rather, it appears that having visual feedback avail-
able aids the control system in reducing or even eliminat-
ing the effects of visual illusions on actions, just as the plan-
ning–control model predicts. The comments of Goodale &
Milner in this respect therefore seem to obfuscate the issue
somewhat, though I am sure this was not their intention.
Vishton expresses surprise that the effects of visual illu-
sions on action can be corrected on-line (at least partly) in
the absence of visual feedback. In two studies (Glover &
Dixon 2001c; 2002a), we have shown that illusions have
large effects early in a movement whether visual feedback
is available or not. However, we also observed that the ex-
tent to which the effect of the illusion dissipates over the
course of the movements depends on the presence or ab-
sence of visual feedback. Thus, when visual feedback is
available, the effect of the illusion is much less at the end of
the movement than when visual feedback is unavailable.
That the illusion effect decreases over time in the ab-
sence of visual feedback, would be surprising if visual feed-
back were the only source of information available to the
on-line control system. However, this is clearly not the case.
In the target article (sects. 2.4.1, 2.4.2, and 2.4.3), it is stated
that not only visual feedback, but also stored visual infor-
mation, proprioception, and efference copy contribute to
on-line corrections. The degree to which nonvisual sources
of information can aid the on-line control process is a mat-
ter for future research, though roles for both propriocep-
tion and efference copy in on-line control have already
been shown in the target article. Therefore, the presence of
dynamic illusion effects in the absence of visual feedback
does not imply an anomalous result. Rather, it implies that
the on-line control process does not rely on visual feedback
alone, a fact that has long been known.
R5.4. Illusions and patients
An interesting point was raised by Goodale & Milner re-
garding illusions and patients. They rightly pointed out that
visual illusions should have similar effects on the patient
D.F. (with a damaged ventral stream) as they have on nor-
mal subjects, because D.F. should not be impaired at on-
line corrections of illusion effects. This is an interesting
point, not least of which because of the unusual results re-
ported by Coello & Rossetti for the optic ataxic patient
I.G. Given that D.F. has extensive damage to her ventral
stream, it might be supposed that this prediction is too
strong, and it will be interesting to see what happens in this
respect.
Coello & Rossetti report data from the optic ataxic I.G.,
who suffered bilateral damage to the dorsal stream, includ-
ing large regions of the SPL, the intraparietal sulcus (IPS),
and a smaller portion of the IPL. I.G., incidentally, is the
same optic ataxic who showed accurate movements to sta-
tionary targets, but disrupted movements when targets
jumped (Gréa et al. 2002; Pisella et al. 2000).
Surprisingly, given the extensive damage to the dorsal
stream in I.G., she was just as affected by the induced
Roelofs’ effect as were healthy controls. Specifically, when
the target position was varied along the sagittal plane, both
I.G. and controls were affected by the illusion. Conversely,
when the target position was varied along the frontal-paral-
lel plane, neither I.G. nor controls were affected.
There are two possible interpretations of this result. One,
offered by Coello & Rossetti, is that both I.G. and con-
trols use their ventral (sic) stream to plan movements, and
thus both have similar effects. A second possibility is that
I.G. has spared capacities in her dorsal stream that allow
her to correct for the illusion on-line, just as controls do. Of
these two possibilities, I would favor Coello & Rossetti’s
view, although it would certainly be interesting to see these
experiments repeated with other patients, and to try to lo-
calize exactly what area(s) are responsible for susceptibility/
immunity to illusion effects on action, and in particular with
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respect to the evolution of such effects over the course of a
movement. Similarly, transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) may be used to selectively “knock out” the planning
or control visual representations and gauge the effects of
this on how the motor system responds to visual illusions,
as was suggested by van Donkelaar & Dassonville.
R5.5. Context in planning and control
Other arguments regarding the planning–control model
criticize the supposition that the context does not affect con-
trol. Coello & Rossetti describe data that demonstrates,
rather compellingly, that the context can indeed have an im-
pact on actions. When movements are made in a structured
environment, they are much more accurate than movements
made in an otherwise empty environment (e.g., Coello &
Magne 2000; Magne & Coello 2002). Further, Coello & Ros-
setti show that the benefits of a structured visual environ-
ment are present both during the planning and the control
phase. Adam & Keulen make similar arguments regarding
the role of the context in on-line control, arguing that con-
textual objects must still be processed while the movement
is underway in order for obstacles to be avoided. Indeed, the
lack of an effect of context per se on on-line control would
seem to be disproved by these studies. Therefore, the model
would seem to require modification.
The simplest way of doing this is to suppose that the con-
textual figures and objects influence only planning with re-
spect to how they affect the processing of the relevant tar-
get characteristics. That is, when a contextual figure/object
induces a visual illusion, this affects planning but not con-
trol. However, the context in general can affect both plan-
ning and control with regard to obstacle avoidance, and
possibly may also have beneficial effects on target localiza-
tion. Whether, and to what extent, the effects of non-illu-
sion-inducing context are similar for planning and control,
remains to be seen.
R6. Recent brain imaging studies of action:
Planning versus control
Goodale & Milner criticize the target article for not citing
a number of recent fMRI studies on action. Although it is
true that I did not discuss these studies in detail, there is a
good reason for this. Very few of these studies actually ad-
dress the distinction between planning and control.
For example, the recent fMRI study by Culham et al.
(2003) described by Goodale & Milner showed that both
the SPL and an anterior region of the intraparietal sulcus
(IPS) was activated during both reaching and grasping, but
that the IPS was more active during grasping than during
reaching. Further to this, areas in the frontal eye fields, oc-
cipital lobes, motor cortex, cingulate, and parietal-occipital
region were also more active during grasping than during
reaching. The effects of grasping in activating the anterior
IPS were similar to those reported by Binkofski et al.
(1998). Quite aside from some methodological issues I have
with the Culham et al. study, it is unclear how that study ad-
dresses the issue of planning versus control.
R6.1. Is the IPS special for anything?
The results of Culham et al. (2003), as described by
Goodale & Milner, seem to suggest that the anterior in-
traparietal sulcus (aIPS) is involved in action, and, in par-
ticular, grasping. This in turn seems to imply a human ho-
mologue for the macaque region aIPS involved in grasping
(Taira et al. 1990). However, these results say little about
whether the IPS/SPL is involved in planning, control, or
both stages of action. Given the speeded nature of the task
(reaching out to touch or to grasp objects as soon as they ap-
peared), it is unlikely that subjects had much time to plan
their movements. As movement times were not recorded,
one can only assume they were at least equivalent to reac-
tion times in a speeded task such as this one. Thus, it is not
clear from this study whether IPS/SPL activity was related
to planning, control, or both.
Another interesting point about the Culham et al. study
is that the IPS was also activated, along with vast regions of
the parietal lobes, during the so-called perception task (in
particular, in the condition where scrambled images were
used). Activation of the macaque IPS during perceptual
judgment tasks has also been observed by Tsutsui et al.
(2003). Culham et al. explained this as possibly arising as a
result of task difficulty, but if this were the case, one must
also wonder whether grasping an object as quickly as possi-
ble (while lying supine in a noisy scanner) is more difficult
than simply pointing to it. If so, this might account for ac-
tivity in the IPS during grasping that was less prevalent dur-
ing reaching.
Indeed, a casual examination of the literature shows the
IPS to be activated during a number of seemingly unrelated
tasks. For example, the IPS has recently been shown to be
more active during: (1) judgments of stimulus intensity ver-
sus judgments of stimulus duration (Ferrandez et al. 2003);
(2) number versus letter or color processing (Eger et al.
2003); (3) motion perception versus rest (Dupont et al.
2003; Pelphrey et al. 2003); (4) comparisons of quantity ver-
sus rest (Fias et al. 2003); (5) demanding versus simple vi-
sual search (Coull et al. 2003; Imaruoka et al. 2003; Poll-
mann et al. 2003); and (6) dual-task versus single-task
performance (Szameitat et al. 2003). The last four of these
in particular could quite sensibly be interpreted as effects
of task difficulty, and the last two could hardly be inter-
preted in any other way. One must therefore exercise cau-
tion before implicating the IPS in grasping versus reaching,
regardless of what this implies for the planning–control
model.
Another concern with interpreting effects in the IPS also
relates to the vast numbers of seemingly unrelated tasks
that activate it. Given the amount of tissue this region com-
prises and the depth of the sulcus itself, such effects might
simply reflect a large amount of densely packed tissue for
which any increase in activity is magnified in the analysis.
One must therefore exercise caution in interpreting activa-
tions of the IPS in brain imaging studies.
R6.2. Planning and control in fMRI
A recent fMRI study that did address the planning–control
issue was carried out by Astafiev et al. (2003). In this study,
subjects lie supine in an fMRI scanner while being pre-
sented with a cue followed two seconds later by a target. In
three conditions subjects either: (1) covertly attended to
the location indicated by the cue; (2) prepared a saccade to
the location indicated by the cue, then executed the saccade
to the target when it appeared; or (3) prepared a pointing
movement to the location indicated by the cue, then exe-
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cuted the pointing movement to the target when it ap-
peared.
When evaluating the planning–control model, the para-
digm employed by Astafiev et al. (2003) has two main ad-
vantages over the immediate reaching and/or grasping tasks
typically used by Goodale and his colleagues. First, the im-
position of a two-second delay between cue and target pre-
sentation ensures that the scan captures mainly the plan-
ning phase rather than some combination of planning and
control weighted (somewhat obscurely) towards the control
phase that results when subjects have to move immediately
on presentation of the target. Second, the inclusion of an
“attention” condition allows one to control for the atten-
tional demands of the tasks.
As was observed for the PET studies described in the tar-
get article (Deiber et al. 1996; Grafton et al. 1998) and else-
where (Corbetta et al. 1993; 1996; Haxby et al. 1994; Jovi-
cich et al. 2001; Nobre et al. 1997), high attentional
demands tended to activate the SPL in the Astafiev et al.
(2003) study. However, when activity in the attention con-
dition was subtracted from activity in the pointing condi-
tion, the main areas of activation included the angular gyrus
of the IPL, the superior temporal sulcus (another putative
“third stream” area), and a region straddling the IPL and
IPS. Although a general increase in SPL activity was pre-
sent in both the attention and pointing conditions, it did not
significantly differ across conditions, suggesting that the at-
tentional demands of the pointing task were the cause of the
increase.
Similar effects of attention were reported by Adam &
Keulen (Adam et al. 2003). In their study’s task, a precue
was used to isolate planning processes. The presence of the
cue led to activity throughout the planning network (and in-
cluding the IPL), though some activation also occurred in
the SPL, presumably due to the attentional demands of the
task.
Future fMRI studies aimed at comparing the planning–
control and perception–action models will need to consider
at least two factors. First, these studies will need to care-
fully distinguish the action from the attention components
of the activation. This can most easily be done by including
an “attention” condition in which subjects need only attend
to the target, not direct a movement to it (Astafiev et al.
2003). Second, researchers must be aware of the con-
straints imposed by their tasks. For example, it should be
kept in mind that immediate movements tend to emphasize
the control phase of the task and should thus lead to activ-
ity in the SPL and possibly the IPS. Conversely, including
preparation periods should tend to activate the IPL more
strongly, as has already been observed in both PET (Deiber
et al. 1996; Grafton et al. 1998) and fMRI studies (Adam et
al. 2003; Astafiev et al. 2003).
R7. Evidence from human neuropsychology
Many commentators discussed the issue of planning and
control with regard to human neuropsychology. These dis-
cussions can be divided into three main categories: optic
ataxia, apraxia, and the basal ganglia.
R7.1. Optic ataxia
Goodale & Milner, Newport et al., and Gentilucci &
Chieffi have pointed out results obtained from patients
with optic ataxia that seem to contradict the planning–con-
trol model. The model holds that optic ataxia, commonly
found after damage to the SPL/IPS control system, should
lead to deficits in on-line control with a concomitant lack of
effects on planning. One prediction of this is that an optic
ataxic will have a relatively intact movement trajectory early
in the action, but that errors will arise as the movement un-
folds. Evidence in favor of this view comes from studies
showing errors in grip formation that largely arise late in the
movement (Binkofski et al. 1998; Jakobson et al. 1991; Jean-
nerod 1986); from the fact that optic ataxics are more im-
paired in peripheral vision than in central vision (e.g.,
Perenin & Vighetto 1983; 1988); that an optic ataxic was im-
paired at manual tracking but not pointing to stationary tar-
gets (Ferro 1984); and that an optic ataxic is near normal at
pointing or grasping stationary targets, but shows a severe
impairment when the position of the target is perturbed co-
incident with movement initiation (Gréa et al. 2002; Pisella
et al. 2000).
Despite the wealth of evidence supporting the notion
that optic ataxia is a deficit specific to the on-line control
phase of actions (see Glover 2003, for a review; also see
Rossetti et al. 2003), there are recent data described by the
commentators that appear to contradict this view.
R7.1.1. Directional errors in optic ataxia. Commentators
Goodale & Milner discuss an article by Milner et al.
(2003) in which an optic ataxic was shown to make errors in
direction from the outset of a movement. Similar results
were described by Newport et al. (see Jackson et al. 2004),
and by Gentilucci & Chieffi. As the data reported by Gen-
tilucci & Chieffi have not been published, I will focus my
discussion on Milner et al. (2003) and Jackson et al. (2004).
Milner et al. (2003) report the trajectories of two patients
with optic ataxia, I.G. and A.T. Both patients suffered ex-
tensive bilateral damage to the SPL and neighboring IPS,
and some damage to the adjacent angular gyrus of the IPL.
When these patients were tested for their ability to point to
targets in the visual periphery, they showed large errors, a
common finding in patients with optic ataxia (e.g., Perenin
& Vighetto 1983; 1988). Moreover, when the trajectories
were measured from the outset of the movement, these
showed errors consistent with the final error. That is, both
planning and control appeared to be impaired in pointing
to targets in the periphery.
In another interesting experiment, the target was initially
presented in one of two conditions, was removed from vi-
sion for five seconds, and then could reappear in either the
original position (a congruent trial), or in another position
(an incongruent trial). On congruent trials, both I.G. and
A.T. were accurate, suggesting that their planning system
was able to take advantage of the preview of the target’s po-
sition. However, on incongruent trials, both I.G. and A.T.
pointed in the direction of the original target, and did not
correct these errors on-line.
Newport et al. reported data from two patients, Mrs. D.
(originally described by Carey et al. 1997), and J.J. (de-
scribed by Jackson et al. 2004). These two patients both
make errors in pointing towards fixation. Further, both Mrs.
D. and J.J. made errors from the outset of the movement.
Both of these patients suffered extensive damage to the
SPL, the IPS, and adjacent regions of the IPL.
Although the directional errors early in the trajectory of
these patients are clear evidence of a planning deficit, I do
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not believe that this provides evidence against the plan-
ning–control model. Rather, there are at least two good rea-
sons to suspect that these patients suffer from severe
deficits in on-line control, as well as a relatively minor
deficit in action planning.
R7.1.2. Direction coding in the IPL? The first reason re-
lates to the anatomical loci of the patients’ lesions. In all
cases, the patients were reported to have large lesions of the
SPL and IPS (the control system), but also lesions of the an-
gular gyrus in the IPL. Given that the IPL plays a major role
in action planning, it is difficult to accept the argument of
Newport et al. that the planning centers have been
“spared.” Rather, it would appear that the planning system
(IPL) was slightly damaged in these patients, though much
less so than was the on-line control system. Indeed, one
might note that neglect patients, with damage typically cen-
tered on the right IPL, often make directional errors early
in the trajectory. However, these errors are corrected on-
line, presumably because of the spared SPL (e.g., Edwards
& Humphreys 1999).
One fact not acknowledged by the commentators was
that the directional errors made by the optic ataxics were
not only present early in the movement, but were not cor-
rected on-line at all, even in the presence of visual feed-
back. For example, the optic ataxic Mrs. D. (Fig. 1 of New-
port et al.) exhibited a consistent leftward deviation in the
original heading of her movements, but these movements
then became redirected (often reversing direction) towards
fixation. This shows a clear distinction between planning
and control phases, because the planning phase exhibited a
leftward deviation, and the control phase exhibited a hon-
ing error towards the point of fixation. Further, the optic
ataxics I.G. and A.T. both made significant directional er-
rors in the early portion of the trajectory when pointing to
the incongruent targets, but there is also little evidence of
any on-line correction in these movements (Milner et al.
2003).
Another thing I find interesting about these patients’
deficits is that whereas they all show directional errors in
planning, there appear to be few if any amplitude errors (in-
cidentally, it is also interesting that the optic ataxic I.G. had
the same susceptibility to the induced Roelofs effect (IRE)
as control subjects along both the directional and amplitude
dimensions – see Coello & Rossetti). Given that the dis-
tinction between distance and direction coding has long
been known (Rosenbaum 1980), these data suggest the in-
triguing possibility that the angular gyrus codes the direc-
tion component of reaching movements, but that the am-
plitude component may be coded elsewhere in the IPL.
This possibility might be examined in a brain imaging ex-
periment in which targets vary either along the directional
(i.e., left to right) or distance (i.e., near to far) planes. The
data from patients with optic ataxia suggests that the direc-
tional task would be associated with activity in the angular
gyrus, whereas the distance task ought to be associated with
a separate region of the IPL.
R7.1.3. Much ado about directional errors. Although the
commentators make much of directional errors in optic
ataxics, this would appear to be practically the only evi-
dence against an interpretation of optic ataxia as a deficit
specific to the on-line control of actions. Therefore, the
second reason for doubting that directional errors early in
the trajectory of optic ataxics’ pointing movements refutes
the planning–control model relates to the wealth of evi-
dence showing that these patients are indeed mostly im-
paired at on-line control, with relatively intact planning sys-
tems. For example, I.G., who shows directional errors early
in pointing to targets in the visual periphery, shows no such
errors in pointing to targets in foveal vision. Further, she
shows a greatly exaggerated error when pointing to a target
that changes position coincident with the onset of the
movement (Pisella et al. 2000). She also shows large errors
in grasping targets that change position at movement onset,
completing first a movement towards the original position
of the target, then a secondary movement to the new target
position (Gréa et al. 2002).
In sum then, the evidence of directional errors in pa-
tients with optic ataxia does not pose a problem for the plan-
ning–control model, because this model is based on an
anatomical distinction between the IPL and planning on
the one hand, and the SPL/IPS and control, on the other.
Whereas optic ataxia is associated to damage to the latter
region, in the cases of optic ataxics showing directional er-
rors early in the trajectory, there is a consistent involvement
of the angular gyrus of the IPL (i.e., of the planning system).
The commentators seem to be assuming that all optic
ataxics have damage restricted to the control regions, and
that none should show any errors in planning. Again, more
careful correlations of the anatomical locus of brain dam-
age with the resulting behavioural deficits are necessary be-
fore strong conclusions can be drawn. However frustrating
it is for researchers that brain damage does not often re-
strict itself to isolable anatomical regions, it is a factor that
must be considered.
R7.2. The apraxias
Goodale & Milner and Ramenzoni & Riley contest the
identification of the planning system with apraxia, suggest-
ing that it is much too simplistic. Johnson-Frey and
Coslett & Buxbaum argue that the apraxia can also be as-
sociated with damage to the SPL, suggesting a wider distri-
bution of the planning system. Before addressing these is-
sues, I will first reiterate my view. In the planning–control
model, planning involves regions of the frontal lobes, the
basal ganglia, and the IPL. It is, in my opinion, beyond co-
incidence that damage to the frontal lobes or IPL often
leads to various forms of apraxia, and that many of these can
be equated with deficits in various aspects of planning.
However, this is not the same as saying that every patient
with apraxia should present the exact same deficit in plan-
ning, or that planning is a single, monolithic system, or that
apraxia only follows damage to the IPL. Rather, one must
again use caution in interpreting the results from human
neuropsychology because of the propensity for naturally oc-
curring lesions to disrespect our scientifically imposed
anatomical boundaries.
The target article describes two of the many variants of
apraxia, ideational apraxia (a deficit in action selection, sect.
4.3), and ideomotor apraxia (a deficit in executing learned
actions, sect. 4.1). Each of these syndromes represents
damage to different regions of the planning system, a
frontal region involved in action selection, and a posterior
region involved in kinematics. Similarly, I also describe
Parkinson’s disease as reflecting a deficit in action planning
(hypokinesia).
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However, many commentators have nevertheless argued
that the planning system as I describe it, is monolithic and
thus incomplete. Clearly this is not what was implied in the
discussion of the consequences of damage to the various
brain regions implicated in planning. Again, I can appreci-
ate that the planning system is very complex and does not
lend itself easily to simple descriptions or simple flow-
charts. In this respect then, the commentators are correct.
However, in a broader perspective, this means only that the
planning system needs fleshing out (hard to do in a single
article, even in BBS!).
Nevertheless, some interesting comments were provided
on the topic of apraxia, and these deserve discussion. For
example, Longo & Bertenthal argue that there are many
instances in which apraxics perform better when the target
object(s) are present than when they must simply pan-
tomime actions in the absence of the target object(s). It is
hard to imagine how this contradicts the planning–control
model. Another argument raised by Longo & Bertenthal is
that patients with “pantomime agnosia” are able to imitate
gestures they are unable to recognize. This also does not
contradict the planning–control model, because the model
says nothing about how actions are recognized.
Coslett & Buxbaum argue that the planning–control
model is not consistent with at least two findings relating to
apraxics. For one, they argue that the model would not pre-
dict difficulty in learning new gestures (Gonzalez Rothi &
Heilman 1984). It is again unclear how this is inconsistent
with the model, given that the planning system is said to rely
heavily on memories of past experience, and that vi-
suokinesthetic engrams (plans) are stored in the IPL. The
finding that apraxics often have difficulty in learning new
gestures is therefore entirely consistent with the planning–
control model.
The second point of contention raised by Coslett &
Buxbaum is that the planning–control model would not
predict the commonly observed dissociations between per-
formance on transitive and intransitive gestures. In partic-
ular, it appears that the left IPL may be less critical for the
performance of intransitive gestures than it is for the per-
formance of transitive gestures. However, this assumes that
damage to the left IPL, in the planning–control model,
would result in a complete inability to plan any action,
which was never suggested in the target article. Rather, I
posit that the IPL is but one part (albeit an important one)
of a greater planning system. My reason for focusing on the
role of the IPL in planning was mainly to contrast it with
the role of the SPL/IPS in control.
To summarize, the commentators have clearly added to
the discussion by illustrating that planning cannot be
viewed as a simple system. This should stimulate much
work on the organization and function of the various com-
ponents of the planning system. On the other hand, it is not
clear how such dissociations between different aspects of
planning contradict the planning–control model.
R7.3. Basal ganglia in planning versus control
The planning–control model holds that the basal ganglia is
a part of the planning system. However, both Gaveau &
Desmurget and Vaillancourt et al. commented on the
possible role of the basal ganglia in on-line control, and
these comments seem to suggest the need to clarify and
perhaps modify the model somewhat.
First, it is not true that the distinction between planning
and control means that both operate in complete isolation
of the other. Thus, whereas many errors in planning can be
corrected on-line, assuming an intact control system, a cer-
tain type of error may affect planning as well. One way in
which the two systems overlap is in the provision and use of
the efference copy. An efference copy is akin to a blueprint
of a motor plan used by the control system in the on-line
correction process. The control system uses this efference
copy to encode the goal of the task, which it then fulfils us-
ing a combination of visual and proprioceptive information.
In this sense, then, control relies on planning to provide an
adequate efference copy. If such an adequate representa-
tion of the movement goal is not produced by the planning
system, then the control system will be unable to complete
its task.
Such a deficit appears to arise from damage to the basal
ganglia, a planning center. Consequences of damage to the
basal ganglia can include Huntingdon’s disease, in which
patients show an impairment in making on-line corrections
(Smith et al. 2000). It is possible that this reflects a deficit
in the planning system through an inability to produce an
accurate efference copy of the movement, although the
deficits in coding sensory input on-line would seem to sug-
gest a role of the basal ganglia in the control phase as well.
Vaillancourt et al. argue that the distinct kinematic pro-
files of Parkinson’s patients with or without visual feedback
reflects a role of the basal ganglia in on-line control. Specif-
ically, when visual feedback is available, Parkinson’s pa-
tients show a reduction in the transport phase and velocity
of their movements relative to controls. This would also
seem to implicate the basal ganglia in on-line control.
To summarize, recent findings have implicated the basal
ganglia not just in planning, as posited in the target article,
but also in on-line control. It appears then that the plan-
ning–control model may require modification in order to
accommodate these recent findings. It may be that the
basal ganglia represents an important interface between
the planning and control systems. However, more research
will be needed to address these issues directly.
R7.4. A note on the neuropsychology of the
perception–action model
As a final comment on the neuropsychology of action, I here
address a concern with the perception–action model. I do
this because I think the evidence from neuropsychology in
favor of the perception–action model has been and contin-
ues to be scant. To illustrate this, one need only examine the
evidence for the “double dissociation” between perception
and action from human neuropsychology.
On the one hand, we may consider Goodale & Milner’s
celebrated case of D.F., who suffered extensive damage to
the ventral stream with a spared dorsal stream. Whereas
D.F. shows severe deficits in perception, consistent with
the “perception as ventral” tenet of the perception–action
model, she also shows many errors in action (see sect. 4.6
of the target article). In principle, this falsifies a strict in-
terpretation of the perception–action model based on the
ventral-dorsal stream distinction because D.F.’s dorsal
stream is spared. Her action system should therefore be in-
tact, but clearly it is not. However, once again the model is
salvaged, because D.F.’s impairments are said to arise on
those occasions when the dorsal and ventral streams must
Response/Glover: Separate visual representations in the planning and control of action
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2004) 27:1 67
interact to plan and control an action. Indeed, D.F. is held
as an instructive example as to when such interactions must
take place. Of course this assumption has the one drawback
of requiring that the model be correct in the first place.
Consider also the complementary dissociation: optic
ataxia. Patients with optic ataxia have roughly the opposite
pattern of brain damage as D.F.: a spared ventral stream but
a damaged dorsal stream. A strict interpretation of the per-
ception–action model then holds that they should have rel-
atively intact perceptions coupled with severely impaired
actions (at least actions under visual guidance). And yet
again, the strict dissociation is not upheld by the data (see
sect. 4.4 of the target article). As Rossetti et al. (2003) have
most eloquently pointed out, despite suffering damage to
large areas of the SPL and IPS, most clinical optic ataxics
have little if any trouble going about their everyday lives –
indeed much less so than D.F.! Further, many of the deficits
in visual guidance are apparent only under rather artificial
experimental conditions, such as in pointing to targets in
the visual periphery. Again, this relative sparing of abilities
related to action following damage to the dorsal stream ap-
pears very difficult to reconcile with the perception–action
model, at least without recourse to interactions.
It seems much more parsimonious to describe the pat-
tern of action deficits that arise from damage to the poste-
rior visual areas of the brain by adopting the planning–con-
trol distinction. The reader is encouraged to review section
4 of the target article for the full treatment of the argument,
only the basics of which I will reiterate here. First, action
planning, including the initial kinematic planning, involves
mainly the IPL, although it also draws information from the
ventral stream and frontal lobe regions, as well as subcorti-
cal structures. This explains why D.F. is not completely
spared in her abilities to act; rather, she has deficits in plan-
ning that can sometimes be ameliorated through a reliance
on on-line control. Conversely, visual on-line monitoring
and control involves the SPL (and possibly the neighbour-
ing IPS) along with the cerebellum. This explains why op-
tic ataxics are generally much less impaired in action than
would be predicted if actions were the domain of the dor-
sal stream alone, and that they exhibit a pattern of spared
and disrupted behaviours that are consistent with a plan-
ning–control distinction (Glover 2003; Pisella et al. 2000;
Rossetti et al. 2003).
R8. Conclusions
The planning–control model, as elucidated in the target ar-
ticle, has provoked a number of interesting and often chal-
lenging commentaries. Unfortunately, a not insubstantial
proportion of these challenges reflected misinterpreta-
tions, suggesting that the original exposition was not as clear
as it could have been. I’ve attempted to address this short-
coming in my replies. More challenging were the com-
mentaries that appeared to contradict the planning–control
model directly. The most important of these can be reiter-
ated here.
R8.1. What goes into planning and control?
Goodale & Milner argued that the planning and control
of kinematics to visible targets are both functions of the dor-
sal visual stream, and are therefore relatively immune to
cognitive or perceptual (i.e., ventral stream) processes. This
is not consistent, however, with the evidence from visual il-
lusions (e.g., Aglioti et al. 1995; Gentilucci et al. 1996;
Glover & Dixon 2001a; 2002a), semantics (e.g., Gentilucci
et al. 2000a; Glover et al. 2004), or associations in long-term
memory (Haffenden & Goodale 2000; 2002a; 2002b).
Rather, these types of effects are consistent with the notion
that planning is susceptible to interference from cognitive
and perceptual variables, whereas on-line control is not.
Others argued that the characterization of planning was
too vague, with which I generally have agreed, albeit with
the explanation that the target article was not meant as an
all-encompassing description of “planning.” Certainly some
attempt had been made to at least touch on the various
components of the planning system.
Finally, many cogent arguments were made regarding
the use of visual feedback in the control process, and con-
troversial arguments were also made regarding the time
course of the decay of the control representation. These
seem to directly challenge the notion of a gradual decay in
the control system, and I look forward to seeing further in-
vestigations of these issues.
R8.2. Visual illusions and planning versus control
A number of commentators addressed the issue of the ef-
fects of visual illusions on action planning and control.
Among the many arguments put forth are those that ques-
tion the reliability of the dynamic illusion effect. However,
in the absence of rigorous attempts to replicate the dynamic
illusion effect using sound methodology, I maintain that
such arguments are spurious. In particular, the issues of
scaling the illusion effects, employing sufficient statistical
power to detect the effects in the first place, and including
time points late in the movement need to be taken seriously.
R8.3. Evidence from brain evolution and function
Controversy arose over the assertion that the brains of
macaques and humans differ in significant ways. Although
I suspect that the differences in planning across species far
outnumber the differences in control, the evolution of the
brain, in particular as it relates to the respective common-
alities and differences between macaques and humans, is
nonetheless an important issue that must be heeded.
Several commentators contested the characterization of
planning and control with regard to human neural anatomy.
Particularly challenging are the reports that many optic
ataxics make errors not only in the final accuracy of point-
ing movements, but in the initial direction as well (Jackson
et al. 2004; Milner et al. 2003). However, in these cases,
damage had invariably extended into the angular gyrus of
the IPL, and I suggest that the angular gyrus might repre-
sent the coding of direction. Further, the planning–control
model’s IPL/SPL distinction is present in a number of stud-
ies of brain imaging (e.g., Adams et al. 2003; Astafiev et al.
2003; Deiber et al. 1996; Grafton et al. 1998; Krams et al.
1998) and neuropsychology (e.g., Clark et al. 1994; Ed-
wards & Humphreys 1999; Gréa et al. 2002; Pisella et al.
2000).
Other arguments related to the characterization of
apraxia. Mainly, these suggested that the explanation given
for apraxia was too simplistic. Certainly it is the case that to
describe and categorize the multitude of variants of apraxia
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fully requires much more space than is allotted here, and I
agree with the various commentators that the complexity of
this syndrome is beyond the present scope of the planning–
control model. Perhaps a future expansion of the model
could attempt to encompass apraxia fully.
Finally, reasoned arguments were made for including the
basal ganglia in the control system as well as the planning
system, and it appears that this may require a slight modi-
fication of the planning–control model. To this end I have
suggested that that the basal ganglia may represent an in-
terface between planning and control, and may indeed be
responsible for the transfer of the efference copy from
planning to control centers.
R8.4. Conclusions
There appear to be two main questions outstanding: First,
to what extent do planning and control rely on different vi-
sual and/or cognitive information, and exactly what infor-
mation goes into each stage? Second, what are the neural
underpinnings of planning and control, and to what extent
do these support the functional and anatomical distinctions
drawn in the target article? Other questions of interest re-
late to the phylogeny and ontogeny of planning and control,
the time course of the transformation from planning to con-
trol, and the detailed component structures of each system.
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